Part I — Situation overview

On 24 October, Mayor of Győr Pintér Bence announced on his Facebook page that the association he leads, Tiszta Szívvel a Városért Egyesület (TSZV), is initiating an amendment to the Fundamental Law and to legislation. The aim is for voters to be able to dissolve — in the term used by the press, “recall” — the local council by referendum. The announcement follows the loss of the Fidesz–KDNP majority in the Győr city assembly. According to Index and Portfolio, eight councillors left the group and Fidesz, and then formed a new group called Csak Győr. Two councillors set up a KDNP group. Former mayor Borkai Zsolt dissolved his association and resigned his local mandate. At the October session the mayor moved to put the dissolution of the assembly on the agenda, but the motion did not receive enough support. According to Pintér, the council has “permanently lost the legitimacy it gained in 2024”, so the people of Győr should decide whether they accept the new groups’ offer.

Under current law, voters have no tool for this. Article 35 of the Fundamental Law knows two routes to dissolution: the local council can declare its own dissolution, or Parliament can dissolve a council operating in breach of the Fundamental Law. For the latter the Government makes a motion, after seeking the opinion of the Constitutional Court. A shift in the political balance of power is a condition for neither route. On the same day two other news items also concerned the functioning of local public services. In Miskolc, two weeks after the start of the heating season, district heating had still not started in 1,164 flats in 21 buildings, because the modernisation ordered by the residents’ associations had been delayed. In Józsefváros, under an agreement between the mayor and the district police chief, a permanent patrol is on duty in Blaha Lujza Square.

In MIAK’s reading, the Győr initiative points to a real institutional gap: for five years voters have no tool against group switches during the term. The proposed solution, however, could also jeopardise local stability, so it must start not from one city’s concrete political situation but from nationally uniform safeguards fixed in advance.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three sources frame the question. The Fundamental Law of Hungary is unambiguous on two points: no national referendum may be held either on amending the Fundamental Law or on dissolving a local council, and Article 35 sets out the routes to a council’s dissolution as a closed list. A change is therefore possible only by a two-thirds decision of Parliament. Alexis de Tocqueville (French political thinker, author of Democracy in America) regarded local self-government as the school of liberty. At the same time he described how frequently repeated elections keep a community in constant agitation and bring continual instability into public affairs. According to Montesquieu (French legal philosopher, classic of the theory of the separation of powers), the advantage of the representative system is that representatives can discuss public affairs in substance, while voters exercise their judgement by choosing between successive bodies. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first sets out the possible form of a recall with safeguards, the second prescribes a test before submission, and the third improves voters’ information immediately, without a constitutional amendment.

3.1 Concept of a narrow, high-threshold local recall procedure (public draft and impact assessment by 31 March 2027)

Formally, the association’s initiative can only be interpreted as a political appeal: an amendment to the Fundamental Law — like a legislative initiative — may be submitted by the President of the Republic, the Government, a parliamentary committee or a Member of Parliament. Its adoption requires the votes of two thirds of Members of Parliament. If the question is put on the agenda, MIAK proposes that the competent ministry prepare a public concept and an impact assessment under I3 by 31 March 2027. The concept should not be a “dissolution referendum” but a local recall procedure, with four fixed safeguards. The first is a high signature threshold: MIAK proposes at least one quarter of the settlement’s voters for discussion. The second is a time limit: no procedure should be launched in the first year after the election or in the last year of the term, and only once per term. The third is a validity threshold linked to turnout at the original election. The fourth is settling the consequences: the new council should serve only for the remainder of the term. The mayor is a separate question: under Article 35(6) of the Fundamental Law, the dissolution of the council also terminates the mayor’s mandate, so the fate of the directly elected mayor must be decided explicitly. Tocqueville’s description of the continual agitation caused by frequent elections (see 6.4.2) shows exactly why the thresholds must be set high.

3.2 Constitutionality test and structured consultation before submission (by 30 June 2027)

The greatest risk of a local recall procedure is not the Győr case, but that a later national majority or a well-organised local group uses it for its own ends. MIAK proposes that before submission an independent expert panel examine the draft using the constitutional “stress test” method of I10. The examination plays through the abuse scenarios: serial, politically motivated procedures, manipulation of signature collection, and the case where central power encourages procedures in opposition-led settlements. It must be laid down that procedures may be launched only by voters, not by the Government or Parliament, and that the verification of signatures and the result can be challenged in court. The draft must also be consulted on in a structured public consultation under I9 and with the local government associations. The current dissolution route under Article 35 of the Fundamental Law is deliberately narrow and tied to several actors (see 6.4.1): the new route cannot be looser than this system of safeguards. The proposal is the local-level application of programme point A6 on checks and balances.

3.3 Public register of council votes by name and of group switches (module by 31 December 2027)

The complaint behind the Győr situation — that councillors do something different during the term from what they received a mandate for — can be partly addressed without a constitutional amendment. MIAK proposes that the KI4 local government digitalisation platform get a uniform module. In it, every local council publishes, in machine-readable form, its votes by name, the composition of its groups and the dates of group switches. Voters can then see who voted how not only at the end of the term but continuously. According to Montesquieu’s argument (see 6.4.3), the judgement of voters works best in the choice between successive bodies; for this, however, they need to know what the outgoing body did. Together with KI9 local participatory budgeting, the register can be an everyday tool of local accountability. The Miskolc and Józsefváros cases also show that local chains of responsibility are complicated — residents’ association, contractor and service provider, or local government and police — and voters can judge them only from public data.

A common principle links the three proposals: strengthening local democracy depends not on how quickly councils can be removed, but on the quality of voters’ judgement. According to the literature, local self-government is the school of liberty, but overly frequent elections cause instability. The representative system works if voters can make a well-founded decision at the end of the term.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Local democracy A high-threshold recall gives voters a last-resort safeguard against a council that persistently turns against its mandate With a low threshold it can lead to a permanent campaign and paralysed councils
Local government operation A public voting register increases predictability and reduces the political gain from group switches The mere possibility of the procedure may make councils more cautious about unpopular but necessary decisions (fees, renovations)
Public administration Election offices and government offices get a uniform procedure The cost and organisational burden of repeated local votes may be disproportionate in small settlements
Constitutional system The stress test filters out opportunities for abuse in advance If the rule is born under the pressure of a concrete political situation, it may become a tool of later majorities

The most important trade-off is the level of the thresholds. With too low a threshold, recall becomes the losing side’s ordinary tool, and the council operates in campaign mode throughout the whole term. With too high a threshold, the procedure exists only on paper. MIAK therefore does not fix a final number, but asks that the impact assessment work through several variants based on international practice and Hungarian turnout data. The second question is the mayor: if the dissolution of the council also terminates the mayor’s mandate, the mayor may have a conflicting interest; if not, the conflict between the two bodies may continue with the new council. The risk of proposal 3.3 is low, but the administrative burden on small settlements must be reduced with a central platform.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following key performance indicators (KPIs):

  • Concept and impact assessment: whether a public draft on local recall, with the calculated effect of at least three threshold variants, appears by 31 March 2027.
  • Preliminary test: whether the independent constitutionality review is completed and the consultation with the local government associations concluded by 30 June 2027.
  • Voting register: by the end of 2027, what percentage of settlements publish council votes by name and group switches in machine-readable form.
  • Signals of abuse: if the rule is introduced, how many procedures are launched in the first two years, and how many of them reach a vote.

5.2 Summary

MIAK asks that the question of local recall not be decided by the rhythm of one city’s political crisis. If the Government or Members of Parliament put it on the agenda, a public concept, an impact assessment and an independent constitutionality test should come first, with a high signature threshold, a time limit and a settlement of the mayor’s position. Until then, publicity of local councils’ votes by name and of group switches gives voters their most direct tool. The proposals concern two of MIAK’s foundational values. Accountability, because voters need to see during the term as well how the mandate they gave is being used. Transparency, because a new tool of direct democracy strengthens local democracy only if its rules and risks of abuse have been weighed in advance and in public.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

Liberal-left band. HVG put the mayor’s suspicion in the foreground: according to the article, Pintér Bence regards the new groups linked to the former governing party as a carry-over of the old politics, and is calling for recall by referendum. The paper described the initiative as a “constitutional amendment” and a “recall”. In the material processed, Telex and 444.hu did not cover the Győr case.

Public-affairs band. Index presented the mayor’s reasoning and the change in the balance of power in the assembly in detail, and presented the initiator as an association. In a separate article it covered the Miskolc district heating outage based on the service provider’s statement. 24.hu focused on the background of the group switches and the statements of the actors, and also reported the Józsefváros mayor’s announcement on patrolling in Blaha Lujza Square, highlighting the mayor’s warning that more patrols alone will not solve the square’s problems.

Economic band. In a report based on MTI, Portfolio reported the Győr announcement and the Józsefváros agreement as news, without evaluation.

Conservative band. Magyar Nemzet presented the initiative as a move by the mayor’s group, framing it as the mayor’s side being unhappy about the formation of the new group (only the lead of the article was publicly available). Material from Mandiner and Népszava was not in the processed set.

6.2 Facts and data

Item Value Source
The initiator Tiszta Szívvel a Városért Egyesület (TSZV), chaired by Mayor Pintér Bence Index; Portfolio, 24 October 2026
The Győr group switch 8 councillors left the Fidesz–KDNP group, new group called Csak Győr; 2 councillors formed a KDNP group Index; Portfolio, 24 October 2026
Size of the former Fidesz group 14 members 24.hu, 24 October 2026
Dissolution motion in the assembly putting it on the agenda did not receive enough support Index; Portfolio, 24 October 2026
National referendum prohibitions not permitted on amending the Fundamental Law or on dissolving a local council Fundamental Law, Article 8(3)(a) and (g)
Dissolution of a local council self-dissolution under a cardinal act; dissolution by Parliament, on a motion by the Government, after seeking the opinion of the Constitutional Court, for operation in breach of the Fundamental Law Fundamental Law, Article 35(4)–(5)
Effect of dissolution on the mayor the mayor’s mandate also terminates Fundamental Law, Article 35(6)
Local government term five years Fundamental Law, Article 35(2)
Miskolc district heating 21 buildings, 1,164 flats without heating two weeks after the start of the season; the provider serves about 32,000 residential customers Statement by MIHŐ Kft., quoted by Index, 24 October 2026
Blaha Lujza Square permanent two-person patrol under an agreement between the mayor and the district police chief 24.hu; Portfolio, 24 October 2026

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — the local voting register on the local government digitalisation platform (KI4), tools of local participation (KI9);
  • Justice (programme points) — legislative impact assessment (I3), structured citizen consultation (I9) and the constitutionality test (I10);
  • Construction (programme points) — scheduling building modernisations around the heating season (EP3);
  • Public security and law enforcement (programme points) — police presence built on local cooperation (KB2).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Fundamental Law of Hungary

The Fundamental Law lays down the foundations of local self-government in Articles 31–35, and leaves the detailed rules on local governments to a cardinal act. Under Article 34, the Government ensures legality supervision through the capital and county government offices — so the government office is a state body, not a local government one. Two paragraphs of Article 35 deal with dissolution:

“(4) The local council may – as laid down in a cardinal act – declare its dissolution. (5) Parliament, on a motion by the Government submitted after seeking the opinion of the Constitutional Court, shall dissolve a local council operating in breach of the Fundamental Law.” (MIAK’s own translation)

Article 8(3) excludes amendment of the Fundamental Law and dissolution of a local council from being the subject of a national referendum. The Győr initiative can therefore be realised not by referendum but only by a two-thirds decision of Parliament. It must be fitted into a system that has so far deliberately limited dissolution to a narrow circle, to constitutional grounds and to the cooperation of several actors (3.2).

📖 Source: Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force on 17 April 2026), Articles 8, 34 and 35

6.4.2 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America

Tocqueville deliberately began his analysis of American democracy with the township, because he considered it the most natural form of community. In his view, local liberty is not the result of planning but takes root over a long time in laws and customs — and is easily destroyed. His most famous thesis:

“Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it.” (own translation)

At the same time, in the chapter on the frequency of elections he warns that when elections recur often, they “keep society in a feverish state of excitement and give a continual instability to public affairs” (own translation). Infrequent elections, on the other hand, cause a violent crisis each time. Tocqueville thus describes both sides of the dilemma. Applied to local recall: voters’ participation in local affairs is a value, but a procedure that is easy to launch can turn the whole term into electoral agitation. That is why a high threshold and a time limit are needed (3.1).

📖 Source: Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America (1835), Volume I, Chapters 5 and 13

6.4.3 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

In the chapter on legislative power, Montesquieu argues that in large communities the people govern through representatives. In his view, the great advantage of representatives is that they are able to discuss public affairs, while the people are excellently able to judge whom to choose. On the succession of bodies he writes:

“When different legislative bodies succeed one another, the people who have a bad opinion of that which is actually sitting may reasonably entertain some hopes of the next.” (own translation)

Applied to local democracy, the idea means that the primary arena of voters’ judgement is the regular succession of bodies. Intervention during the term can only be an exceptional safeguard. And the quality of voters’ judgement depends on how much they know about the work of the outgoing body — this is what the register of votes by name serves (3.3).

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (1748), Book XI, Chapter 6

6.5 International comparison

Japan: dissolution of the local assembly on voters’ initiative. The Japanese Local Autonomy Act allows voters, in a local vote initiated with the signatures of a significant share of the electorate, to dissolve the local assembly or recall the mayor. The system is built on a high signature threshold and fixed time limits — exactly the elements proposed in 3.1.

Poland: local referendum on recalling bodies. Under Polish local referendum rules, voters can recall the municipal council or the mayor by referendum before the end of the term. The rule links the validity of the referendum to turnout at the original election, and it cannot be held in the period after the election or close to the end of the term. Polish experience shows that because of the high validity threshold a significant share of procedures are unsuccessful — this is both a safeguard and a warning for calibrating the thresholds.

Germany: removability of the mayor. In several German states the directly elected mayor can be removed by a vote of the residents, but there is typically no such route for dissolving the council. The difference highlights that the fate of the mayor and that of the council must be settled separately (3.1).

Public administration and e-government

  • KI4 — Local government digitalisation
  • KI9 — Local participatory budgeting

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment
  • I9 — Popular-sovereignty audit — law-making with citizen feedback
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

Construction

  • EP3 — Energy-efficiency renovation programme

Public security and law enforcement

  • KB2 — Community policing

Proposed new programme point: Local recall procedure with a package of safeguards — high signature threshold, time limit, validity threshold, settlement of the mayor’s position, preliminary constitutionality test, and a register of council votes by name — for the Public administration and e-government area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 25 October 2026 — topic 6):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (text in force on 17 April 2026)
  • 📖 Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America (1835)
  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (1748)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI4, KI9)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I3, I9, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Construction (programme points; programme point ID: EP3)
  • MIAK policy area: Public security and law enforcement (programme points; programme point ID: KB2)
  • MIAK press monitor, 25 October 2026 — topic 6, score: 69/100

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