Part I — Situation overview

Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia’s former head of state, conceded at around half past nine on the evening of 25 October 2026, barely an hour and a half after the polls closed, that his party, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), had lost the snap parliamentary election. According to his own sample-based estimate, the Student List (Egyetemista Lista), born of the student movement, will win 135–140 seats and his “Aleksandar Vučić – United Serbia” list some 105 seats in the 250-seat parliament (Politico, Balkan Insight, MTI). The Ipsos and CeSID projection gives the Student List 52 per cent and 138 seats, and Vučić’s list 39.3 per cent and 104 seats. CRTA, an independent election-monitoring organisation, reported 51.5 and 40.2 per cent respectively. A majority requires 126 seats. No other national list got in. Among the minorities, according to Vučić’s estimate, the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSZ) may get three seats, and the Albanian and Bosniak lists one each. According to the Republic Electoral Commission (RIK), turnout was 64.9 per cent by six in the evening; by seven, CRTA measured 67.8 per cent. According to Politico, there has been no such turnout since 2000, when Slobodan Milošević’s regime fell. The vote was accompanied by serious irregularities: by four in the afternoon, CRTA had detected pressure on voters or on the committees in 29 per cent of the observed polling stations (MTI, 24.hu). There was no final official result by the time this article was completed.

The turn is the result of two years of protest. The collapse of the station canopy in Novi Sad on 1 November 2024, in which 16 people died, launched a nationwide student movement. In September Vučić resigned as president in order to return as prime minister. On 1 October MIAK proposed party-neutral Hungarian conduct for the campaign period, OSCE observation and application-based support for Vojvodina. On 27 September it wrote on the scenarios for the Serbian gas contract and the NIS case, and in June on lifting the secrecy over the Budapest–Belgrade railway. Now the question is the post-election situation. Prime Minister Magyar Péter congratulated the winners by telephone in the evening and, according to Telex, assured them of “Hungary’s support”. In a Facebook post he drew a parallel with the Hungarian turn in April (“Sound familiar?”). Vitézy Dávid, Minister of Transport and Investment, put it this way: in a political sense, the Budapest express reached Belgrade before it did on the rails. According to Srbijavoz’s announcement, direct passenger services will start on 13 December.

MIAK’s reading: the Hungarian–Serbian relationship has so far rested on the personal alliance of two leaders, and therefore it has now lost its supporting pillar overnight. The biggest risk is not that Budapest and the new Belgrade majority will fail to communicate. The risk is that the old pattern repeats itself with the sign reversed: the Hungarian government becomes the political patron of the new winner. This could also alienate the losing side, which makes up almost four-tenths of the voters, and the VMSZ. A lasting neighbourly relationship can only be built at the level of offices, treaties and joint committees.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three sources provide the interpretive framework for the post-election period. The Hungarian edition of Spin Dictators (2022) by Russian economist Sergei Guriev and American political scientist Daniel Treisman names Vučić among today’s examples of rule based on manipulation and media control. Their main thesis, the “modernisation cocktail”, holds that such a system works as long as the informed, educated stratum is small. If this stratum grows stronger, manipulation is less and less able to sustain power. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (economists, leading authors of institutional economics; awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2024) warn in Why Nations Fail (2012) of the “iron law of oligarchy”. According to it, new leaders promising radical change often inherit the old institutions and keep running them. The turn is lasting if it is carried by a broad social coalition and the institutions change too. The European Union’s 2016 global strategy (Shared Vision, Common Action) regards credible enlargement built on strict and fair conditionality as the key to the resilience of the Western Balkan states. It adds that cooperation must already deliver tangible benefits now. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures for the period of Serbian government formation and the first months that follow. The first settles the nature of the relationship, the second the railway services starting on 13 December, and the third the affairs of the Vojvodina Hungarian community.

3.1 State to state: a contact rule and a public inventory of agreements (until government formation, and within 60 days of the new Serbian government taking office)

MIAK proposes that the Government lay down the rules of Hungarian contact for the period of Serbian government formation. First: official contact should be conducted with the Serbian state bodies of the day. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should establish contact with the new majority. However, no member of the Government should appear together with politicians of the winning list at party-political events, and government communication should not build on the parallel with Hungarian domestic politics. The Student List’s lead candidate, Ilija Srdanović, called Hungary one of Serbia’s most important partners in an interview with Telex this week, and named good neighbourly relations as the goal. This works through official channels too. Second: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should prepare a public inventory of the Hungarian–Serbian agreements, memoranda of understanding and joint projects concluded between 2014 and 2026. The inventory should also include the energy elements (gas supply, storage, the matter of Mol and the Serbian oil company NIS), border-police cooperation and the railway investment. For each item it should state whether its text is public, when it expires, and who is responsible for it. Third: the Government should offer the new Serbian government a professional exchange of experience on how to review inherited obligations on taking office. This is called an opening balance sheet: an itemised review, prepared when a new government takes office, of inherited obligations, pending projects and unfunded promises. Dejan Šoškić, former governor of the Serbian central bank and one of the Student List’s possible candidates for prime minister, named precisely this as the new government’s first task in an interview with 444.hu. The proposal is an application of KP4 principled pragmatism and KP3 transparent foreign policy. According to Guriev and Treisman’s account (see 6.4.1), personal networks were the foreign-policy tools of the old system, so the inventory is the first step in clarifying the relationship.

3.2 Budapest–Belgrade railway: a joint request to lift secrecy and public operating data (before the start of services on 13 December)

According to 24.hu, the modernisation of the line was carried out partly with a Chinese loan and by Chinese contractors. The Hungarian government has already initiated the lifting of the secrecy, but according to HVG this also requires the consent of the Chinese side. MIAK’s June analysis proposed full contract transparency on the Hungarian side and an independent audit. The Serbian change of government now opens a new opportunity: the new Belgrade majority grew out of anti-corruption protests. First: the Government should propose to the new Serbian government that the two countries jointly approach the Chinese side to have the contracts relating to the line made public. The classification of the Hungarian documents was ordered by Parliament in an act, so to lift it the Government should submit a bill to Parliament. Second: from the start of services on 13 December, the Ministry of Transport and Investment should publish the line’s operating data every month: passenger numbers per service, punctuality, fares, the average duration of border checks. According to the Serbian railway company, the journey time to Budapest will be three hours, but border checks may also affect this. Third: the border police operating under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior and the Serbian border guard should examine the possibility of joint border checks carried out on board the train or handled at a single stop. The Hungarian–Serbian border is an external border of the Schengen area, so this has a decisive effect on journey time. The proposal builds on the KO4 data-based railway development and A2 public-procurement transparency programme points. According to Acemoglu and Robinson’s thesis (see 6.4.2), secret large-scale investments are the institutions that can survive a change of government if nobody opens them up.

3.3 Minority affairs with a public agenda and a transparent Hungarian position in the accession negotiations (within 90 days)

The political situation of the Vojvodina Hungarian community has changed. According to preliminary figures, the VMSZ won three seats, and until now it has been an ally of the losing governing party. According to a Telex report, a smaller local organisation, Vojvodina Hungarian Restart (Vajdasági Magyar Újrakezdés), supported the Student List and set itself the goal of dismantling the system built by the VMSZ. First: the Government should initiate a meeting, within 90 days of the formation of the new Serbian government, of the Hungarian–Serbian joint minority committee operating under the two countries’ minority protection agreement. Its agenda should be public: mother-tongue education, official language use, the financing of the national councils. The Hungarian side should hear all the community’s organisations, not just one party. Second: in Serbia’s accession negotiations, the member states decide unanimously on opening and closing negotiating chapters, so Hungary’s position carries weight. For every Serbian accession decision, the Government should publish a one-page justification of its vote, as part of the public voting log under KP3. It should also commit to not tying accession decisions to bilateral matters unrelated to minority protection. Third: the Government should take into account that, according to Šoškić, the Student List would make Serbia’s EU accession subject to a referendum. Hungarian support should therefore not be a campaign-style promise, but concrete cooperation that is visible to the public too: railways, border crossings, university and healthcare links. According to the EU’s global strategy (see 6.4.3), strict conditionality together with tangible benefits today is what makes enlargement credible. The proposal links the “bridge” function of KP10 regional resilience-building with KP15 preventive diplomacy.

The three proposals are linked by a single principle: good neighbourly relations are preserved by institutions, not by affinity. If Budapest now becomes the patron of the new winners, it may lose the relationship at the next Serbian election in the same way it has now lost it with the old leader. According to the literature framework, the turn is lasting if the inherited secret agreements and personal channels are replaced by public, enforceable rules.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Foreign policy A predictable state-to-state relationship with any Belgrade government; a credible Hungarian position in the accession negotiations The restrained tone may be perceived as coolness in Belgrade; the losing side may frame the Hungarian congratulations as interference
Transparency The inventory of agreements and the publication of the railway contracts reduce the risk of hidden obligations The Chinese side may refuse consent; the inventory may contain sensitive energy items that must be partly protected
Transport Public operating data will make it measurable whether the investment is worth it; shorter border checks If passenger numbers are low, the data will trigger political debate; aligning joint border checks with EU and Schengen rules takes time
Energy The inventory makes the obligations of the southern gas route visible According to Vučić, the new government may join the sanctions against Russia by spring; this could also affect the Serbian energy contracts and transit
Minority protection All the community’s organisations are brought into the consultation, not just one party The VMSZ may experience this as being sidelined; in a divided community consultation is slower

The main dilemma is timing. The Hungarian government must signal quickly now that it is ready to cooperate. If, however, the gesture takes on a party-political colouring, it repeats precisely the pattern from which the relationship needs to be freed. The proposal works if the quick contact happens through official channels and the substantive steps in public documents. A risky turn could come if the final result differs significantly from the preliminary one, or if the losing side disputes the election. In that case the pre-agreed EU position under KP15 is authoritative, not the Hungarian government’s unilateral assessment.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following performance indicators (KPIs — Key Performance Indicators):

  • Inventory of agreements: it is worth tracking whether the public list of Hungarian–Serbian agreements appears within 60 days of the new Serbian government taking office, and for what percentage of the items the text is available. Proposed target: at least 80 per cent within 12 months.
  • Railway transparency: lifting the secrecy over the contracts of the Budapest–Belgrade line by mid-2027, and monthly publication of operating data from the start of services on 13 December (passenger numbers, punctuality, border-check time).
  • Border checks: a reduction in the time spent at the border on international services in the first six months.
  • Joint minority committee: a meeting within 90 days with a public agenda and minutes; the share of Hungarian votes on Serbian accession decisions accompanied by a justification (proposed target: 100 per cent).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: the Hungarian government should not swap one Belgrade ally for another, but should build a state-to-state relationship. To this end it asks decision-makers for three concrete steps. A public inventory of agreements should be prepared, the two governments should jointly request that the secrecy of the railway contracts be lifted, and minority affairs should be brought before the joint committee with a public agenda. The proposal touches on two MIAK foundational values. Transparency, because the most sensitive elements of the Hungarian–Serbian relationship, railways and energy, became tools of personal politics precisely because of secrecy. Ideology-free policy, because good neighbourliness cannot depend on whose party happens to be in power in Belgrade.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

Left-liberal band. Telex, with on-the-spot reports, put election day and the Vojvodina Hungarian strand in the foreground: the bussing of voters, chain voting and the more than 60 observers of the DE! Action Community (DE! Akcióközösség), who brought their Hungarian experience to Vojvodina. In a separate article it covered Magyar Péter’s “Sound familiar?” reaction, so the parallel with Hungarian domestic politics became the main frame. 444.hu reported from the results night and published an interview with Dejan Šoškić, according to whom the Hungarian turn in April “gave strength” to the Serbian opposition. HVG’s subscriber analysis linked the railway and Vučić’s fate with the “Budapest express” metaphor (only the introduction of the article was publicly available).

Public-affairs band. 24.hu and ATV, building on MTI material, emphasised turnout and irregularities: CRTA’s data on pressure, photographed ballot papers and the police presence surrounding the electoral commission’s building. Index reported RIK’s partial results minute by minute, and showed that the official count initially had Vučić’s list ahead. This framing stressed that caution was warranted until the final result.

Economic band. Portfolio did not produce a separate analysis of the election but reported the railway timetable: eight services a day from 13 December, with fares still under negotiation. The economic press thus highlighted the practical, measurable consequence.

Government-critical conservative band. On this day MIAK’s press monitor contained no material focusing on the topic from either Magyar Nemzet or Mandiner. The conservative reading could therefore not be traced in today’s sample.

International press. Politico and the BBC highlighted the record turnout and the parallel with 2000, while EUobserver wrote of it as the year’s fourth electoral defeat of a pro-Russian or far-right force, after Hungary, Sweden and Latvia. Balkan Insight focused on Vučić’s speech, in which he called the defeat a foreign-backed “revolution”. Rapporteur (Euractiv) also reported that the leaders of the losing party greeted the result with songs about Ratko Mladić, the convicted war criminal.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Student List — seat estimate 135–140 (Vučić’s estimate); 138 (Ipsos/CeSID) Politico, Balkan Insight, HVG
Vučić’s list — seat estimate approx. 105 (Vučić); 104 (Ipsos/CeSID) Politico, HVG
Seats needed for a majority 126 / 250 HVG, Index
Vote share — Ipsos/CeSID 52% – 39.3% Rapporteur, HVG
Vote share — CRTA 51.5% – 40.2% Balkan Insight
Number of votes according to Vučić’s estimate Student List approx. 2.2 million, United Serbia approx. 1.72 million Telex, 444.hu (MTI)
VMSZ — seat estimate 3 Telex, 444.hu (MTI)
Turnout by 18:00 (RIK) 64.89% (2023: 51.93%) HVG, ATV
Turnout by 19:00 67.6% (Ipsos/CeSID), 67.8% (CRTA) HVG, Politico
Pressure at polling stations by 16:00 29% (CRTA) 24.hu, Telex (MTI)
Photographed ballot papers at 40 per cent of polling stations; in Belgrade at 80 per cent of observed stations 24.hu, Balkan Insight
Lists standing 18 lists, 2,418 candidates, of which 9 minority lists ATV (MTI)
Budapest–Belgrade direct passenger services from 13 December 2026, 8 services a day (6 to Budapest, 2 to Vienna); journey time to Budapest approx. 3 hours HVG, 24.hu, Portfolio
Suspension of direct passenger services since 1 February 2019 24.hu
Classification of the documents for the Hungarian section 10 years (decision of Parliament at the initiative of the previous government) HVG
Serbia’s EU candidate status since 2012; the process has stalled Politico

The results are preliminary. The final figures will be set by RIK’s official result and by the observer report of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — placing the Hungarian–Serbian relationship on a state-to-state footing, transparency of the Hungarian position represented in the accession negotiations, neighbourhood resilience-building.
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — a public inventory of bilateral agreements and lifting the secrecy over the Budapest–Belgrade railway contracts; the Serbian election is also a case study for MIAK’s A9 spin-dictatorship prevention index.
  • Transport and infrastructure (programme points) — public access to the operating data of international rail traffic and faster border checks.
  • Environment and climate (programme points) — the risks of the southern gas route and of the Serbian energy contracts after a possible Serbian alignment with sanctions (K7 energy-market shock resilience).
  • Demography (background material) — the conditions for the Vojvodina Hungarian community to remain in its homeland. The DM8 diaspora relations platform is built on attracting those living abroad back home; for a cross-border community living in its homeland, this may come into tension with supporting people staying put, so the two goals must be handled separately.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

According to the authors, the authoritarian leaders of the 21st century retain power not through open violence but through manipulation, media control and a democratic façade. The preface to the Hungarian edition explicitly mentions Vučić: he learned the method as Milošević’s information minister, and his party controls most of the major TV channels and tabloids. The book’s explanation for change is the “modernisation cocktail”. Its essence is that manipulation works well as long as the influence of the informed stratum is small:

“Once, however, the informed stratum grows, and this stratum accumulates more and more skills and resources, builds its own media and spreads its various values among the wider population, it becomes increasingly difficult for dictators to retain control, even with the help of experts in deception.”

The authors also describe how such systems build on personal friendships and networks abroad too, using them to bind certain actors of the Western political world to themselves. In the Serbian case this is a twofold lesson. On the one hand, the mobilisation of the student movement and of urban and young voters living abroad shows precisely the book’s mechanism. On the other hand, the old system’s foreign-policy connections, including the personal Hungarian–Serbian axis, do not disappear by themselves. That is why the public inventory proposed in 3.1 is needed.

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

6.4.2 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

According to the authors, critical junctures do not guarantee better institutions. Citing the German sociologist Robert Michels, they call the “iron law of oligarchy” the pattern in which a radical movement merely puts a new actor in the place of the old one:

“The essence of the iron law of oligarchy is that new leaders are able to overthrow the rule of the old ones because they promise radical changes, which they then fail to deliver.”

At the same time, the authors stress that this is not a law set in stone. The chances of a lasting turn increase if it is carried by a broad social coalition and inclusive, pluralist institutions really replace the old ones. The Serbian student movement also put doctors, actors, scientists and athletes on its list (BBC), that is, it acted as a broad coalition. The risk lies elsewhere: the secret contracts, the management of state companies and media oversight pass into the hands of the new government. The Hungarian neighbour cannot influence this, but it can ensure that no secret agreements remain in place in the two countries’ common affairs, for example on the railway.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

6.4.3 European Union: Shared Vision, Common Action

The EU’s 2016 global strategy describes enlargement as a security-policy investment. In its view, a credible enlargement policy built on strict and fair conditionality is an irreplaceable tool for the resilience of the countries concerned. The document adds that, alongside conditionality, cooperation must deliver tangible results today as well:

“At the same time, EU support for and cooperation with these countries must deliver concrete benefits today, and must be communicated well.”

After the Serbian change of government, this duality applies to Hungarian policy as well. The strict conditions, namely the rule of law, media freedom and minority protection, cannot be relaxed because the Belgrade government is more sympathetic. Serbian voters, however, will only support accession in a possible referendum if they already feel the benefits of rapprochement now. The railway, faster border crossings and the settlement of minority affairs are tangible opportunities for this.

📖 Source: European Union: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016)

6.5 International comparison

The closest historical parallel is Serbia’s own turn in 2000. According to Politico, that was the last time turnout was this high, and the “He’s finished!” slogan chanted on election night also spread at that time. The period after 2000 shows that even after a regime falls, it can take years for institutions to be transformed. According to EUobserver, the Serbian result is the year’s fourth national election in which a pro-Russian or far-right force lost, after Hungary, Sweden and Latvia. The paper believes that with Vučić’s departure the chances of settling relations with Kosovo increase, and that after Montenegro enlargement could extend to other Western Balkan states. The Hungarian experience runs in two directions here: the change of government in April inspired the Serbian opposition (444.hu), and the Serbian example shows that foreign policy after a change of government can also easily be built on party-political parallels. MIAK proposes avoiding this trap.

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP4 — Principled pragmatism doctrine
  • KP10 — Regional resilience-building
  • KP15 — Institutionalisation of preventive diplomacy

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency
  • A9 — Spin-dictatorship prevention index

Transport and infrastructure

  • KO4 — Railway development with data-based priority

Environment and climate

  • K7 — Energy-market shock resilience

Demography

  • DM8 — Diaspora relations platform

Proposed new programme point: Public inventory of bilateral agreements with neighbouring states — for the Foreign policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK foreign press monitor, 26 October 2026 — topic 1):

Supplementary press sources (MIAK press monitor, 26 October 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators (2022)
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail (2012)
  • 📖 European Union: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe (2016)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP3, KP4, KP10, KP15)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A2, A9)
  • MIAK policy area: Transport and infrastructure (programme points; programme point ID: KO4)
  • MIAK policy area: Environment and climate (programme points; programme point ID: K7)
  • MIAK policy area: Demography (background material; programme point ID: DM8)
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 26 October 2026 — topic 1, score: 92/100
  • MIAK press monitor, 26 October 2026 — topic 2, score: 82/100

Supplementary public data sources (for the final data):

  • Republic Electoral Commission of Serbia (RIK) — official final result
  • OSCE/ODIHR — preliminary and final report of the election observation mission

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