Part I — Situation overview

The Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) published the September labour market data on 22 October. Among 15–74-year-olds, an average of 4,661,000 people were in work, the number of unemployed was 224,000, and the unemployment rate was 4.6 per cent. Compared with August, the number of employed rose by 7,500, the number of unemployed fell by 4,700, and the rate improved by 0.1 percentage points (pp) (24.hu, ATV). Looking at the third quarter as a whole, however, the picture is different. The average number of employed was essentially the same as a year earlier. In the domestic primary labour market, on the other hand — that is, in jobs at home, excluding public works participants and those working abroad — 4,482,000 people were in work, 22,000 fewer than in the same period of 2025. The statistics also count as employed the 69,000 public works participants and the 118,000 people working abroad. Among the unemployed, the share of those who have been looking for work for more than a year rose to 32.5 per cent (+3.3 pp), and the average duration of job search is 11.6 months. At the end of September, 223,000 jobseekers were on the register of the National Employment Service (NFSZ), 1.1 per cent more than a year earlier.

On the same day, two other pieces of news arrived. Several workers were unexpectedly dismissed from the battery plant of SK On Hungary Kft. in Iváncsa, and according to the Youth Workers’ Interest Protection Organisation (LIMÉSZ), which belongs to the LIGA trade union confederation, the layoffs are continuing. The company justified the decision as “adjustment to current business conditions” (Telex, HVG, Portfolio). According to public company data, 1,819 people worked at the company’s Komárom and Iváncsa sites in 2025, compared with 2,700 a year earlier. Meanwhile, the first substantive round of the minimum wage bargain took place at the Permanent Consultation Forum of the Business Sector and the Government (VKF) — the wage bargaining forum of employers, trade unions and the government. The employers’ side wants a 4 per cent rise, the trade unions a double-digit one (Portfolio, Magyar Nemzet).

On 26 September (Births at a record low, unemployment rising) MIAK proposed a quarterly population and labour balance and a six-month activation threshold, and on 20 October (Sectoral pay rises, the minimum wage bargain) a separate presentation of the gross rise and the tax effect. This analysis does not repeat them. The new data show two things. Beneath the improving headline figure, the number of market jobs is falling, and the public debate barely sees this. And both society and the state learn about layoffs late, from the press. In MIAK’s reading, the current labour market is not collapsing but slowly weakening: the headline figure is held up by public works and work abroad, while the domestic primary labour market is slowly shrinking. This situation calls not for alarm, but for more precise measurement and faster response.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three sources provide a frame for interpreting the situation. The European Commission’s European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (2021) does not regard restructuring as an internal matter of the company. Restructuring can be socially responsible if employment services and the social partners become involved in time and workers are informed in advance. According to the autumn 2025 World Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European battery production is at a significant cost disadvantage compared with China. The employment gains of clean technology sectors built up with state support are therefore fragile, and according to the report, rapid labour market reallocation can be helped by modern employment services. Joseph E. Stiglitz (American economist, awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2001, former chief economist of the World Bank) writes in his book Globalization and Its Discontents that unemployment has social costs which private companies do not account for. According to the book, if workers move from low-productivity jobs in state enterprises into unemployment, this does not increase the country’s income. Stiglitz also refutes the claim that unemployment is necessarily the consequence of excessively high wages or the minimum wage. The detailed treatment of the literature — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable steps. The first breaks down the headline employment figure, the second makes layoffs visible in time, and the third makes the disputed target of the minimum wage bargain unambiguous.

3.1 The primary labour market alongside the headline figure (monthly publication from January 2027, a government target figure in the 2027 budget)

The KSH currently publishes the breakdown quarterly; the headline of the monthly flash report is the total number of employed and the unemployment rate. MIAK proposes that the KSH also show the three components of employment in its monthly publication, in a single table: the primary labour market, public works and those working abroad. Each should be accompanied by the value a year earlier and the change. The KSH decides on the methodology itself, on the basis of its professional independence; the Government’s task is to provide the resources needed for this. The same table should also include the sampling error margin of the change. Portfolio pointed out that the error margin of the survey is around 0.3 pp, so monthly movements of 0.1–0.3 pp often cannot even be distinguished from stagnation. The second element of the proposal concerns the Government. The Government should tie the employment target of the 2027 budget and government communication to the headcount in the primary labour market, not to the total number of employed. Public works are a social safety net, not market jobs. And work abroad says nothing about the performance of the domestic economy. This is a common measurement condition of the FO1 employment data platform and the FO2 public works transformation programme points. FO2 already treats the share of those moving from public works into market jobs as a target figure, and this requires the monthly base data. The consolidated population and labour balance of 26 September is about why labour supply changes. This proposal is about how many of those already in work work in the primary labour market.

3.2 An early warning system for layoffs: monthly public notification data and headcount tracking at subsidised companies (launch on 1 January 2027, first headcount report by 31 March 2027)

Under the Labour Code, dismissals within 30 days that reach a threshold set according to the employer’s headcount count as collective redundancy. In such cases the employer is obliged to consult the workers’ representatives and to inform the state employment body, that is, the government office, in advance. The proposal of 26 September set out what should happen after such a notification. The Iváncsa case reveals two gaps. One is that the aggregate notification data are not public, so neither the press nor the local governments of the area can see where the risk is building up. The other is that layoffs carried out in instalments, below the threshold, fall outside the procedure. According to the trade union, neither the immediate dismissal nor a possible collective redundancy meets the requirements, and the scale of the planned layoffs is not known. According to public data, the company’s headcount fell by around a third between 2024 and 2025, and there are no public data on the procedure under which this happened. MIAK proposes two steps. First: from 1 January 2027, government offices should publish every month, broken down by county and sector and without names, the number of collective redundancy notifications and the number of people affected. Second: at companies that received investment subsidies by individual government decision, the National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) should compare every quarter, on the basis of monthly contribution returns, the actual headcount with the headcount committed to in the subsidy contract. The supporting ministry should publish the result by 31 March 2027 and quarterly thereafter. If the headcount falls by more than 10 per cent within a quarter, or drops below the commitment, the government office should contact the company even before the notification threshold is reached. The purpose of the contact is information, advice and an offer of retraining, as well as a review of the contract. According to the EU Action Plan (see 6.4.1), a condition of socially responsible restructuring is that the employment service becomes involved in time. The proposal is a measurement tool of the FO13 labour market programme for trade realignment and of G9 conditional industrial policy. The 4 June blog post on the battery industry dealt with the conditions of future subsidies; this proposal is about tracking the headcount commitments of contracts already concluded.

3.3 Minimum wage: fixing the measure of the 2027 target by the next VKF round (by 30 November 2026 at the latest)

The three-year wage agreement of 2024 set as a common goal that by 2027 the gross minimum wage should reach 50 per cent of regular gross average earnings (Magyar Nemzet, Portfolio). After the first round it turned out that the parties are not measuring the same target. According to Portfolio’s calculation, reaching the gross target would require an immediate rise of 10–15 per cent. Together with the 5.5 per cent average wage growth expected by the government, this could mean a rise of more than 20 per cent. If, however, the net minimum wage is measured against net average earnings, then after the cut in personal income tax (SZJA) from 15 to 9 per cent, 1–5 per cent would suffice, or 6–10 per cent together with average wage growth. The same “50 per cent” therefore means a several-fold difference depending on the measure. MIAK proposes that in the next round the VKF should fix the measure of the target in writing, before bargaining over the figures. MIAK’s proposal is the gross ratio, in line with the original text of the agreement. Alongside it, the net ratio should be published as a mandatory supplementary indicator, so that the effect of the tax cut is visible but does not override the target. If the parties do not consider it realistic to reach the gross target in a single year because of economic performance, they should fix a multi-year, year-by-year schedule up to 2029. In it, the path of the guaranteed minimum wage — the mandatory lowest pay for jobs requiring at least secondary education or a vocational qualification — should appear separately. According to Stiglitz’s argument (see 6.4.3), the minimum wage does not automatically cause unemployment. The negotiation should therefore be about the balance between a measurable target and capacity to bear the burden, not about whose indicator is the “right” one. The 20 October blog post proposed the starting point of the negotiation (inflation plus productivity) and a gross–net table for each variant. This proposal adds that the parties should also measure the target on the same yardstick. The proposal is a procedural element of FO10 modernising wage bargaining and of G18 tripartite wage coordination.

The three proposals are linked by a common principle: today, information for labour market decisions arrives at the wrong time and in the wrong breakdown. The headline figure masks the real market process, the public learns about layoffs after the fact, and the parties argue about the minimum wage target using different yardsticks. According to the literature frame, the social cost of unemployment is not included in the company’s decision. Only timely, shared information held by the state and the social partners can counterbalance this.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Statistics and public information The primary labour market figure is placed alongside the headline figure, and monthly fluctuations can be interpreted together with the error margin A monthly breakdown on a smaller sample comes with a larger error; the KSH must publish it with methodological caution
Workers and regions The area and the employment service learn about layoffs weeks earlier, and retraining can start even before the dismissals Public notification data may make a company identifiable in a smaller area
Investment environment Headcount tracking of subsidised companies means predictable, rule-based supervision Investors may perceive the quarterly headcount report as an extra burden or a sign of mistrust
Pay policy A fixed measure reduces talking at cross purposes at the VKF If the gross target is reached too fast, wage cost pressure rises at smaller companies; if too slowly, the bottom of the pay scale falls behind

The most important question to weigh is in proposal 3.2. Headcount tracking cannot be a punitive tool: a factory may be forced to cut production for market reasons too, and subsidy contracts typically do allow room for manoeuvre for this. The proposal therefore prescribes not automatic repayment, but early contact and a review of the contract. The line is where the commitment and the actual headcount diverge persistently, and the public knows nothing about it. In the case of the Iváncsa company, according to public data, the headcount fell from 2,700 to 1,819 between 2024 and 2025, while after-tax profit rose from 9 billion to 107 billion forints (Telex). This in itself is not a breach of the law, but it is precisely the situation in which the social cost (unemployment, commuting and regional effects) and the company’s results part ways. The risk of proposal 3.1 is smaller, but real: if the government target figure is tied to the primary labour market, scaling back public works will worsen the total employment indicator in the short term. This must be accepted, because the goal is to lead people into market work, not to embellish the statistics. Proposal 3.3 becomes risky if the multi-year path of the gross target remains a matter of political bargaining and is renegotiated every year. This can be prevented by written, year-by-year steps of the path fixed in advance.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes following these key performance indicators (KPIs):

  • Monthly publication of the primary labour market figure: from January 2027, whether the KSH’s monthly flash report contains the primary labour market, public works and those working abroad on separate lines, with the annual change and the error margin.

  • Headcount in the primary labour market: whether in the third quarter of 2027 the number of people working in the primary labour market reaches or exceeds the current 4,482,000.

  • Publicity of layoff data: whether by 31 January 2027 the first monthly summary of collective redundancy notifications, broken down by county and sector, appears, and by 31 March 2027 the first headcount report on subsidised large companies.

  • Measure of the minimum wage target: whether by 30 November 2026 the VKF fixes in writing whether the 2027 target refers to the gross or the net ratio, and whether there is a year-by-year path up to 2029.

5.2 Summary

MIAK asks for three things. The KSH should show the primary labour market separately in its monthly publication as well, and the Government should tie its employment targets to it. Government offices should make collective redundancy notifications public every month, and compare the headcount of subsidised large companies with their commitments every quarter. And the VKF should fix what it measures the target against before the minimum wage figures. The proposals touch on two of MIAK’s foundational values. Data-drivenness, because the current September data can be read both as a success and as a failure, and only a more precise breakdown can decide this. Transparency, because today workers and the area learn about layoffs from the press, even though the necessary data are already in the hands of the state.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

Left-liberal band. Telex and HVG brought the Iváncsa dismissals to the fore, on the basis of the trade union statement sent to MTI and the company’s response. Telex also detailed the company data: the fall in headcount and the significantly improving results over the same period. Both outlets recalled the two fines of 100 million forints each: one was imposed for occupational safety irregularities, the other for groundwater pollution. 444.hu examined one element of the public sector pay rises, the police rise. According to the Independent Police Trade Union, 15 per cent is too little, and the force would consider 50 per cent necessary to stop attrition (only the introduction of the article was publicly available). This band did not analyse the composition of the KSH data in the processed material.

Mainstream band. 24.hu presented the September data factually, following the KSH’s release, including the 22,000 fall in the primary labour market and the rise in the share of the long-term unemployed. In another article it reported the disappointment of the Public Service Police Trade Union with the details of the interior ministry pay rise. ATV reported in a favourable frame, with the question “Has the trend turned?”: it highlighted the monthly improvement, not the fall in the primary labour market. In the processed material Index did not cover this topic separately.

Economic band. Portfolio dealt with the topic in four articles. Citing insider sources, it reported on the first round of the minimum wage talks, the employers’ 4 and the trade unions’ 14 per cent positions, and the informally floated 8 per cent compromise. According to its analysis of unemployment, the increase is driven not by layoffs but by previously inactive people entering the labour market, as the activity rate is at a historic high. This framing differs from the KSH’s quarterly breakdown, which shows the primary labour market shrinking. The two readings do not exclude each other, but together they show why the breakdown is needed alongside the headline figure. The article on the slowdown of wage dynamics was behind a paywall after the introduction.

Government-critical conservative band. Magyar Nemzet stressed that the government had “rewritten the original target”, and that the minimum wage rise may fall short of the three-year agreement. The article quoted both sides in detail: the president of the National Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions (MASZSZ) demanded continuity, while the secretary general of the National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers (VOSZ) argued for the need to renegotiate. The pieces of Mandiner and Népszava were not in the processed set.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Employed, September 2026 (aged 15–74) 4,661,000 (+7,500 compared with August) KSH, cited by 24.hu, 22 October 2026
Unemployed, September 2026 224,000 (−4,700); rate 4.6% (−0.1 pp) KSH, cited by 24.hu, 22 October 2026
Employed, Q3 2026 4,669,000, essentially the same as a year earlier KSH, cited by ATV, 23 October 2026
Primary labour market, Q3 4,482,000, 22,000 fewer than a year earlier KSH, cited by 24.hu, 22 October 2026
Public works participants / working abroad 69,000 / 118,000 KSH, cited by 24.hu, 22 October 2026
Employment rate (aged 15–64) 75.6% (men 79.2%, women 72.0%) KSH, cited by 24.hu and ATV
Unemployment rate, Q3 4.7% (men 4.5%, women 4.9%) KSH, cited by 24.hu and ATV
Share of those seeking work for more than a year 32.5% (+3.3 pp) KSH, cited by 24.hu and ATV
Average duration of job search 11.6 months KSH, cited by 24.hu and ATV
Registered jobseekers, end of September 223,000 (+1.1% in one year) NFSZ, cited by 24.hu and ATV
Sampling error margin of the labour force survey around 0.3 pp Portfolio, 22 October 2026
SK On Hungary headcount (Komárom and Iváncsa) 2025: 1,819; 2024: 2,700 public company data, cited by Telex and HVG, 22 October 2026
SK On Hungary revenue and after-tax profit 2025: HUF 378 billion / HUF 107 billion; previous year: HUF 315 billion / HUF 9 billion Telex, 22 October 2026
SK On Hungary fines 2 × HUF 100 million (occupational safety; groundwater pollution) Telex, HVG, Portfolio, 22 October 2026
Employers’ offer for 2027 minimum wage and guaranteed minimum wage +4% Portfolio, 22 October 2026 (Confederation of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists, MGYOSZ)
Three-year agreement for 2027 +14%; target: minimum wage at 50% of regular gross average earnings Portfolio; Magyar Nemzet, October 2026
Informally floated compromise +8% Portfolio, 22 October 2026
SZJA rate on the minimum wage from 2027 9% instead of 15%; the tax burden falls below a gross HUF 680,000 Portfolio; Magyar Nemzet, October 2026
Rise needed under the gross / net target 10–15% (above 20% with average wage growth) / 1–5% (6–10% with average wage growth) Portfolio’s calculation, 22 October 2026
Directly affected employees 800,000 – 1 million Magyar Nemzet, October 2026
Government assumptions for 2027 inflation 3%, economic growth 2.4%, gross wage growth 5.5% Portfolio, 22 October 2026

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Employment policy (programme points) — monthly publication of the primary labour market figure (FO1), measuring exit from public works (FO2), the early warning system for layoffs in sectors affected by industrial realignment (FO13), the measure of the minimum wage target (FO10);
  • Economy (programme points) — tracking the headcount commitments of subsidised investments as conditional industrial policy (G9), tripartite wage coordination (G18);
  • Social policy (programme points) — targeted protection of the losers of industrial realignment (SZ11), the European frame of information and protection in case of dismissal and of adequate wages (SZ12);
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — the law enforcement pay rise featured in the same press monitor topic (KI6); this was discussed in the 20 October analysis; the area is also affected here because of the employment tasks of government offices (3.2).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 European Commission: The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan

The 2021 Action Plan of the European Pillar of Social Rights, in discussing the shift from crisis response to recovery, deals separately with restructuring. It states that many sectors will not fully return to their earlier path, and many companies are struggling with financial difficulties. In this process it regards cooperation with employment services and dialogue between the social partners as key:

“In this process of change, cooperation with employment services and dialogue between social partners are essential to promote socially responsible restructuring.” (own translation)

The document recalls that EU directives — including Directive 98/59/EC on collective redundancies — provide a comprehensive framework for informing and consulting workers. The Commission also indicates that separate modalities for improving their implementation and enforcement could be developed. Under principle 7 of the Pillar, before any dismissal workers have the right to be informed of the reasons and to be granted a reasonable period of notice. Applied to the Iváncsa case: the trade union objected precisely that the dismissal was unexpected and that the scale of the planned layoffs is not known. Proposal 3.2 therefore does not impose a new obligation on the employer, but creates a timely signal from the existing notification data and the headcount data already held by the state.

📖 Source: European Commission: The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan, COM(2021) 102

6.4.2 IMF: World Economic Outlook 2025

The industrial policy chapter of the International Monetary Fund’s October 2025 report uses model calculations to examine what happens to clean technology sectors in Europe under different subsidy scenarios. Citing an industry survey, it records that for electric vehicle batteries there is a cost gap of around 30 per cent between China on the one hand and Europe and the United States on the other. According to the chapter, industrial policy can protect the sector’s jobs, but at a high fiscal cost, and the outcome depends heavily on whether Europe is able to learn and reduce its costs at a pace similar to China’s:

“Overall, industrial policy could allow Europe to achieve self-sufficiency in clean technology manufacturing and protect jobs in the sector, but it would come with large fiscal costs.” (own translation)

The report’s labour market recommendation is just as practical. Labour market institutions should support mobility and efficient matching: the transition from declining to expanding sectors can be accelerated with modern public employment services, digital job matching and relocation support. Applied to the Hungarian battery industry: some of the jobs built up with subsidies may not be lasting because of global cost competition. Proposal 3.2 builds a system of measurement and response on this risk: changes in headcount must be seen in time, and the employment service must become involved even before the dismissals.

📖 Source: IMF: World Economic Outlook — Global Economy in Flux, Prospects Remain Dim (October 2025, Chapters 1 and 3)

6.4.3 Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

Writing about the employment effects of privatisations and restructurings, Stiglitz’s 2002 book starts from the fact that eliminating a company’s losses often involves cutting staff. The economist, however, must look at overall economic efficiency. According to the author, unemployment has social costs which private companies simply do not take into account:

“Moving people from low-productivity jobs in state enterprises into unemployment does not increase a country’s income, and it certainly does not increase the welfare of the workers.” (own translation)

Among the hidden costs of unemployment, Stiglitz lists the anxiety of workers who keep their jobs, the burdens falling on family members, and long-lasting social effects. He also warns that a foreign owner, because of shareholder value, is less sensitive to the local social environment than a domestic one. In another part he criticises the idea that unemployment is necessarily caused by excessively high wages, the power of trade unions or the minimum wage. According to modern economics, unemployment can persist even in competitive markets, and cutting wages creates few new jobs while worsening the position of other workers. Applied to the Hungarian situation, two lessons follow. The social cost of the Iváncsa layoff does not appear in the company’s results, so the state must see and handle it in time (3.2). And in the minimum wage debate, the employers’ argument that a larger rise endangers jobs must be weighed, but it is not an automatic truth. Proposal 3.3 therefore fixes the measurability and scheduling of the target, not the outcome of the debate.

📖 Source: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents (2002)

6.5 International comparison

European Union: the collective redundancies directive. Directive 98/59/EC, mentioned in 6.4.1, requires in every member state consultation with workers’ representatives and prior notification of the authority in the case of collective redundancies. The Hungarian rules transpose it. Member states differ in how public the aggregate notification data are. At this point proposal 3.2 would go beyond the minimum requirement.

United States: advance notice obligation. US federal rules (the WARN Act) require larger employers to give 60 days’ advance notice to workers and local authorities before mass layoffs. In several states the list of notices is public, and local employment services launch rapid response programmes on that basis. The lesson for the Hungarian proposal: public notification data are in themselves one of the tools of response.

Measuring potential labour reserves. The statistical office of the European Union (Eurostat) regularly publishes, alongside the unemployment rate, a broader indicator of the potential labour reserve. Besides the unemployed, this includes those who would work but are not actively looking for work, or who would work more. This points in the same direction as proposal 3.1: alongside the headline figure, the breakdown is also part of regular publication.

Employment policy

  • FO1 — Employment data platform
  • FO2 — Data-driven transformation of the public works system
  • FO10 — Modernising wage bargaining — tripartite wage consultation forum
  • FO13 — Labour market programme for trade realignment

Economy

  • G9 — Strategic industrial policy
  • G18 — Tripartite wage coordination council

Social policy

  • SZ11 — Targeted protection of the losers of globalisation
  • SZ12 — National action plan for the European Pillar of Social Rights

Public administration and e-government

  • KI6 — Competitive public service pay system

Proposed new programme point: Early warning system for layoffs — monthly public summary of collective redundancy notifications by county and sector, and quarterly comparison of the headcount of companies subsidised by individual government decision with their commitments — for the Employment policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 23 October 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 European Commission: The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (2021)
  • 📖 IMF: World Economic Outlook — Global Economy in Flux, Prospects Remain Dim (2025)
  • 📖 Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents (2002)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Employment policy (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Employment policy (programme points; programme point ID: FO1, FO2, FO10, FO13)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G9, G18)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (programme points; programme point ID: SZ11, SZ12)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI6)
  • MIAK press monitor, 23 October 2026 — topic 3, score: 87/100

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