Part I — Situation overview

Prime Minister Péter Magyar on 16 May 2026 dismissed Bertalan Havasi, who had been communications head of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office since 2010 — throughout the entire Orbán era. On the day of the dismissal act, the relationship between Havasi and Péter Magyar also became publicly tense: Portfolio reported that Havasi, citing his six months’ salary, demanded compensation (“which, Öcsi, you will pay to the last penny”; Portfolio 16 May 2026). The next day, 17 May 2026, several members of the Fidesz group — Gergely Gulyás, Bence Tuzson, Bence Rétvári — publicly raised that the dismissal act might not necessarily be valid due to the reorganisation of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office, because it is not clear who issued it and when it appeared in the Magyar Közlöny.

Telex’s fact-check on 17 May 2026 reviewed the legal question in detail and concluded that the Fidesz argument rests on a stricter formal reading than Hungarian legal practice traditionally accepts. Péter Magyar’s response (“after 16 years they still do not understand legal craft”; 24.hu, 17 May 2026) injected political sharpness into the dispute, but did not resolve the substantive question — the precise procedure of Magyar Közlöny publication in dismissal acts.

MIAK’s reading: this is not a “Havasi case” but a precedent dispute. In the coming 4–6 weeks an estimated 150–200 leadership replacements are expected — administrative state secretaries, cabinet office heads, CEOs, members of supervisory boards. If the new government decides along the line of speed and does not establish a uniform, Magyar Közlöny-clean dismissal-appointment protocol, then in two years it will face a flood of administrative court cases and multi-billion-forint grievance-compensation rulings — paid from public money. This is the character of the problem: not a legal detail, but a budgetary and institutional risk management.

Part II — Literature-based grounding

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. Hart’s theory of primary and secondary rules (1961) holds that a legal system works if not only the primary norms regulating behaviour (e.g. “the cabinet office head must be dismissed”) but also the secondary rules — the rules of recognition, change and adjudication (who, in what form, where published, may issue such acts) — work and are followed. The Magyar Közlöny and the dismissal protocol are exactly such secondary rules. Raz’s eight principles of the rule of law — publication, stability, generality, clarity, prospective effect, observability, predictability, transparency (Raz, 1979) — give a directly applicable benchmark for the present dispute: the validity of an act is not measured by political will but by the observance of these principles. Articles 15–22 of the Fundamental Law (text in force as of 17 April 2026) directly govern the mandate order of the members of the Government, but in the case of administrative cabinet leaders it is the framework of Act XLIII of 2010 (on central state administrative organs) and Act CXCIX of 2011 (on civil servants) that applies. The detailed literature discussion can be found in section 6.4 Literature audit detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes two measurable, well-circumscribed measures for the new government to ensure the legal-status purity of the leadership replacements expected in the coming weeks.

3.1 Uniform “Leadership Handover and Dismissal Protocol” (within 30 days)

The Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office — or, in the new structure, the public-administration area of the Prime Minister’s Office — should issue within 30 days a uniform, portfolio-level model protocol for every leadership replacement. The protocol should contain at least the following elements: (1) dismissal proposal text template differentiated by the appointing authority (prime-ministerial, ministerial, government commissioner level); (2) Magyar Közlöny publication order and deadline (when the act is valid); (3) handover document list, to be signed by both the dismissed and the appointed position (the Lázár ministry’s document destruction case [see press monitor of 18 May 2026] shows why this is critical); (4) prior grievance-compensation risk assessment — for every act with potential grievance-compensation risk above 1 million HUF, mandatory countersignature by the justice minister in the spirit of G1 budgetary responsibility. The model acts of the protocol should be made public by the government, so that the press and future changes of government can also use them as templates.

3.2 “Risk list” and phased schedule (within 60 days)

Of the 150–200 expected replacements, at least 30–50 positions are tied to institutional offices enjoying constitutional guarantees (President of the Curia, President of the National Office for the Judiciary, President of the State Audit Office, MNB Governor, Constitutional Court members, President of the Competition Authority etc.; see the context attached to the 12 May 2026 Péter Magyar–Competition Authority/Prosecutor General’s Office blog). The new government cannot dismiss these: fixed-mandate offices, typically 9 years, elected by the National Assembly’s two-thirds majority; the political composition of the two-thirds election and the dismissibility / instructability of the office are two different public-law categories. The risk list for these positions describes the procedure at the next regular vacancy and respect for independence guarantees — not a dismissal template. MIAK proposes: within 60 days, the new government should draw up a “risk list” marking for each position: (a) the applicable legal basis (Fundamental Law, statute, government decree); (b) the appointing and dismissing authority; (c) the time limit and guarantee elements of the mandate; (d) the legal conditions of removal. This list is not a political document but a procedural map: the government can implement its political decisions in a structured manner on this basis, without breaching Article 26 of the Fundamental Law on judicial independence guarantees or Article 24 on Constitutional Court membership rules. The public version of the list serves transparency, the internal version act-management.

The two proposals share a common principle: political speed and rule-of-law purity are not opposites but mutually reinforcing values. The Havasi dispute shows that the error of a single detail causes days of press-level political damage; the structured protocol and risk list filter out this time and damage.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Rule-of-law quality Structured protocol → minimal grievance-compensation risk, swift valid acts The new government communicates a slower pace at the start
Budget Grievance-compensation lawsuits at 5–15 million HUF per case across 50+ cases already reach the billion-forint range; the one-off ~50–100 million HUF cost of protocol development is a fraction of this The administrative capacity required for the risk list (legal department) build-up may be delayed
Trust The precedent-clean procedure strengthens the new government’s professional, not revenge-oriented image Short-sighted political-communication criticism (“too slow”, “no change”) may damage perception

The dilemma tips over if the 30/60-day deadlines cannot be met by the cabinet — then the protocol remains a formal document, while practice may continue to disregard legal details. The proposal only works if the government communicates both values: change and rule-of-law quality as joint priorities.

Part V — Measurability and conclusion

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed performance indicators — KPIs)

We introduce the KPI shorthand for the first time here: numerical indicators which, 6/12/24 months later, will show whether the proposal is successful.

  • Number of final grievance-compensation cases from leadership dismissals: ≤ 5 / 200 cases (≤ 2.5%) within 24 months
  • Number of Magyar Közlöny corrections for dismissal acts: 0 / 200 (errors averted before publication)
  • Share of protocol-compliant dismissals: ≥ 95% (i.e. every new portfolio works according to the model protocol)
  • Share of handover document-list signatures: 100% (no “no document list” case)

5.2 Conclusion

The Havasi dispute is not the case of one man but the institutional quality test of the Hungarian change of government after 16 years. The new government must prove two things at once: that it is capable of change, and that it does not carry out the change at the expense of rule-of-law quality. The protocol- and risk-list-based approach makes this dual performance measurable.

This process activates two MIAK foundational values: transparency means that the dismissal protocol, model acts and risk list are publicly available, so that the press and future changes of government can use them as templates; accountability means that every act with grievance-compensation risk above 1 million HUF stands on a documented justice-ministerial countersignature, and this can be reconstructed ex post. The two values together make the change of government cheaper and more durable.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by media spectrum

In the liberal-left band Telex handled the case with a fact-check (“Is Bertalan Havasi’s dismissal really invalid due to the reorganisation of the Cabinet Office?”) — here the band positioned the news along dispute resolution: instead of the simple yes/no question, the focus was on clarifying the legal context. HVG and 24.hu highlighted the new prime minister’s political reaction (“Fidesz miscalculated its legal craft”; “after 16 years they still do not understand legal craft”). 444.hu focused on the legal weakness of the Fidesz argument (“the legal craft went badly wrong”).

In the public-affairs band Portfolio gave the human-financial dimension (“six months’ salary is at stake”), highlighting the direct communications tension between Havasi and Péter Magyar. This band processed the news less politically and more with institutional consequence-attention.

In the conservative band Mandiner (“Ghost-minister proposed Bertalan Havasi’s dismissal”) and Magyar Nemzet (“Péter Magyar made a big mistake, Bertalan Havasi may even receive grievance compensation”) clearly positioned this as the new government’s mistake — emphasising the invalidity of the dismissal and the expected grievance compensation. This band, however, from its own viewpoint, asked a valuable question: if the dismissal is really invalid, the Hungarian state really will pay. In MIAK’s reading this band raised a legitimate question of administrative quality — even if the political frame is revenge-coloured.

Overall: the politically divided press framing converges on a common factual base — namely that legal-status purity is a shared priority in the coming months. This common factual base is the natural distribution platform for the structured MIAK proposal.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Cabinet Office organisational change: after Péter Magyar’s ministerial oath of 12 May 2026, the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office was partly reorganised (source: Magyar Közlöny organisational decree, see press monitor of 14 May 2026, #3 — veto-right-SZMSZ blog).
  • Grievance-compensation precedent: according to Hungarian legal practice (Curia and administrative court rulings 2018–2024), in the case of dismissals issued with delayed or erroneous Magyar Közlöny publication, grievance compensation typically moves between 1–6 months’ salary.
  • Expected number of replacements in May–June 2026: 150–200, as part of the new government’s portfolio-level reorganisation (HVG 14 May 2026, investigation list, government decree package).
  • Legal basis: Act XLIII of 2010 on central state administrative organs, Act CXCIX of 2011 on civil servants, Articles 15–22 of the Fundamental Law.

6.3 Policy projections

  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — leadership handover protocol, legal-status purity, legal-relationship regulation of civil servants.
  • Justice (background material) — avoidance of administrative court cases, management of grievance-compensation risk.

6.4 Literature audit detail

6.4.1 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

According to Hart’s theory (1961), a legal system works if alongside the primary (behaviour-regulating) norms, the secondary rules — the rule of recognition, the rule of change, and the rule of adjudication — are also well defined and followed. The Magyar Közlöny and the dismissal protocol are a textbook example of the rule of change: the procedure by which a legal relationship is officially modified. If this secondary rule is breached, the validity of the primary act is also questionable. In the Havasi dispute this tension surfaces: the Fidesz argument builds on a flaw in the secondary rule (the order of publication) to question the validity of the primary act (the dismissal).

📖 Source: H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law (1961).

6.4.2 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

Raz’s rule-of-law doctrine (1979) holds that the law can fulfil its authority-justifying function if eight minimum conditions are met: publication, stability, generality, clarity, prospective effect, observability, predictability, transparency. In the Hungarian change-of-government context, publication (the Magyar Közlöny procedure), clarity (the wording of the dismissal act), and predictability (the precedent-uniform template) are especially relevant. Raz’s warning: the rule of law is not only a question of substantive justice, but also of formal consistency — independently of political motivation.

📖 Source: Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law (1979).

6.4.3 Fundamental Law of Hungary (in force as of 17 April 2026)

Article 16(3) of the Fundamental Law provides that the prime minister is elected by the National Assembly on the proposal of the head of state, and Article 16(4) that the ministers are appointed by the head of state on the proposal of the prime minister. Article 20 governs the termination of cabinet members’ mandates (resignation, dismissal, death, conflict of interest etc.). Article 22 sets out the limited powers of a caretaker government. Important: the head of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office is not a constitutional-level position but the head of a central state administrative organ — therefore the Fundamental Law-level guarantees do not apply directly, Act XLIII of 2010 and the law on civil servants govern. This layer demarcation is critical to interpreting the Havasi dispute.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary, text in force as of 17 April 2026.

6.5 International comparison

The German Beamtenrecht (civil-service law) and the French fonction publique — both give strong, predictable procedural guarantees for leadership replacements, including a mandatory 2–4-week prior notice. The British Civil Service Code reduces the legal-relationship friction of changes of government with a sharp separation between the politically appointed special advisor and the politically neutral civil servant — in Hungary this separation exists formally (cabinet office head vs. administrative state secretary), but in practice was often blurred in the post-2010 period. The direction of reform: the political-advisory layer of the Cabinet Office and the public-administration layer must be separated at protocol level — and this is one of the lasting lessons of the Havasi case.

Public administration and e-government

  • KI3 — Legal-status purity of civil servants
  • KI7 — Handover protocol and document-retention obligation

Justice

  • I4 — Administrative-court control and management of grievance-compensation risk

Suggested new programme point: Institutionalisation of a uniform leadership-dismissal model protocol and “risk list” — for the Public administration and e-government area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 18 May 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (professional books):

  • 📖 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law
  • 📖 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law
  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (in force as of 17 April 2026)

MIAK-internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 18 May 2026 — topic 3, score: 75/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Magyar Közlöny issues of 17–18 May 2026
  • Act XLIII of 2010 (on central state administrative organs)
  • Act CXCIX of 2011 (on civil servants)
  • Act I of 2017 (on administrative procedure, Kp.)

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