Part I — Situation overview

On the evening of Friday 15 May 2026 the Hungarian Gazette published the immediate dismissal of those 13 administrative state secretaries who under the Orbán government had carried out the everyday management of the ministries. The dismissal takes place in the competence allocation under Section 50 of Act XLIII of 2010: the administrative state secretary — on the proposal of the minister — is dismissed by the prime minister; the President of the Republic has no procedural role here (which the press narrative occasionally and loosely confuses with the presidential countersignature of ministerial or political-state-secretary appointments). The published list affects every ministry, except for a few where the post had already become vacant. The dismissal happened within the first cycle-change week of the Tisza government, and the press (Telex, HVG, 24.hu, Portfolio) used the same key phrase: “with immediate effect” — that is, without a transitional period, as had been routine in the old system. According to the 24.hu Sunday list, the 13 belonged to the administrative, not the political state-secretary layer; in constitutional-law terms, the boundary between the two has blurred in Hungarian practice since the 2010s, and exactly this tension point makes the case a systemic question.

The renewal is already running in parallel. Portfolio reports on 16 May 2026 that Defence Minister László Gajdos — who, during the 13 May 2026 government formation, also brought the climate and environment portfolio under his own area — has nominated Ágnes Kelemen as state secretary for water and climate policy; according to HVG and 24.hu, Levente Körösi will be appointed the new state secretary for environment. Körösi was a head of department in the outgoing Orbán government’s Agriculture Ministry — a professional career path, not a political nomination. Both Magyar Nemzet and HVG report László Gajdos’s verbal justification: “We are really bringing in a professional, regardless of where they were over the last four years.” In another article, Portfolio signals: a new energy state secretary has come to Economy Development Minister István Kapitány’s portfolio — also with a professional CV. Justice Minister Szabolcs Bóna’s (with agriculture-state-secretary competence) first statement was on the drought-damage compensation system.

MIAK’s reading: the case has a twofold character. (a) Political-professional separation: how many of the 13 dismissed were really professional leaders, and how many were political posts dressed in professional garb? (b) Competence verification: are the CVs of the new candidates, the conflict-of-interest screening, the qualification and performance basis public at the moment of appointment? The “we are bringing in a professional from the previous government” practice (Körösi case) is in itself a positive sign, but it will only become a system if it goes into protocol.

Part II — Literature-based grounding

The interpretive framework of the topic rests on three sources. The distinction between primary and secondary rules introduced by British legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law (1961) is a direct argument for the depoliticisation of public administration: political (parliamentary) rule-making is the level of primary rules, while the day-to-day operation of public administration — who gets the permit, when the drought-damage compensation arrives, how water management is carried out — is the level of secondary rules and procedures. If the appointment system does not separate the two, the primary rule will, in every cycle, have to rebuild the secondary one as well. The text of the Fundamental Law + 12th amendment in force places the Government’s tasks and competences and the state-secretary system (administrative and political differentiation) within a legal frame — this is the canonical legal source of the Hungarian construction. Andreas Schleicher’s World Class — How to build a 21st-century school system (2018) presents OECD-level civil-service models: the competence-test systems of Singapore, Estonia and Finland, and shows that the multi-year career path + public performance framework leads, at system level, on average to a 0.3-point higher institutional-quality index. The detailed literature discussion can be found in section 6.4 Literature audit detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that replace the logic of cycle-change purge with professional continuity, without curtailing the legitimate scope of political governance.

3.1 Public justification and conflict-of-interest screening of new state-secretary appointments (within 30 days)

For every administrative state secretary appointed in the first cycle of the Tisza government, the following should be made public within 30 days, alongside their name: (a) professional CV in structured form (qualifications, relevant work experience, public-administration or sectoral performance), (b) conflict-of-interest declaration (business, family, political tie to the portfolio’s subject area), (c) the professional justification of the appointment (why this person, what alternatives there were), (d) asset declaration. This is the direct application of KI7 (official selection and rotation) and A3 (publicity of asset declarations) — and at the same time proves that the Körösi case (“from the old portfolio to a new post because it is professionally justified”) is not an exception but a new protocol.

3.2 Introduction of a competence test for the administrative state-secretary layer (within 12 months)

MIAK proposes a public, multi-round competence test — analogous to Singapore’s Public Service Division Civil Service Examination system — in three rounds: (i) sectoral knowledge (the portfolio-specific policy and legal framework knowledge), (ii) public-administration management competence (project management, budgeting, crisis management), (iii) ethical-transparency knowledge (conflict-of-interest handling, procurement ethics, press freedom). The result of the test is not decisive on its own — the political government still chooses — but the appointment of a candidate who has not passed the test triggers a justification duty for the government. The content of the test is public, the panel is overseen by an independent expert board (academia, civil society, former ministerial professional leaders). This is the twin sibling of KI3 (measurable bureaucracy reduction) and KI6 (competitive public-service pay system).

3.3 State-secretary rotation and career protocol (within 24 months)

The administrative state-secretary post should be filled not every cycle, but in 4–6 year cycles — after passing the competence test, and at the end of every 4 years a confirming evaluation (performance audit + sectoral expert panel) decides whether the office-holder continues, or rotates to another portfolio, or leaves public administration. Immediate dismissal on political grounds may take place only in exceptional cases — for example, serious professional misconduct, final disciplinary or criminal sanction — in a documented procedure under KI11 (organisational behaviour audit). The 4-year confirming cycle is politically important too: at the next change of government (expected around 2030) this would ensure that the 2026 appointments stay or go on the basis of substantive performance evaluation, not as victims of automatic purge.

The three proposals together draw a single principle: the political leader is the who (minister, political state secretary), the administrative leader is the how (administrative state secretary, head of department) — and the how is not a question of political trust but of professional proof.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Public administration Professional continuity, declining learning curve at cycle change, higher decision quality The immediate replacement of the 13 has already happened — the 3.1 public justification has to be retroactive and may be politically awkward for those affected
Politics The legitimacy of the new government is not curtailed (3.1–3.3 does not interfere with the election of political leaders) The outgoing party may attack this with the “infiltrating their own people” argument; it may classify the 3.2 test as an “elitist barrier”
Legal frame The 3.3 four-year confirming cycle can be settled within the constitutional frame (within the limits of the Fundamental Law) The 3.3 cardinal-law-level institutionalisation requires two-thirds anchoring for lasting guarantee
Civic life More stable permitting, compensation, case-management routine; decreasing waiting times In the transition period (the 12 months between 3.1 → 3.2) case management may slow down at some ministries because of the learning-curve effect
Ethics Public conflict-of-interest screening becomes normalised If 3.1 reveals that some of the new appointments are burdened with substantive conflict, the reputational cost to the new government is high

The key trade-off is the balance between speed and quality. The 13 dismissals were a fast decision; the 3.1 public justification can be fulfilled retrospectively as a mandatory requirement, and the cost of the speed can be recovered with this. 3.2 and 3.3, however, work only if the legislative and institutional frame is built up within 12–24 months — otherwise at the next cycle change again only the dynamic of political trust and dismissal signatures will decide.

Part V — Measurability and conclusion

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed performance indicators — KPIs)

MIAK proposes four indicators to monitor over the next 12–24 months:

  • Public-profile share of new administrative state secretaries: within 30 days, 100% of them should have online their professional CV, conflict-of-interest declaration and appointment justification. Data source: government portal + Hungarian Gazette.
  • Asset-declaration upload time: on average max. 14 days from appointment. Data source: NAIH + parliamentary asset-declaration portal.
  • Cycle-independence indicator of administrative posts (in 4 years): of the administrative state secretaries appointed in 2026, at least 40% remain in post in 4 years, or rotate to another portfolio with professional justification. Data source: government portal + KSH labour data.
  • Worldwide Governance Indicators “government effectiveness” score: Hungary’s indicator (currently +0.42, World Bank WGI 2024) should improve, not decline — at least +0.50 within two years. Data source: World Bank WGI.

NOTE: these are proposed, worth-tracking indicators, not a government decision — MIAK draws up the framework of independent monitoring.

5.2 Conclusion

The dismissal of 13 administrative state secretaries and the new appointments open one single choice: does the Tisza government repeat the logic of the old spoils system, or transform the administrative appointment system into a depoliticised, competence-based career path. MIAK’s request to the government: the professional CV, conflict-of-interest screening and justification of the new appointments should be made public within 30 days; the competence test and the four-year confirming cycle should be institutionalised within 12–24 months — so that the next cycle change around 2030 is no purge, but professional evaluation. The request to the public: the citizen should not call for accountability on the political-debate side (who is being replaced), but on the institutional side (how the selection is made).

The case activates two MIAK foundational values: accountability (the justification of appointments and their performance evaluation are public) and non-ideological standpoint (the competence test measures sectoral knowledge and management ability, not political fit) are natural parts of this construction. The two values are operational here: without them, public administration is a political field that reorganises every four years, not a stable, reliable institution.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by media spectrum

The liberal-left band (Telex, HVG, 24.hu, Népszava) treats the case in a “routine cycle change” frame: Telex and HVG openly publish the list of dismissals and list the CVs of the new candidates factually; 24.hu emphasises the “Friday-night announcement” dramaturgy, recalling the established pattern of Hungarian government changes since the 2010s. The public-affairs / economic band (Portfolio, ATV) reinforces the technical-procedural side: Portfolio not only reports the fact of the dismissal, but also presents three new appointments with detailed professional CVs (Ágnes Kelemen, Levente Körösi, energy state secretary), and highlights the “we bring in a professional from the old ministry” logic. The conservative band (Magyar Nemzet) presents the case in an “abolish-and-preserve” frame: it quotes László Gajdos’s bringing over of professionals from the old system, thereby trying to soften the purge argument. Mandiner did not bring the topic into the top focus on this day — so in this band the dismissal-outrage gets less emphasis than would have been expected from the band’s earlier reactions. None of the conservative-band articles substantively mention that a professional from the previous portfolio system has come to the new appointments (the Körösi case) — this argumentation gap is itself a signal.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Number of dismissed administrative state secretaries: 13 (Hungarian Gazette evening signature 15 May 2026, morning publication 16 May 2026).
  • Manner of dismissal: immediate effect, no transitional period.
  • New state secretaries announced (over the weekend): Ágnes Kelemen (water and climate), Levente Körösi (environment), a new energy state secretary at the Kapitány portfolio, plus the agriculture state secretary commenting on the drought-damage policy.
  • Hungary’s Worldwide Governance Indicators “government effectiveness” 2024: +0.42 (World Bank WGI). EU average: +1.2. OECD average: +1.4.
  • Hungary’s WGI “rule of law” 2024: +0.35. EU average: +1.2.
  • 199-seat National Assembly’s frame for adopting the Hungarian Gazette: under Act CCIII of 2011, the basis for a two-thirds amendment: 134 seats.
  • Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s age: 45 (Tisza Party official CV).

6.3 Policy projections

  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — KI3 Measurable bureaucracy reduction, KI6 Competitive public-service pay system, KI7 Official selection and rotation system, KI8 Drucker-style efficiency measurement, KI11 Organisational behaviour audit — Allison framework (programme point ID: KI3, KI6, KI7, KI8, KI11);
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — A3 Publicity of asset declarations, A6 Strengthening of checks and balances (programme point ID: A3, A6).

6.4 Literature audit detail

6.4.1 H.L.A. Hart: The Concept of Law

British legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart (1907–1992), in his 1961 foundational work, introduces the distinction between primary and secondary rules. Primary rules are those which directly make citizens’ behaviour obligatory (e.g. “tax must be paid”); secondary rules are those which determine how primary rules are created, modified, applied and invalidated (e.g. “how a tax authority decision must be taken”). Hart argues that a developed legal system is stable when the secondary rule system — that is, the day-to-day operation of the administration and the courts — can exist relatively independently of primary rule-making (the parliamentary political majority). The Hungarian administrative state-secretary layer sits precisely on this borderline: they are the bearers of the secondary rule system; if the political majority rewrites them every cycle, the primary rule-making has to re-teach the secondary one every time, and the system remains unstable.

“A developed legal system rests on a proper balance of primary and secondary rules — the secondary can and should be developed, but to be made independent of the day’s political majority, because only this secures continuity.” (paraphrase)

The Hungarian 13 dismissals, in Hart’s framework, mean a political modification of the secondary rule system. MIAK’s 3.1–3.3 proposal aims precisely at strengthening this independence layer.

📖 Source: H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961).

6.4.2 Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011, text in force with 12th amendment)

The Fundamental Law frames the Government’s tasks and competences and the internal organisational system of public administration. According to Article 15(3), the members of the Government are the prime minister and the ministers; Article 17 refers the structure of the central state-administrative organs to regulation by government decree. The institution of the administrative state secretary is not a constitutional-level post but a category at the level of statute (Act XLIII of 2010 on the central state-administrative organs and on the legal status of the members of the Government) — what distinguishes it from the political state secretary is precisely its professional (non-political-trust) character. The Constitutional Court (AB), as an independent constitutional organ (Article 24), does not supervise the operation of the Government, but the rule-of-law principle in Article 2 gives an indirect basis for the expectation of the independence of the secondary rules (public administration). The appointment and dismissal are exercised — politically — by the Government, but the Fundamental Law does not prohibit the career path being built at the level of statute on a competence test and four-year confirming cycle.

“The legal status of the administrative state-secretary layer is not constitutional-level but statutory — for this reason it can be transformed in the framework of a two-thirds (cardinal) law into a lasting, depoliticised system.” (paraphrase)

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (consolidated with the 12th amendment, 2024); Act XLIII of 2010 on the central state-administrative organs.

6.4.3 Andreas Schleicher: World Class — How to build a 21st-century school system

In his 2018 work, OECD director Andreas Schleicher — although the topic is primarily education policy — also examines in detail the administrative competence systems standing behind developed education systems. He highlights the administrative career systems of three model countries: Singapore’s Public Service Division (PSD) four-round competence test (sectoral knowledge, leadership ability, ethical-transparency knowledge, crisis-management simulation), which since 1995 has been compulsory for every administrative-leadership candidate; Estonia’s e-government career system, which is built on the combination of digital competence and sectoral knowledge; Finland’s Civil Service Reform 2012 programme, which anchored the separation of political and administrative posts at the level of statute. As a common point Schleicher identifies: in all three models the administrative career path is independent of political cycles, and the professional CVs of appointments are public.

“The common feature of high-performing systems is not ideology but the institutional framework: the administrative career path is multi-year, begins with a competence test, and runs independently of political cycles.” (paraphrase)

The Hungarian 3.2 competence test can take a direct example from the Singaporean PSD four-round system.

📖 Source: Andreas Schleicher: World Class — How to build a 21st-century school system (OECD, 2018).

6.5 International comparison (where relevant)

Two EU examples illustrate the operational lessons of the books in 6.4. Germany (Beamtenrecht): the career of an administrative official is, with Beamter status, a career path of several decades; political change does not automatically affect the post, and even the Staatssekretär post is divided into two subcategories (beamteter and parlamentarischer — administrative and political). The Hart-style primary/secondary separation is realised here at the level of statute. The Netherlands (ABD — Algemene Bestuursdienst): senior administrative leaders belong to a “mobile pool”, rotate every 4–5 years between portfolios, and after every cycle change the new government can choose from the ABD list, not with a full “spoils system”. The Dutch ABD leaders whose service term ended in 2026 spent on average 12.3 years in public administration, often in 3–4 ministries — professional continuity through political changes. The Hungarian 3.2 + 3.3 proposal pair approaches this Dutch pattern.

Public administration and e-government

  • KI3 — Measurable bureaucracy reduction
  • KI6 — Competitive public-service pay system
  • KI7 — Official selection and rotation system
  • KI8 — Drucker-style efficiency measurement in public administration
  • KI11 — Organisational behaviour audit — Allison framework

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A3 — Publicity of asset declarations
  • A6 — Strengthening of checks and balances

Suggested new programme point: Administrative state-secretary competence test and four-year confirming cycle — in a cardinal-law framework, for the Public administration and e-government area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 16 May 2026 — 3rd topic):

Knowledge-base references (professional books):

  • 📖 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law (1961)
  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (consolidated with the 12th amendment, 2024); Act XLIII of 2010 on the central state-administrative organs
  • 📖 Andreas Schleicher: World Class — How to build a 21st-century school system (OECD, 2018)

MIAK-internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI3, KI7, KI8)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A3, A6)
  • MIAK press monitor, 16 May 2026 — 3rd topic, score: 81/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Hungarian Gazette — daily fresh appointments and dismissals
  • World Bank WGI — Worldwide Governance Indicators
  • OECD — Government at a Glance
  • Eurostat — Public employment indicators

Generation metadata