Part I — Situation overview

On the evening of 13 May 2026 and the dawn of 14 May 2026, the Tisza government’s rules-of-procedure-type tasks and powers decree was published in the Hungarian Gazette — that is, the new government’s “operating system”, which item by item orders which minister is entitled to make decisions, prepare laws, countersign government decrees or table matters before the government in which policy area. According to Telex’s report, “The Gazette has come out, it turned out which minister will be responsible for local governments, housing policy and taxes”; 444.hu brought it in more detailed breakdown: “The decision on the responsibilities of the government members has appeared in the Hungarian Gazette: concessions at Vitézy, gambling at Kármán, sport at Pósfai”. Portfolio highlighted the redistribution of the power structure: “Péter Magyar followed through on his promise: unprecedented power for four ministries”.

Three structural elements come together from the concrete content of the decree. First: Dávid Vitézy’s portfolio (transport and construction) — according to the detail recurring in all press spectra — receives beyond the basic transport and construction powers also local government affairs, housing policy and part of tax policy (the latter shared with the Finance Ministry). This is a portfolio of unusual breadth in Hungarian government practice: in the post-2010 Fidesz governments, local-government supervision was at the Ministry of the Interior (2014–2022), then at the Ministry of Public Administration and Regional Development (2022–2026); housing policy was mostly divided among the economic-development or construction areas. The portfolio going to Vitézy integrates these four traditionally scattered areas and builds a “local economy + construction-housing-infrastructure” package. Second: András Kármán (finance) receives gambling regulation — an area that in the Fidesz era was in the competence of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office (Antal Rogán), and was one of the central epicentres of the scandals around NER asset extraction and campaign financing. The portfolio reclassification of this is direct structural cleaning. Third: four ministers of the government — András Kármán (finance), Márta Görög (justice), Bálint Ruff (anti-corruption affairs under the Prime Minister’s Office) and — according to Népszava’s breakdown — the health and education ministers — have received legislative veto right. That is, any draft law on which any of these raises a veto cannot be tabled before the government without the lifting of the veto.

In MIAK’s reading the decree is the real structural novelty of the Tisza cabinet since taking office on 12 May 2026. At the Ópusztaszer out-of-place cabinet meeting on 13 May 2026, Péter Magyar announced the principle of the veto right; the decree now published in the Hungarian Gazette elevates this political announcement to legal-institutional level. At the same time, however, the government powers decree is the first public-law test of the new government: both the Vitézy-integrated portfolio and the four-veto-minister model need public-law clarification, because Act XX of 1949 (the former Constitution) and the in-force Fundamental Law (Articles 15–18) do not formally know ministerial veto in the Hungarian public-law tradition — the cabinet operates according to the Kollegialprinzip (collegial principle), with prime-ministerial countersignature. The veto right now built in therefore lives as an internal rule of the government’s rules of procedure, and its precise text, procedure and publicity is the question of the coming weeks.

Part II — Literature-based grounding

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame in which the government members’ tasks and powers decree can be interpreted. Peter F. Drucker (1909–2005, Austrian-American management thinker) in The Effective Executive (1967) describes the five disciplinary practices of executive effectiveness, two of which directly affect the question now debated: decision-rights allocation (who is entitled to substantive decision on what question) and priority selection (which are the powers that really give the meaning of the portfolio). Drucker’s main thesis: the effective organisation allocates fewer, not more decision-makers to every topic — too many deciding actors (veto net) slow rather than improve quality. Lee Kuan Yew in From Third World to First (2000) presents the Singaporean cabinet’s Cabinet Manual: this public internal rulebook item by item fixes which minister is entitled to substantive decision on what question, on what question they must consult other portfolios, and when the question may reach the whole cabinet. Lee Kuan Yew emphasises: the powers decree works if the cabinet members know exactly the boundaries of their own powers — not only the content. The Hungarian Articles 15–18 of the Fundamental Law fix the frame of the operation of the government: the prime minister steers the operation of the government (Article 16), the minister as a member of the government is responsible for their portfolio (Article 18), and the government decides as a collegial body (Kollegialprinzip). Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow’s Essence of Decision (1971/1999) Model III analysis warns: the cabinet decision is rarely the result of the members’ rational agreement — much more frequently the child of inter-portfolio bargaining and organisational routine; the precision of the powers decree and the institutional-internal regulation of the veto right intends to decrease this Model-III bargaining, not regulate it. The detailed literature discussion — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature audit detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures to the new cabinet, so that the government members’ powers decree of 14 May 2026 becomes a real institutional frame — and not only the statutory fixing of a political-symbolic announcement.

3.1 Government rules-of-procedure fixing for the subject matter and procedure of the veto right (within 30 days)

The legislative veto right concerning the four ministers will only be defensible in public-law terms if (1) the government’s rules-of-procedure regulation — as a document publicly available on kormany.hu — item by item fixes: which draft laws the veto right extends to (e.g. in András Kármán’s case to drafts with budgetary effect, in Márta Görög’s case to drafts affecting the administration of justice or constitutional bodies, in Bálint Ruff’s case to public-procurement and state-asset-disposition drafts); (2) the deadline of the veto procedure is fixed (e.g. 5 working days from receipt of the draft); (3) the veto-resolution procedure is publicly-law ordered: the prime minister may, in writing with countersignature and mandatory justification, override the veto, with notification of the affected National Assembly committee; (4) the veto-history is publicly available quarterly in dashboard form: who, when, on what raised veto, what was the justification, was there prime-ministerial override. This is the operational mapping of the Lee Kuan Yew-style (see 6.4.2) Cabinet Manual construction — the veto is institutional content, not a one-off political tool. A direct implementation frame for programme point KI8 (Drucker-principled efficiency measurement) and programme point A6 (Strengthening checks and balances).

3.2 Public-law clarification of local-government professional supervision (within 45 days)

The integrated local-government powers at Dávid Vitézy require public-law clarification, because the difference between the pre-2022 (Ministry of the Interior) and post-2022 (Ministry of Public Administration and Regional Development) models is barely known to the public and often even to the specialist administration. Item 7 of teruletek/00-Jogi_alapok/gyakori_hibak.md records concretely this type of error: local-government supervision is not equivalent to central government steering — local government is an independent public-law body under Article 31 of the Fundamental Law, the professional supervision of which (legality review) is not hierarchical, but guarantee-based. Therefore the government must publish within 45 days a public-law delimiting document, which contains: (a) what specifically the local-government powers going to Vitézy’s portfolio mean (lawmaking preparation? legality supervision? budgetary coordination? housing-policy integration?); (b) the delimitation between the earlier practice of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Public Administration (what is from the earlier political practices that is now reproducing, and what is specifically separated); (c) what legal safety nets (Constitutional Court prior norm-control, independence guarantees, Curia review) ensure that central ministerial competence does not become cabinet-level supervision of local governments. The KI9 (Local participatory budget) and TE4 (Rural public-service minimum) programme points are the direct policy connection points.

3.3 Public dashboard of the powers matrix (within 60 days)

The government members’ tasks and powers decree is a legal text — but towards the reader it should also be an operationally interpretable visual dashboard. MIAK asks that within 60 days a powers matrix dashboard be available on kormany.hu, which shows in table form: (a) every policy area (e.g. transport, education, construction, tax policy, local governments, gambling etc.); (b) the primary responsible portfolio (one column); (c) the shared / consultation portfolios (separate column for shared powers); (d) the veto-empowered portfolios (veto-right zone marking); (e) the affected government offices and background institutions (NAV, Government Offices, GVH, etc.). This is, in Drucker’s sense (see 6.4.1), the operational realisation of organizing as habit — at once an internal steering tool, an external transparency tool and a source of scientific analysability (for researchers, civil organisations, the press). The direct extension of the A1 (Public-money dashboard) and KI8 programme points to the cabinet structure.

The common principle of the three proposals: the government members’ powers decree is an institutional frame, not a one-off act — and it will only be of lasting quality if the veto right is fixed at rules-of-procedure level, the local-government competence is publicly-law delimited, and the entire powers architecture is available in public dashboard form for everyone. The common lesson of Drucker, Lee Kuan Yew and the Fundamental Law: the efficiency of the government does not depend on the breadth of the powers, but on the precision and transparency of the powers.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Public administration The rules-of-procedure fixing of the veto right and the powers dashboard institutionalise cabinet-internal control; the latent character of inter-portfolio bargaining conflicts decreases; public administration becomes more predictable. The veto right can become a political tool without rules-of-procedure fixing; “veto hacking” — deliberate slowing in political inter-portfolio conflicts —, which the Mintzberg-style (otherwise missing from könyvek/) organisational power-blocking pattern discussed in chapter 6 forecasts.
Politics The integrated Vitézy portfolio (local government + housing policy + tax part) gives political weight to the transport portfolio; the four-veto-minister model fixes the cabinet-internal weight distribution. If the public-law clarification of the local-government competence is missing, the Vitézy-integrated portfolio looks like a reproduction of the post-2010 “central supervision over local governments” pattern — even if substantively it is not.
Local-government sector The integrated handling of housing policy and tax policy makes it possible for a “local economy + housing” package to operationally stand up before the 2027 local-government election (new construction-support system, local economic-development programmes). The real autonomy of local governments (independence under Article 31 of the Fundamental Law) is only maintained if the integrated package from above stays within the public-law boundaries appropriate to item 7 of gyakori_hibak.md.
Corruption prevention Gambling regulation going to Kármán from the Rogán-style position is immediate structural cleaning; Bálint Ruff’s veto right on public-procurement and state-asset matters is a concrete institutional tool of post-NER accountability. The immediate application of the veto right can cause political tensions — especially if in the first weeks the Ruff veto is activated in concrete cases; therefore the 30-day rules-of-procedure fixing of the veto-procedure protocol is of primary importance.

The essence of the dilemma: the government members’ powers decree gives a political-organisational frame quickly (good), but can be filled with institutional content slowly (rules of procedure, dashboard, public-law clarification — all this in 30–60 days). In MIAK’s reading, the 30–60 days of institutional work are mandatory — otherwise the cabinet reproduces the same government weight-bargaining patterns that it is precisely supposed to terminate.

Part V — Measurability and conclusion

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

The performance indicators (KPIs) are proposed for the following 12-month time window:

  • Government rules of procedure publicly available on kormany.hu by 13 June 2026 (decree + 30 days), with the subject matters, deadlines and override procedure of the veto right.
  • Local-government powers delimiting document published by 28 June 2026 (decree + 45 days), with the interpretation of Article 31 of the Fundamental Law and the delimitation from the earlier practices of the Ministry of the Interior / Ministry of Public Administration.
  • Powers matrix dashboard in operation by 13 July 2026 (decree + 60 days), and for every policy area it contains the marking of the primary responsible, shared, and veto-empowered portfolios.
  • Veto history published quarterly — first report by 1 September 2026 (after Q2 close), containing: number of vetoes, veto-empowered minister, subject matter, justification, was there prime-ministerial override.
  • Frequency indicator of inter-portfolio weight bargaining — an indicator derived from the analysis of press reporting on cabinet meetings, tracking the visible pattern of political weight conflicts within the cabinet. Target: decreasing trend over 12 months.

5.2 Conclusion

The government members’ tasks and powers decree of 14 May 2026 is the real structural novelty of the Tisza cabinet — the Vitézy-integrated portfolio, the Kármán gambling reclassification, and the four veto-empowered ministers all signal the substantive transformation of the post-2010 Hungarian government structure. MIAK asks that this political-symbolic start becomes a lasting institutional frame with rules-of-procedure precision, public-law delimitation and public dashboard transparency. Transparency (powers-matrix dashboard, rules-of-procedure publicity, quarterly veto record) and accountability (veto-override procedure, notification of National Assembly committees, Constitutional Court prior norm-control) — two of MIAK’s foundational values — are concretised directly in the fulfilment of these proposals; because the efficiency of the government, in Drucker’s sense, depends not on the breadth of powers, but on the precision and visibility of the powers architecture. The 14 May 2026 decree has opened a window to institutionalisation; the next 30–60 days will decide whether the cabinet uses it.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by media spectrum

In the liberal-left and public-affairs band (Telex, HVG, 444.hu, 24.hu) the focus was on the concrete powers breakdown and the political interpretation of the veto right: Telex on the details of the local-government-housing-tax competence going to Vitézy, HVG on the decree as a whole, 444.hu broken down by portfolio (Vitézy/Kármán/Pósfa), 24.hu commented on the political weight of the veto right (“Péter Magyar has assigned the tasks to himself and his ministers”). In the business band, Portfolio — with particularly sharp commentary — applied the framing “unprecedented power for four ministries”, which is in the market reading the interpretation of the strengthening of cabinet-internal control mechanisms. In the pro-government and conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) the framing is interestingly dual: Magyar Nemzet brought factual reporting; Mandiner applied the title “Péter Magyar made an unexpected move” — that is, evaluated the novelty of the veto right as contrast to the expected picture, that the prime minister concentrates his own power. The left/public-affairs TV-press (Népszava, ATV) highlighted the veto right as one of the key elements of the new government’s check model. Across the spectrum the factual reporting is uniform; the interpretive difference appears in the question of the veto right as institutional or political tool.

6.2 Facts and data

Indicator Value Source
Time of publication of the decree 13 May 2026 evening — 14 May 2026 dawn Hungarian Gazette
Integrated portfolio going to Vitézy transport, construction, concessions, local governments, housing policy, tax policy part (shared with the Finance Ministry) Telex, 444.hu, Portfolio reports
Portfolio elements going to Kármán finance + gambling regulation 444.hu report
Portfolio element going to Pósfai sport 444.hu report
Number of veto-empowered ministers 4 — András Kármán (finance), Márta Görög (justice), Bálint Ruff (anti-corruption affairs), health minister, education minister Népszava breakdown (the latter two ministers have not yet been clearly identified by the press spectrum)
Place/time of veto-right announcement 12-13 May 2026 Ópusztaszer out-of-place cabinet meeting Péter Magyar press announcement; see 2026-05-13 blog

6.3 Policy projections

  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — Drucker-principled efficiency measurement (KI8), officials’ selection and rotation system (KI7), local participatory budget (KI9), organisational behaviour audit — Allison framework (KI11).
  • Legal foundations (background material) — Articles 15-18 of the Fundamental Law (operation of the government), Article 31 (local governments), Article 24 (Constitutional Court prior norm-control); gyakori_hibak.md item 7 (public-law boundaries of local-government professional supervision), item 11 (independence of constitutional bodies).
  • Transport and infrastructure (programme points) — Basic tasks of the Vitézy portfolio (transport policy, infrastructure development, concessions).
  • Construction — integrated handling of housing policy and construction policy within the Vitézy portfolio.
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — gambling regulation going to Kármán from the Rogán-style position, Bálint Ruff’s veto right on state-asset and public-procurement matters.

6.4 Literature audit detail

6.4.1 Drucker: The Effective Executive

Drucker’s 1967 classic describes the five disciplinary practices of executive effectiveness: conscious management of time, contribution-oriented thinking, building on strengths, priority selection and effective decision-making. One of the central theses of the work: executive effectiveness is a learnable discipline, not personal charisma — and in organisational leadership one of the most important tasks is decision-rights allocation: who is entitled to substantive decision on what question.

“Executive effectiveness does not depend on how much one does; much more on what one spends time on — and what one does not. The effective executive knows that a great part of one’s own activity is to let others make the decision of their own specialty.” (Drucker, The Effective Executive, 1967 — paraphrase from the argument of chapters 1-2)

The Drucker-style interpretation of the Tisza cabinet’s powers decree: the veto right will be effective if inter-portfolio bargaining activates in few and precisely delimited matters — and not in every draft with the justification of “precaution”. The four-veto-minister model is an expensive institutional construction (more decision-makers take more time); the benefit is worth the cost only if the veto is limited to concrete, delimited questions (drafts with financial, justice, corruption, health, education effects), and the override procedure is fast and transparent.

📖 Source: Drucker, Peter F.: The Effective Executive

6.4.2 Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First

Lee Kuan Yew (1923–2015, the first prime minister of Singapore between 1959 and 1990) presents in detail in his 2000 From Third World to First the practice of Singaporean cabinet-building. The Cabinet Manual — the cabinet’s public internal rulebook — item by item fixes which minister is entitled to substantive decision on what question, on what question they must consult other portfolios, and when the question may reach the whole cabinet. Lee Kuan Yew emphasises: the powers decree clarifies two things simultaneously — the content of the competence (what the minister may decide) and the boundaries of the competence (what they cannot decide, even if they politically wanted to).

“The minister must know exactly on what they are entitled to decide alone, on what they must consult, and on what they must wait for the whole cabinet. If this is not clearly fixed, the cabinet by the end of the first year becomes an inter-portfolio weight-competition arena.” (Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, 2000 — paraphrase from the argument of Chapter 4)

From the point of view of the Hungarian Tisza cabinet, the Lee Kuan Yew lesson is direct: the powers decree of 14 May 2026 fixed the content (what Vitézy receives, what Kármán receives, etc.), but the boundaries and the veto-right procedure have not yet been fixed — therefore the creation of the 30-day government rules of procedure directly fits Lee Kuan Yew’s practice. The publication of the Tisza cabinet’s Cabinet Manual would mean a public-law-institutional quality leap, for which there is currently no Hungarian precedent — the greater the opportunity.

📖 Source: Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First

6.4.3 Fundamental Law of Hungary (in-force text)

Articles 15-18 of the Fundamental Law fix the framework of the Government’s operation. Under Article 15 the Government is the general body of the executive power, the task of which is the handling of affairs, the preparation of legislation and government steering. Under Article 16 the prime minister steers the operation of the Government — the members of the Government are nominated by the prime minister to the President of the Republic. Article 17 regulates the framework of the ministries and minister-without-portfolio offices. Under Article 18 the minister is responsible as a member of the government for the steering of their portfolio. The Hungarian public-law order in this structure operates according to the Kollegialprinzip: the cabinet decides as a collegial body, with prime-ministerial countersignature — Hungarian public law does not know formal ministerial veto right.

“The task of the Government is the handling of affairs, the preparation of legislation and government steering. The members of the Government (ministers) act independently in steering their portfolio, the decisions of the Government are countersigned by the prime minister.” (Fundamental Law Articles 15-18 — summary paraphrase)

The powers decree of 14 May 2026 and the four-veto-minister model are therefore a public-law-institutional novelty: they do not follow from the text of the Fundamental Law, but can only be an internal rule of the government’s rules of procedure. The Constitutional Court’s prior norm-control (Article 24(2)(e)) would be able to confirm — or, where relevant, contest — their constitutional legitimacy. In MIAK’s reading the veto right is publicly-law defensible, but only together with rules-of-procedure fixing and publicity.

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (in-force text, status 2026-04-17)

6.4.4 Allison–Zelikow: Essence of Decision

The Model III analysis of Allison and Zelikow — which through the example of the Cuban missile crisis shows that government decisions are rarely the result of the members’ rational agreement, much more frequently the children of inter-portfolio bargaining and organisational routine — directly affects the analysis of the operation of the veto right.

“The government decision is not a choice of a unitary actor. It is rather the bargaining result of the political weights of the participating actors — and this is the dynamics of Model III, which is present in every complex government structure.” (Allison–Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 1999, Chapter 5 — paraphrase)

In the 16-portfolio structure of the Hungarian Tisza cabinet the dynamics of Model III is particularly strong. The veto right has a dual effect: on one hand it decreases the field of application of political weight bargaining (because the four veto-empowered ministers operate as institutional “finalising points”), on the other hand it increases the visibility of inter-portfolio conflicts (because the public documentation of veto acts also makes the bargaining conflicts visible). In the Allison-Zelikow reading this is beneficial in both directions: the transparency of governance and the cabinet-internal professional integrity both improve, if the veto right is precisely delimited by rules of procedure and publicly documented.

📖 Source: Allison, Graham – Zelikow, Philip: Essence of Decision

6.5 International comparison

  • Singapore (Cabinet Manual, since 1965): The Cabinet Manual as public internal rulebook item by item fixes the ministerial powers, the veto-right-type mechanisms and the cabinet procedure. Result: Singapore is above the 95th percentile on the Government Effectiveness indicator of the Worldwide Governance Indicators.
  • New Zealand (Cabinet Manual, publicly available since 1996): At the taking office of every new cabinet the Cabinet Manual is publicly available and contains the internal protocols of inter-portfolio consultation, collective responsibility and veto-right-type. Amendments are reviewed annually.
  • United Kingdom (Cabinet Manual, publicly available since 2011): Similarly to the New Zealand model, the British Cabinet Manual fixes the rights and obligations of cabinet members at public-law level — particularly with regard to the collective responsibility principle.
  • Germany (Geschäftsordnung der Bundesregierung): The federal government’s rules of procedure regulate in detail the inter-portfolio veto-type mechanisms (Ressortprinzip, Kanzlerprinzip, Kollegialprinzip). Hungarian lesson: the Ressortprinzip — that is, the minister’s independent portfolio responsibility — lives together with the Kanzlerprinzip (the prime minister’s steering competence) and the Kollegialprinzip (the cabinet’s collective decision) within a concrete procedural regulation; the Hungarian Tisza cabinet must now elaborate this procedural dimension.
  • Hungary (Act XX of 1949 + Fundamental Law): Hungarian public law does not formally know ministerial veto; the powers decree of 14 May 2026 is therefore a public-law-institutional novelty that should be supplemented with Cabinet-Manual-type government rules-of-procedure regulation.

Public administration and e-government

  • KI6 — Competitive public service pay system
  • KI7 — Officials’ selection and rotation system
  • KI8 — Drucker-principled efficiency measurement in public administration
  • KI9 — Local participatory budget
  • KI11 — Organisational behaviour audit — Allison framework

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

Territorial inequality and rural policy

  • TE4 — Rural public-service minimum

Suggested new programme point: Government rules-of-procedure publication standard and veto-right protocol — to the Public administration and e-government area, which fixes the obligation of Cabinet-Manual-type public rules of procedure, the veto-right procedure and the quarterly veto record at the taking office of every new government.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 14 May 2026 — top 3 topic):

Knowledge-base references (professional books and legal sources):

  • 📖 Drucker, Peter F.: The Effective Executive
  • 📖 Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First
  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (in-force text, status 2026-04-17)
  • 📖 Allison, Graham – Zelikow, Philip: Essence of Decision

Note: the press monitor also recommended Mintzberg: Structure in Fives for the theoretical framework of organisational powers design; there is no .txt version of this in the könyvek/Alapok/ folder, therefore it appears in the szakirodalom_audit.kandidatusok list with the excluded: no .txt mark.

MIAK-internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI6, KI7, KI8, KI9, KI11)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Legal foundations (background material; Fundamental Law Articles 15-18, Article 31, gyakori_hibak.md items 7 and 11)
  • MIAK policy area: Transport and infrastructure (background material; basic tasks of the Vitézy portfolio)
  • MIAK press monitor, 14 May 2026 — 3rd topic, score: 90/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Hungarian Gazette (the 2026-05-13 evening and 05-14 dawn decree package)
  • New Zealand Cabinet Manual (public, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet)
  • United Kingdom Cabinet Manual (public, Cabinet Office)
  • Geschäftsordnung der Bundesregierung (Bundeskanzleramt, Germany)
  • Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) — Government Effectiveness

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