Part I — Situation overview

On 14 May 2026 the new law prepared by the new Justice Minister, Márton Melléthei-Barna — already as minister-designate, within the framework of a working group before the cabinet’s taking office — and adopted by the National Assembly on 13 May 2026 in the first legislative package of its inaugural session came into force, officially terminating the special legal order declared on 11 March 2020 and extended from the summer of 2022 on a “wartime” legal title. The temporal order of the termination: in 2020 the Government declared the coronavirus state of emergency by state of danger under Article 53 of the Fundamental Law; in the summer of 2022 — after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine — they switched, with an amendment, to “due to the wartime situation in the neighbouring country” legal title, and this has since been the central title of the special legal order. According to Telex’s report, the entry into force on 14 May 2026 definitively closes these six years — “After six years the wartime state of danger has ended in Hungary”.

At the same time as the termination, however, the six years of emergency lawmaking does not vanish. According to HVG’s detailed reporting, “The special legal order has ended, but several hundred wartime emergency decrees of the Orbán government have remained with us”. The law presented by Melléthei-Barna addresses precisely this: it reclassifies the subject matters of the emergency government decrees — designating some measures as transitional rules (typically with a sunset date a few months out), and making others part of the normal legal order (with statutory or statutorily-authorised decree rank). 444.hu’s report — with a satirical title — “Don’t worry: the wartime state of danger has ended” emphasises the duality: the legal framework has ended, a significant part of the substantive rules remain. Magyar Nemzet specifically highlighted the survival of “popular measures” — utility-bill-reduction-type benefits, the fuel price cap, the interest-rate stop — in a pro-government reading.

In MIAK’s reading the six years of special legal order have been one of the main institutional tools of the gradual hollowing-out of the Hungarian rule of law: the government decree could override laws adopted by parliament as lex specialis, which is precisely against the principle of “Hungary is a parliamentary republic” under Article 1 of the Fundamental Law and became the systemic tool for bypassing parliamentary debate. The termination signals an epochal shift symbolically and at the Fundamental Law level. At the level of substance, however, the termination only settles half of the problem: the question now is which range of preserved decree content is moved to normal statutory rank with proper parliamentary legitimacy (that is, retroactively or prospectively validated by parliamentary debate) — and which range is phased out because it is also substantively untenable from a rule-of-law standpoint, or economically distorts the market (e.g. utility-bill reduction, price cap, assembly restrictions). This double transition is the true centre of gravity of the current moment.

Part II — Literature-based grounding

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific-legal-theoretical frame in which the six-year special legal order’s termination and the decree transition can be interpreted. The Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011, in-force text) — particularly Articles 48–54, which regulate the categories of the special legal order (state of war, state of emergency, preventive defence situation, state of danger) — is the primary normative source of the Hungarian public-law order on this question; the 12th amendment (December 2023) restructured this category system and introduced the “state of war” + “preventive defence situation” + “state of danger” division, in the canonical frame of which the emergency decree of the 2020–2026 period can be interpreted. H. L. A. Hart (1907–1992, British legal philosopher) in his classic The Concept of Law (1961) distinguishes primary rules (which prescribe behaviour) and secondary rules (which regulate the procedures of rule-making, modification and review); Hart’s key concept is acceptance — the validity of a rule depends not only on its formal promulgation, but also on whether legal practitioners and the community accept it. Part of the six years of emergency decrees undoubtedly gained such acceptance (e.g. the political acceptance of the utility-bill-reduction narrative), while another part did not (e.g. the assembly restrictions and the public-television propaganda decrees). Joseph Raz (1939–2022, Israeli-British legal philosopher) in The Authority of Law (1979) lists the eight elements of the rule of law — the rule-of-law minimum criterion: the law should be prospective (forward-looking, not retroactive), open and clear (public and clear), relatively stable (relatively stable), promulgated, the application consistent, accessible, independently reviewable, and the sanctions proportionate; the six years of emergency decrees systematically violated at least three of these — stability, transparency of promulgation, and independent review. The detailed literature discussion — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature audit detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures to the new cabinet, so that the termination of the special legal order on 14 May 2026 also becomes a lasting step in public law and institutional terms — and not merely a symbolic act in the wake of which the substantive regulatory chaos remains.

3.1 90-day public decree-audit schedule (from the day of termination)

The Justice Ministry (Márton Melléthei-Barna, or, after the portfolio shaping under the powers-and-competences decree, the relevant minister), in coordination with the Planning Ministry, must carry out an item-by-item audit within 90 days of all emergency government decrees issued between 11 March 2020 and 14 May 2026. The audit typology — three categories — is as follows:

  • “A” category: substantive public-interest rule. A substantive decree that can also be defended in the framework of normal parliamentary lawmaking (e.g. emergency healthcare protocols, traffic-regulation refinements, administrative simplifications). These should be elevated to statutory rank in the framework of regular parliamentary debate, after substantive discussion by the relevant committee (health, economic, justice, etc.). In Hartian terms these are primary rules that deserve acceptance.
  • “B” category: populist snapshot with market-distorting effect. A decree that emerged from political logic (campaign, economic-tension management) and substantively distorts market signals: utility-bill-reduction framework, fuel price cap, interest-rate stop, margin stop. For these we propose time-slot phase-out: with a 12–18-month transition, according to a pre-fixed schedule, and with targeted compensation for the vulnerable groups (lowest three income deciles, energy-poverty-affected). According to the canonical forms of tasks/helpers/szakkifejezes-szotar.md: not ad hoc market intervention, but a pre-announced, measurable, transparent gradual termination.
  • “C” category: tool untenable from a rule-of-law standpoint. A decree that directly violated the Razian rule of law criteria (see 6.4.3): retroactivity, lack of publicity, restriction of freedom of assembly, association or speech, public-procurement exceptions (particularly in NER-related circles), restriction of freedom of opinion or media isolation. These must be immediately repealed — without transitional time.

The precise exhaustive list of the three categories is the public end-result of the audit; this must appear in a decree-dashboard available on kormany.hu. A direct extension of the KI8 (Drucker-principled efficiency measurement) and A1 (Public-money dashboard) programme points — decree transparency is the legal precondition of public-money transparency.

3.2 Independent expert panel for quality assurance of the audit (during the entire 90-day process)

For the credibility of the audit the government apparatus’s own classification is not sufficient. MIAK proposes a 7–9-member independent expert panel — composed of constitutional lawyers, administrative lawyers and economic lawyers representing the law faculties of ELTE, PPKE, SZTE and KRE —, which gives an opinion on each individual classification of the audit (particularly with regard to the “B” and “C” categories), and publicly documents the debate points. The Venice Commission’s (the Council of Europe’s advisory body, the yardstick of the rule of law) Hungarian member or delegate should participate as an invited observer at the panel’s meetings. Direct application of the A6 (Strengthening checks and balances) and KP19 (International institutional participation) programme points.

3.3 Constitutional Court prior norm-control on the contested “B” and “C” decree groups (within 60 days)

Under Article 24(2)(e) of the Fundamental Law, the Constitutional Court — which in public law is not part of the judicial system (is not a body of the administration of justice), but is an independent constitutional body — may carry out prior or subsequent norm-control. MIAK asks the Government (on the prime minister’s motion) or the National Assembly (on the motion of one-quarter of the MPs) to initiate the group Constitutional Court review of the disputed “B” and “C” classified decrees within 60 days. This ensures that the phase-out or the elevation to normal statutory rank takes place with constitutional legitimacy, and is not reversible as a political act at the next change of government. In the framework set by the earlier 12th amendment of the Fundamental Law (2023), fixing the Constitutional Court position is particularly important, because the amendment introduced the “preventive defence situation” gradation, the boundaries of which are still unclarified without legal-application practice.

The common principle of the three proposals: the termination of the six-year special legal order is not only a legal act, but also an institutional transition — and this transition will only be successful from a rule-of-law standpoint if the audit is typologically disciplined, independently quality-assured and constitutionally legitimised. Out of Raz’s eight rule of law criteria (see 6.4.3), this restores stability, independence and consistency. The framework of the termination is there; MIAK asks that the substance also be ordered, because “Don’t worry” — as the 444.hu title says — will only be true if rule-of-law integrity is also restored, not just the legal title is swapped.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Rule of law The termination of the special legal order + the decree audit restore the primacy of parliamentary lawmaking; at least 3 of Raz’s rule of law minimums (stability, independence, consistency) are substantively restored. If the audit is not completed within 90 days, or the classification becomes a subject of political battle, the termination remains only a rhetorical act.
Public administration The restoration of the normal lawmaking order gives slower but more predictable regulation — particularly in the lasting sectoral areas (health, transport, education). The public administration apparatus accustomed to extreme-speed emergency lawmaking needs retraining and a new order of procedure — this requires a 3–6-month transition period.
Economy The time-slot phase-out of utility-bill-reduction-type price caps eliminates the distortion of market signals — in the medium and long term supply tensions (such as the May 2026 fuel crisis) decrease. In the short term the political cost of “time-slot phase-out” is high — without the protection of the lowest three income deciles, this must not be started. The targeted compensation should be on the priority list of the first 90 days of the Finance Minister (András Kármán).
Society The message of rule-of-law restoration strengthens the sense of constitutional belonging; the closure of the six-year experience of “the state reaches into my life by government decree”. If the Venice Commission or the EU Commission criticises the slowness of the transition in the rule-of-law-report framework, this also endangers the EUR 34 billion EU-funds release schedule (see EU-funds topic).

The essence of the dilemma: the termination is a fast political act, the audit is slow institutional work. The management of the transition between the two rhythms decides whether the Tisza cabinet’s rule-of-law-restoring programme becomes operational, or remains only rhetorical positioning. In MIAK’s reading, the 90-day audit + the independent panel + the Constitutional Court control is an institutional investment to be undertaken — against the temptation of political acceleration.

Part V — Measurability and conclusion

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

The performance indicators (KPIs) are proposed for the following 12-month time window:

  • Closing of the audit and public dashboard on kormany.hu by 12 August 2026 (termination + 90 days), with the classification of every emergency decree.
  • Out of the “A” category decrees, at least 80% by 31 December 2026 elevated to statutory rank in the framework of regular parliamentary lawmaking, with committee debate + Constitutional Court prior norm-control.
  • For all “B” category decrees a public 12–18-month time-slot phase-out schedule should be prepared by 12 September 2026 (termination + 4 months) — with a targeted compensation package.
  • All “C” category decrees repealed by 12 September 2026 (termination + 4 months).
  • Transitional-rule share (the share of decrees temporarily preserved by the Melléthei-Barna law compared to all emergency decrees) decreased below 30% by 14 May 2027 (termination + 1 year).
  • Positive evaluation of the Hungarian transition by the Venice Commission or EU Commission rule-of-law report, in the 2027 reporting cycle.

5.2 Conclusion

The official termination of the wartime state of danger is one of the deepest transitions of the post-2010 Hungarian public-law system: for six years the government could essentially regulate without parliamentary debate within the framework of the special legal order under the Fundamental Law. The termination on 14 May 2026 restores the constitutional framework; MIAK asks that the substantive ordering of the decree transition (audit, independent panel, Constitutional Court control) be just as thorough and transparent. Transparency (public decree dashboard, documented classification debate) and accountability (independent panel + Constitutional Court control + parliamentary debate) — two of MIAK’s foundational values — are concretised directly in the fulfilment of these proposals; because the restoration of the rule of law is not a declarative act, but a fixed, measurable, institutional protocol. “Don’t worry” — as the 444.hu title said — will only be credible if, with the completion of the audit, the Hungarian citizen will actually know which rules bind their own government.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by media spectrum

In the liberal-left band (Telex, HVG, 444.hu) we see two different focuses: Telex focused on the factual reporting (“After six years the wartime state of danger has ended”), HVG already on the analysis of the substantive duality (“The special legal order has ended, but several hundred wartime emergency decrees of the Orbán government have remained with us”); 444.hu highlighted the dual message with a satirical title and factual text. The liberal-left spectrum equally leaves the question open: what does the normal lawmaking order say about the surviving decrees?

In the pro-government and conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) the focus is markedly different: Magyar Nemzet (“The state of danger has ended, but several popular measures of the Orbán government live on”) builds the narrative of continuity — that is, positions the Orbán-era decrees as “popular measures”, which will be a communication pressure point on the Tisza cabinet. Mandiner framed the termination as the closure of the Orbán era, emphasising the technical legal title of “the state of danger ordered due to the Russian-Ukrainian war” — that is, contesting the political-symbolic content less.

The left/public-affairs TV-press (Népszava, ATV) concentrated on the legislative detail — particularly on the Melléthei-Barna authorship and the factual pattern of the decrees made “part of the normal legal order”. Across the spectrum the factual reporting is uniform; the interpretive difference appears in the political evaluation of the surviving decrees.

6.2 Facts and data

Indicator Value Source
Declaration of the special legal order (original) 11 March 2020 Article 53 of the Fundamental Law + Government Decree 40/2020 (III. 11.)
Switch to “wartime” state of danger title Summer 2022 (also reinforced by Fundamental Law amendment) 12th amendment of the Fundamental Law (2023-12) — preliminary fixing
Date of entry into force of the termination 14 May 2026 New law, presented by Márton Melléthei-Barna; published in the Hungarian Gazette
Total duration ~6 years (11 March 2020 → 14 May 2026) calculation
Typically surviving decree groups utility-bill-reduction framework, fuel price cap, interest-rate stop, foreign-currency-mortgage rules, emergency healthcare protocols based on HVG, Magyar Nemzet reporting

6.3 Policy projections

  • Legal foundations (background material) — Fundamental Law regulation of the special legal order (Articles 48-54), 12th amendment 2023 restructuring, direct application of the rule of law concept (Raz, Hart).
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — Bureaucracy reduction measurably (KI3), Drucker-principled efficiency measurement (KI8), cabinet-internal rules of procedure and audit protocol.
  • Justice — Enforcement of the Constitutional Court’s prior norm-control power on the contested decree groups; judicial and prosecutorial independence is not affected in this question (the Constitutional Court is an independent constitutional body, not part of the judicial system; decree review is not an investigative or judicial matter).

6.4 Literature audit detail

6.4.1 Fundamental Law of Hungary (in-force text + 12th amendment)

Articles 48–54 of the Fundamental Law know four kinds of special legal order categories: state of war (Articles 51-52), state of emergency (Article 50), preventive defence situation (Article 51) and state of danger (Article 53). The 12th amendment (December 2023) clarified this four-fold system and also introduced the “state of war” category — the current termination ends the state of danger declared in 2020 and modified from 2022 to a “wartime” legal title.

“In the event of a state of danger the Government, in the event of a natural disaster or industrial accident endangering life and property security, as well as in order to avert their consequences […] may introduce extraordinary measures laid down in a cardinal law.” (Article 53 of the Fundamental Law, partial quotation)

Hungarian lawmaking between 2020 and 2026, citing Article 53, extended the emergency government decrees to subject matters (utility-bill reduction, fuel price cap) that are substantively not direct emergency measures — this is contrary to the spirit of the Fundamental Law; in formal terms, however, the excess of competence would have required review before the Constitutional Court. The aim of the current decree audit is precisely the clarification of this.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (in-force text, status 17 April 2026) + 12th amendment (22 December 2023)

6.4.2 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

Hart’s 1961 classic interprets law as the unity of two rule types: primary rules (which prescribe behaviour — e.g. “stealing is forbidden”) and secondary rules (which are about how primary rules arise, change and cease — e.g. “parliament may pass laws by majority vote”). Hart’s key concept is acceptance: the validity of a rule depends not only on its formal promulgation, but also on whether legal practitioners and the community accept the behavioural pattern as a rule.

“One central feature of a legal system is not coercion in itself but that the authorities and the citizens share in a common rule-accepting practice (in the rule-identifying practice that may be called the rule of recognition).” (Hart, The Concept of Law, 1961 — paraphrase from the argument of Chapter VI)

In the Hartian interpretation, the six years of emergency decrees stand in a double status: one part (emergency healthcare protocols, transport refinements) clearly gained acceptance because legal practitioners (healthcare professionals, police, citizens) applied and followed the behavioural pattern continuously. Another part (utility-bill reduction, assembly restrictions) gained only formal acceptance: the execution worked, but the social-legal-application acceptance was not complete — because the way of rule-making (by government decree, without parliamentary debate) violated the framework of secondary rules. MIAK’s 90-day audit can publicly separate this duality.

📖 Source: Hart, H. L. A.: The Concept of Law

6.4.3 Raz: The Authority of Law

Joseph Raz, in his 1979 The Authority of Law, lists the minimum conditions of the rule of law in eight elements: (1) prospectivity — the law is forward-looking, not retroactive, (2) open and clear — public and clear, (3) relative stability — relatively stable, (4) open — promulgated, (5) consistent application — the application is consistent, (6) accessibility — accessible, (7) independent review — independent review, (8) proportional sanctions — proportionate sanctions. Raz emphasises: this is not a complete theory of justice, but the description of the technical minimum conditions of law as an instrument.

“The rule of law is essentially a negative value. The law inevitably creates a great danger of arbitrary power — the rule of law is designed to minimise the danger created by the law itself.” (Raz, The Authority of Law, 1979, Chapter 11 — direct quotation)

The six years of Hungarian emergency decree practice systematically violated at least three of Raz’s eight criteria: (3) stability — the decrees changed weekly, often overriding each other; (5) consistent application — the implementation practice was inconsistent across portfolios and periods; (7) independent review — the prior norm-control of the Constitutional Court was not affected in several cases by the decree package. The aim of MIAK’s audit is the operational restoration of these three: the audit stabilises the rule material, makes the categorisation consistent, and gives a reviewable system alongside an independent panel + Constitutional Court control. This is not a political act, but a rule-of-law minimum.

📖 Source: Raz, Joseph: The Authority of Law

6.5 International comparison

  • Germany (Notstandsverfassung, 1968): The framework of the German federal constitution’s special legal order — the Notstandsverfassung — may only be used with strict parliamentary debate and temporal limitation. Long-term (multi-year) emergency decrees have not occurred in the FRG’s history after 1949.
  • France (2015–2017 state after the Paris terror attack): After a two-year application of the état d’urgence, the 2017 law elevated part of the exceptional measures to regular statutory level (public-security normalisation) — this is one of the European precedents of the Hungarian reclassification, but in France the Conseil constitutionnel’s prior norm-control fixed the boundaries.
  • Italy (COVID state of emergency 2020–2022): The government terminated the stato di emergenza in 2022, and the reclassification of COVID decrees took place by parliamentary enabling law (legge delega), with detailed committee debate. The Hungarian pattern is similar to this, but the reclassification in the Hungarian case currently does not have the substantive parliamentary-debate supplements.
  • Poland (lessons of the 2015–2024 rule-of-law backsliding): The Polish example shows that the lasting use of special-legal-order tools carries a systemic-erosion risk, even if formally takes place within constitutional frameworks — the post-2024 Tusk government started a similar audit process, the lessons of which can be directly transferred to the Hungarian cabinet.

Public administration and e-government

  • KI3 — Bureaucracy reduction measurably
  • KI8 — Drucker-principled efficiency measurement in public administration
  • KI11 — Organisational behaviour audit — Allison framework

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard (as a model for the decree dashboard)
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

Foreign policy

  • KP19 — International institutional participation (Venice Commission, EU Commission rule-of-law report)

Suggested new programme point: Operational protocol for the rollback of the special legal order — to the Legal foundations area, which fixes the audit typology, the independent panel and the Constitutional Court control duty for the application of every future state-of-danger termination.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 14 May 2026 — top 2 topic):

Knowledge-base references (professional books and legal sources):

  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (in-force text, status 17 April 2026)
  • 📖 Twelfth amendment of the Fundamental Law of Hungary (22 December 2023)
  • 📖 Hart, H. L. A.: The Concept of Law
  • 📖 Raz, Joseph: The Authority of Law

Note: the press monitor also recommended Koncewicz: Constitutional Capture and Resilience and Schmitt: Political Theology; in the könyvek/Jog/ folder there is no .txt version of these, therefore both appear in the szakirodalom_audit.kandidatusok list with the excluded: no .txt mark.

MIAK-internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Legal foundations (background material; Fundamental Law regulation of the special legal order)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI3, KI8, KI11)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A6)
  • MIAK press monitor, 14 May 2026 — 2nd topic, score: 91/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Hungarian Gazette decree archive (the complete decree mass of the six-year period)
  • Venice Commission reports on the special legal order (CDL-AD)
  • Eötvös Károly Institute special-legal-order analyses
  • EU Commission Rule of Law Report — Hungary (annual report)
  • Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) — Rule of Law indicator

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