Part I — Situation overview

On the morning of Wednesday 7 October 2026, Prime Minister Péter Magyar announced in a Facebook post that Magyar Koncessziós Infrastruktúra Fejlesztő Zrt. (MKIF), owned by interests of Lőrinc Mészáros and László Szíjj, accepts the Government’s decision. The company is ready to terminate the motorway concession signed in May 2022 and running until 2057. The Government estimates the state payments calculated over the full term of the contract at HUF 23 thousand billion. In response to questions from 444.hu and HVG, MKIF issued a two-sentence statement the same day. According to it, consultations are under way between the company and the Ministry of Transport and Investment (KBM), and they will not comment on the details until the process is concluded. According to Telex’s information, a solution is taking shape in which MKIF could hand back the operation of the motorways by next spring. On the same day, Dávid Vitézy, Minister of Transport and Investment, said on a 24.hu podcast that steps affecting construction players linked to the previous government would come in the following weeks. In his words: “Among the players linked to the previous government there is one where we see a suspicion pointing to serious irregularities in earlier public procurements, in connection with which we will act in the coming weeks.” These steps may lead as far as exclusion from later construction procurements. The minister also said that the state-owned Magyar Közút Nonprofit Zrt. is building its own construction capacity for smaller road renovations. Smaller Hungarian companies, in turn, would get room by not always setting the strictest condition for references. According to Magyar Nemzet, Vitézy also added that the state cannot declare it as a goal to exclude certain contractors from the market, but it enforces the legal consequences against those who break public procurement rules.

MIAK has so far dealt with the concession in five analyses. In July the topic was rent-seeking and data disclosure, in August a register of long-term commitments. On 6 September MIAK asked for a review protocol, an exit cost estimate and competition rules for the successor model. On 19 September it proposed a settlement cap, a budget completeness rule and a public takeover plan for Magyar Közút, and that the draft settlement be made public before signing. The development of 7 October opens a new question. With the end of the concession, not only does a contract close, but a market structure is also transformed. According to the 2025 analysis of Transparency International Hungary cited by Népszava, in the three years examined the interests of Lőrinc Mészáros won the most public procurements. Seven companies of László Szíjj obtained contracts worth a total of HUF 758 billion.

MIAK’s reading: dismantling the market dominance of the government-linked construction circle is a justified goal, but the chosen tools are double-edged. Exclusion from public procurement, the state’s own construction work and the relaxation of entry conditions can all improve competition. All three are also suitable for raising a new circle of beneficiaries in place of the old one, if the rule follows the names of the players rather than their conduct. Pushing firms out is consistent with the rule of law if the same yardstick can be applied to any contractor, and the decision also stands up in court.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three authors provide an interpretive framework for the topic. Susan Rose-Ackerman, professor of law and political science at Yale University and one of the leading scholars of the political economy of corruption, regards debarment from public procurement in her book Corruption and Government as an effective deterrent against repeat bidders. The condition is that the length of the debarment matches the gravity of the misconduct uncovered, and that performance measurement is objective and leaves room for new entrants. Robert Klitgaard, American economist and author of the anti-corruption handbook Controlling Corruption, shows in a case study how a reformist manager dealt with a supplier monopoly through blacklisting and relaxing entry conditions. He also warns that anti-corruption campaigns are sometimes used to remove political opponents. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (economists, leading authors of institutional economics; awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2024) describe the iron law of oligarchy in their book Why Nations Fail (Hungarian edition: Miért buknak el a nemzetek?). According to it, a new power that replaces the old elite often takes over the extractive institutions and uses them for its own purposes. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first concerns the procedure of the announced exclusion steps, the second Magyar Közút’s own construction work, and the third the structure of the transport procurement market. All three can be launched within the framework of the Public Procurement Act in force, within the own competence of the ministry and the state contracting authorities. MIAK maintains its September proposals (exit cost estimate, settlement cap, takeover plan) and does not repeat them here.

Under Act CXLIII of 2015 on public procurement (Kbt.), an economic operator is not excluded by the minister, but by the contracting authority in the given procedure. Among the mandatory exclusion grounds, corruption and other serious criminal offences are tied to a final court judgment (Section 62). The discretionary exclusion grounds must be specified in advance by the contracting authority in the notice launching the procedure (Section 63(2)). Grave professional misconduct must be “appropriately demonstrated” by the contracting authority, and may only concern conduct in the past three years (Section 63(1)(b)). MIAK proposes that within 30 days, before the announced steps, the KBM issue public guidance to the state contracting authorities managing transport investments. This should lay down four things. First: which discretionary exclusion grounds they apply, and what evidence (a decision of an authority or a court, documented breach of contract) is needed for them. Second: as long as there is no such finding, the ministry communicates about the suspicion in a criminal complaint and not in a list of names. The suspicion of a criminal offence is decided by the investigating authority and the prosecution service, and guilt exclusively by a court. Third: every exclusion should be justified in writing, with the facts and the legal basis, and the company should be able to turn to the Public Procurement Arbitration Board and then to a court. Fourth: the guidance should also name the path of self-cleaning. Under Section 64 of the Kbt., a company whose reliability has been declared by a final decision of the Public Procurement Authority or by a court cannot be excluded despite an exclusion ground. Under the EU public procurement directive, this requires proof of compensation for the damage, cooperation with the authorities, and organisational and personnel measures. Because of the termination agreement there is also a fifth consideration. Serious breach of an earlier contract can be an exclusion ground if it led to termination, rescission, damages or a sanction (Section 63(1)(c)). In MIAK’s reading, therefore, the agreement should not contain a statement that MKIF did not breach the contract. Otherwise the settlement itself could become an obstacle to a later exclusion. Rose-Ackerman’s proportionality yardstick (see 6.4.1) and Klitgaard’s warning (see 6.4.2) lead to the same place. The proposal is the joint application of the A2 public procurement transparency programme point and the I5 property rights protection programme point: breaking the rules has consequences, and independent legal remedy protects against politically motivated proceedings.

3.2 Competitively neutral state construction at Magyar Közút: separate accounting and cost comparison (before the capacity expansion decision, then annually)

The state’s own construction work may be justified if there are few genuine bidders on the market. According to HVG, moreover, the concession company took over part of Magyar Közút’s assets in 2022, which the state must buy back. Own construction work, however, is not public procurement, and therefore falls outside public procurement transparency. Without a yardstick, a state unit protected from competition can be just as expensive and slow as a private monopoly. MIAK proposes that before the decision on expanding Magyar Közút’s capacity, the KBM make three rules public. First: the scope of own construction work, that is, which types of work and renovations below what value threshold belong here. Above the threshold, the work should go to the market through public procurement. Second: the construction unit should keep separate accounts, at full cost, including depreciation of machinery, overheads and the cost of capital. This makes its unit prices comparable with market offers. Third: Magyar Közút should publish annually the unit cost of works carried out in-house, for example the price per square metre of pavement renovation, alongside the average public procurement prices of similar works. Where the in-house cost persistently exceeds the market price by more than 10 per cent, the task should go back to the market. The analysis of 19 September already asked that subcontracted works go through public procurement; this proposal provides a yardstick for the in-house work remaining outside public procurement. The yardstick builds on the G5 competition policy, the G21 spending review and the EP4 construction transparency programme points. Acemoglu and Robinson’s proposition (see 6.4.3) warns here that a new, unchecked state position can produce the same rent as the old private position.

3.3 A public market concentration indicator and regulated easing of reference requirements in transport procurement (by 31 March 2027, then quarterly)

The success of pushing firms out is measured not by whether certain names disappear from among the winners, but by whether competition becomes broader. MIAK proposes that by 31 March 2027 the KBM publish, from the data of the Electronic Public Procurement System (EKR), the market concentration of road and rail construction procurements for the period 2022–2026, and then update it quarterly. The indicators: the number of winning bidders, the share of the five largest winners in contract value, and the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). The latter is the sum of the squares of market shares: the larger it is, the fewer players dominate the market. The calculation should also take into account consortium members and beneficial owners, so that chains of companies do not distort the result. Linked to this is the easing of reference requirements. Under Section 65(3) and (5) of the Kbt., a suitability condition may be at most what is actually necessary, and the reference may reach at most 75 per cent of the value of the procurement. The contracting authority can already set a milder condition today. MIAK proposes that easing should not be an ad hoc decision, but public guidance. This should lay down below what value threshold, with what division into lots and with what performance guarantee the reference requirement may be relaxed. In Klitgaard’s case study (see 6.4.2), the argument against relaxing entry conditions was precisely that small companies would overcommit themselves. The guarantee answers this. The indicator is aligned with the goal of the A2 programme point on single-bid procedures and with the G6 programme against rent-seeking.

The three proposals are linked by a single principle: the rule should not know the names of the players. Exclusion should be based on conduct, state capacity on cost, and market opening on measured competition. If the rule works this way, pushing out the current government-linked circle will become a lasting market improvement. If the rule follows names, only the beneficiaries change. Rose-Ackerman, Klitgaard, and Acemoglu and Robinson arrive at the same place from three sides: an anti-corruption tool is the more effective, the less it can be used as a political weapon.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Rule of law Exclusions also stand up in court; decisions are based not on political announcements but on documented findings The guidance and the standard of proof slow down the steps; the public may see this as procrastination
Budget Damages lawsuits over unlawful exclusion can be avoided; the cost of in-house construction can be checked Full-cost accounting may show that state construction is more expensive than expected
Construction market More bidders, lower concentration, measurably growing participation of smaller Hungarian companies For large investments (M1 widening, the Mohács bridge) capacity is scarce, and exclusions may cause a temporary shortage of bidders
Public administration Magyar Közút’s own capacity grows with a measurable remit and a cost yardstick Building capacity burdens the road manager at the same time as the takeover of the concession
EU funds Data on competition and transparent exclusion strengthen compliance with public procurement conditions Protracted legal disputes and capacity shortages may delay projects financed from EU funds

The most important question to weigh is the relationship between time and credibility. The minister promised steps within weeks, and the protocol is slower than that. In MIAK’s view, however, speed is only an apparent advantage here. An insufficiently substantiated exclusion can be annulled by the Public Procurement Arbitration Board or a court, and this benefits the excluded company, not public money. Finance Minister András Kármán, quoted by Magyar Nemzet, himself acknowledged that renegotiating overpriced contracts may have a short-term price: temporarily idle capacities and delayed investments. A well-founded procedure reduces this price, a challengeable procedure increases it.

The second risk is capacity. According to Magyar Nemzet, MKIF undertook to build 279 kilometres of new expressway and to widen 299 kilometres by 2034. If exclusions and the takeover affect these works at the same time, few companies capable of running a large project will remain on the market. Easing reference requirements and in-house capacity can mitigate this, but only in a measured way. For large projects the proposal therefore asks not for relaxation, but for division into lots and a performance guarantee.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes the following key performance indicators (KPIs). These are proposed indicators, not government commitments.

  • Quality of exclusion decisions. Target: 100 per cent of exclusions in transport investments are justified in writing and specify the exclusion ground under the Kbt. The contracting authorities publish quarterly aggregated statistics by exclusion ground, together with the outcomes of legal remedies.
  • Competition in transport procurement. Target: by 2028 the share of single-bid procedures at contracting authorities belonging to the KBM falls below 15 per cent, and the average number of bids is at least 3.
  • Market concentration. Target: the baseline HHI for 2022–2026 and the share of the five largest winners are public by 31 March 2027. Thereafter the indicators decrease, and no single group of companies’ share exceeds 20 per cent of the contract value awarded per quarter.
  • Cost yardstick for state construction. Target: the unit cost of Magyar Közút’s in-house works and the average price of similar procurements are public for the first time by the end of 2027, then annually.
  • Transparency of the termination agreement. Target: the draft agreement is public before signing and contains no statement recording the absence of a breach of contract.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is addressed primarily to the Ministry of Transport and Investment. Before the announced steps, the ministry should issue public exclusion guidance on the exclusion grounds of the Kbt., the standard of proof, legal remedy and self-cleaning. It should decide on the expansion of Magyar Közút’s capacity with separate accounting and a public cost comparison. And from EKR data it should publish the concentration of the transport procurement market by spring 2027. MIAK supports the termination of the concession, and also considers dismantling the market dominance of the government-linked circle a justified goal. The request does not set conditions for these, but secures their durability.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, accountability and ideology-free decision-making are affected here. Accountability, because a company that breaks the rules only truly bears the consequences if the decision also stands up in court. Ideology-free, because the same yardstick must be applied to past and future government-linked contractors. A rule that follows names can, at the next change of government, turn in the same way against the current winners.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing across the spectrum

In the left-liberal band, 444.hu framed the announcement from the perspective of the scale of the concession. It highlighted that this is by far the largest motorway concession in Europe, and recalled that many consider it one of the most serious theft cases of the entire Fidesz era. The article did not discuss the exclusion question. Telex put the company’s cautious reply in its headline (“still consulting”), and added from its own information that MKIF could hand back operation by next spring. HVG treated the two threads separately in two articles. One went through the practical steps of the termination, from ongoing construction works to buying back the assets. The other highlighted Vitézy’s sentences foreshadowing exclusions and the easing of reference requirements intended for smaller companies. The paper’s morning news podcast put the possibility of exclusion among the day’s main news. Népszava placed the Transparency International Hungary procurement data and the European Commission’s 2025 infringement procedure as background next to the minister’s words, that is, it justified exclusion from the angle of past market dominance.

In the public-affairs band, 24.hu repeated the Government’s September arguments alongside the Prime Minister’s announcement: an unlawful, overpriced contract, an increase in value of nearly 50 per cent, and that according to the professional proposal the concession should have been split into at least six parts. The headline of the article on the paper’s podcast (“The pushing of Lőrinc Mészáros out of the construction industry begins”) gave the strongest political frame. The same piece also reported on the ministry’s 2027 budget envelope and the budget deficit. In the source selection processed, Index and ATV did not carry this topic. In the business press, Portfolio’s headline (“The government has won”) emphasised the political result, but the body of the article was balanced. It recalled that MKIF had earlier disputed the accusations of unlawfulness and of causing damage, and stressed that it won the concession in an open procedure. It named as the key question of the dispute whether an agreement or a legal dispute will close the case.

In the conservative band, Magyar Nemzet read the company’s statement as meaning that the matter is “far from” where the Prime Minister claims. The paper framed the exclusion statements as an effort by the Tisza government to make things impossible for these firms. It called the HUF 23 thousand billion a fictitious sum, because it can only be paid out over the full 35 years. Citing a previously described professional document, it also claimed that the 35-year term is average by international comparison. The paper also published the deliberative remarks of Finance Minister András Kármán on the short-term costs. Mandiner did not appear on this day in the sources processed by MIAK. Common to the whole spectrum is that they wrote about exclusion as a political intention. None of the papers wrote about who may exclude a company under the Kbt., on the basis of what evidence, and what legal remedy is available against it.

6.2 Facts and data

Main data of the concession (according to the sources processed):

Item Content Source
Signing, term May 2022, 35 years, until 2057 444.hu, Portfolio
Network concerned 1,237 km of existing expressway (according to Portfolio about 1,200–1,300 km, according to 444.hu two-thirds of Hungary’s motorways) Magyar Nemzet, Portfolio, 444.hu
Development commitment 279 km of new expressway by 2034, a further 299 km of widening, including the M1 Magyar Nemzet
State payment over the full term HUF 23 thousand billion according to the Government’s calculation; according to Magyar Nemzet this is a sum meaningful only over the full 35 years Portfolio, Magyar Nemzet
Amendments twice in 2023, with increases in value; according to the Government, the value grew by nearly 50% compared with the original 444.hu, 24.hu
EU procedure In 2025 the European Commission sent an additional letter of formal notice in an infringement procedure over the award Népszava
Status of termination the Government decided in September; 7 October 2026: according to the Prime Minister MKIF accepts, according to the company negotiations are under way Telex, HVG, 444.hu

Market background and ministry budget envelope:

Item Content Source
Procurement concentration in the three years examined, the interests of Lőrinc Mészáros won the most public procurements; seven companies of László Szíjj won HUF 758 billion, of which Duna Aszfalt about HUF 204 billion Transparency International Hungary, 2025 (Népszava)
Framework agreements according to TI, multi-year framework agreements can reduce transparency and restrict competition Népszava
KBM envelope 2027 may improve by several hundred billion forints, mainly from EU funds; priority road projects: the Mohács bridge, the M49, the M1 24.hu, Népszava
State capacity Magyar Közút would carry out smaller road renovations in-house; the concession company took over part of MK’s assets in 2022 24.hu, HVG

Legal framework of exclusion from public procurement (Kbt., text in force, National Legislation Database, 8 October 2026):

Rule Content Location
Mandatory exclusion grounds the contracting authority must exclude an operator subject to an exclusion ground; for corruption offences a final court judgment is the condition Section 62
Discretionary exclusion grounds the contracting authority may prescribe them in the notice; grave professional misconduct in the past three years, if the contracting authority appropriately demonstrates it; serious breach of an earlier public contract, if it led to termination, rescission, damages or a sanction Section 63(1)(b) and (c)
Prior specification the discretionary exclusion grounds applied must be specified in the notice launching the procedure Section 63(2)
Self-cleaning an operator whose reliability has been declared by a final decision of the Public Procurement Authority or by a court cannot be excluded despite an exclusion ground; the contracting authority must accept this without discretion Section 64
Suitability condition at most to the extent actually necessary for performance; a reference may be required up to at most 75% of the value of the procurement Section 65(3) and (5)

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — analysis of public procurement data, flagging of single-bid procedures and recurring winners (programme point ID: A2); exclusion statistics and transparency of spending (programme point ID: A1);
  • Economy (programme points) — measuring market concentration and HHI-based monitoring (programme point ID: G5); uncovering privileged market positions (programme point ID: G6); regular review of state spending, including in-house construction (programme point ID: G21);
  • Construction (programme points) — transparency of the cost and deadline data of state construction investments and of the ownership structure of main contractors and subcontractors (programme point ID: EP4);
  • Transport and infrastructure (background material) — the operating model of the expressway network, organising maintenance and development after the concession;
  • Justice (programme points) — protection against politically motivated proceedings and independent legal remedy (programme point ID: I5);
  • Legal foundations (background material) — exclusion from public procurement is decided procedure by procedure by the contracting authority, and legal remedy can be sought before the Public Procurement Arbitration Board and then a court; the suspicion of a criminal offence is decided by the investigating authority and the prosecution service, and guilt exclusively by a court; the negotiation on closing the concession was ordered by the Government in a resolution, while amending statutory rules is within the competence of Parliament.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

In the chapter on reducing the incentives for corruption, discussing sanctions for bribery, Rose-Ackerman argues that repeat bidders can be effectively deterred by debarment procedures. These prohibit corrupt firms from concluding state contracts for a period. She adds that debarment only affects decisions if its length matches the gravity of the misconduct uncovered. As examples she mentions Singaporean practice and the procedure of the New York school construction authority. In the same chapter, in the part on procurement reforms, she regards debarment as a form of performance evaluation. In her view it is also useful because it prevents officials from favouring poorly performing but well-connected firms. She immediately warns, too: performance measurement must be objective and must leave room for new entrants. Otherwise the yardstick strengthens the position of existing, entrenched contractors. In the Hungarian situation both propositions apply sharply. The proportionality of exclusion can be ensured in a procedure tied to the exclusion grounds and time limits of the Kbt.; this is what point 3.1 asks for. The chances of new entrants are created by measured market concentration and regulated easing of reference requirements; this is what point 3.3 asks for. The author’s book is a copyrighted work, so her line of argument appears here in paraphrase.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (1999), chapter 4

6.4.2 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

One of Klitgaard’s case studies concerns the state food supply organisation of a country with an invented name, “Ruritania”. The new head, Rafiq Shabir, examined the records of persistently poorly performing suppliers and blacklisted five of them, whom he also suspected of corruption and collusion. Among them was the country’s largest supplier, which enjoyed a virtual monopoly in coastal shipping and had close political connections. Shabir then also wanted to broaden competition: he wanted to let suppliers of every category into every tender and to relax the entry conditions. The minister vetoed this, fearing that some firms would overcommit themselves and deliveries would fail. The book also points out that blacklisting in this organisation could be imposed for vaguely defined reasons, at the head’s discretion, for periods ranging from months to years. The volume’s closing chapter raises the abuse of anti-corruption powers as a separate research question. According to Klitgaard, anti-corruption campaigns have sometimes been used to remove political opponents rather than to eliminate corruption. He therefore asks which powers are the most vulnerable, and what safeguards are needed. In this framework the Hungarian situation yields two lessons. Pushing out a supplier in a monopoly position can in itself be a legitimate goal. A discretionary blacklist with vague conditions, however, is precisely the kind of power that point 3.1 ties to a statutory ground, written reasons and legal remedy. The debate around relaxing entry conditions is the reason for the performance guarantee in point 3.3. The author’s book is a copyrighted work, so his line of argument appears here in paraphrase.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption (University of California Press, 1988)

6.4.3 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

Acemoglu and Robinson describe the iron law of oligarchy, a concept of the German sociologist Robert Michels, as a particularly harmful form of the vicious circle. According to it, the overthrow of an extractive system often only brings new holders. The new leaders are able to replace the old ones because they promise radical change, and then take over the old institutions and use them for their own purposes. The authors show through African examples that the new leaders often narrowed the circle of power-holders even further. They also stress that this is not a physical law: where change is carried by a broad social coalition, and pluralist institutions take the place of the old ones, the circle can be broken. Applied to the Hungarian construction industry, the question is whether, after the government-linked circle of contractors is pushed out, the institutions of the public procurement market change, or only the winners. Points 3.2 and 3.3 ask for a yardstick that signals, independently of who the winners are, if the market narrows again to a few players, or if a state unit gets into a position protected from competition. The authors’ book is a copyrighted work, so their line of argument appears here in paraphrase.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Miért buknak el a nemzetek? (Hungarian edition of Why Nations Fail), chapter 4 and the chapter The Vicious Circle

6.5 International comparison

Article 57 of the European Union’s public procurement directive 2014/24/EU, which the Kbt. transposes, lays down three elements. These are the mandatory and discretionary exclusion grounds, the possibility of self-cleaning and the upper time limit of exclusion. Under the directive, exclusion based on a final judgment may last at most five years, and exclusion on discretionary grounds at most three years. In self-cleaning, the economic operator may prove that it has paid or undertaken to pay compensation for the damage, has cooperated with the authorities, and has taken organisational and personnel measures. This logic can also be applied to the Hungarian situation: exclusion is not a permanent ban, but a time-limited consequence tied to the restoration of reliability. The United States Federal Acquisition Regulation also examines a firm’s “present responsibility”. The period of debarment is generally at most three years, and the party concerned receives prior notice and an opportunity to respond. The World Bank’s sanctions system has two tiers: the decision of the first-tier official can be reviewed by an independent sanctions board. The baseline sanction is debarment for a fixed period, from which the firm can be released by introducing a compliance programme.

On the competitive neutrality of the state’s own capacity, the OECD, the economic cooperation organisation of advanced economies, adopted a recommendation in 2021. Its recurring elements are separate accounting for market activities, full allocation of costs and the application of the same yardsticks as for market players. Point 3.2 transposes this principle to Magyar Közút’s in-house construction. Competition authorities use the HHI to measure market concentration. Since 2023 the US merger guidelines have regarded a value above 1,800 as a highly concentrated market, while earlier practice used 2,500. MIAK’s A7 programme point already applies this indicator to the media market. Point 3.3 extends the same to transport procurement.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public money dashboard
  • A2 — Public procurement transparency
  • A7 — Media pluralism as an institutional guarantee (the model for HHI-based concentration measurement)

Economy

  • G5 — Competition policy and anti-monopoly
  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture
  • G21 — Systematic review of state spending

Construction

  • EP4 — Construction industry transparency

Justice

  • I5 — Protection of property rights

Proposed new programme point: A rule-of-law protocol for exclusion from public procurement — exclusion tied to a statutory exclusion ground and justified in writing, public statistics by exclusion ground, legal remedy and a self-cleaning path, plus a quarterly concentration indicator for the transport procurement market — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 8 October 2026 — topic 1):

Legal sources:

Knowledge base references (literature):

  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Miért buknak el a nemzetek? (Why Nations Fail)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A2, A7)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G5, G6, G21)
  • MIAK policy area: Construction (programme points; programme point ID: EP4)
  • MIAK policy area: Transport and infrastructure (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I5)
  • MIAK legal foundations: typical conceptual errors concerning the branches of power and institutional competences (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 8 October 2026 — topic 1, score: 92/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • OECD: Recommendation of the Council on Competitive Neutrality (2021)
  • U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission: Merger Guidelines (2023)

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