Part I — Situation overview

On 30 September 2026 the investigating judge of the Central District Court of Buda ordered the pre-trial detention for 30 days of Miklós Seszták, former Minister of National Development and KDNP Member of Parliament. According to the spokesperson of the Budapest-Capital Regional Court, the court found the risk of interference with evidence well founded, but not the risk of flight. The court also indicated that this ground can be maintained only as long as the suspect can actually influence the investigation. The decision is not final; the defence has appealed. The pre-trial detention of Balázs Hankó, former Minister of Culture and Innovation, was requested by the Bács-Kiskun County Chief Prosecutor’s Office. The investigating judge of the Kecskemét District Court is hearing the request on the morning of 1 October; the decision was not yet known when this post was finalised. In both proceedings the court is deciding on a coercive measure, not on criminal liability. The acts reported are suspicions of the prosecution service or of the authorities, both politicians deny them, and both are entitled to the presumption of innocence.

Two other developments took place on the same day. The new leadership of the National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) withdrew, with effect from 1 October, the senior appointments of Brigadier General Ferenc Domokos, Director-General for Criminal Affairs, and his deputy, Colonel Gábor László Szűcs. According to the NAV, under the relevant law a senior appointment can be withdrawn without giving reasons. According to 24.hu and Index, the background to the decision may be the March operation against Ukrainian cash couriers (the so-called gold convoy case) and a NAV event on the evening of the same day, at which a brigadier general of the financial guard lost his life. These are press reports; the NAV gave no reason. The third development: on the Fidesz website, under the name “ÁVH Watch”, a public presentation of the staff of the National Asset Recovery and Protection Office (NVVH) was launched. The NVVH is a new investigating authority set up to uncover earlier corruption cases and to recover lost public assets. Former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the chairman of Fidesz, wrote that everyone must know who directs the office’s work and who takes part in it. For now the site contains the professional CVs of President Anna Unger and Vice-President for Investigations Katalin Tasnády. According to Anna Unger, the office’s first investigative team of 30-40 people starts work on 1 October.

The background: according to a HVG report, as early as 13 September Viktor Orbán said on Hír TV that everyone taking a job at the office would be “tracked” and “made public”. On 28 September the NVVH took four cases into its own competence; in its analysis of that day MIAK made a proposal on the reasoning for taking over cases and on measuring the office’s success. On 30 September MIAK proposed a voluntary code of statements covering every MP, which would prohibit threatening to list the officials handling cases. MIAK wrote on 20 August about the August closure of the NAV’s money-laundering investigation in the gold convoy case.

MIAK’s reading: accountability has moved from the stage of announcements to the stage of law enforcement, and with that two new, so far unregulated risks have appeared. One reaches the investigating bodies from outside: a parliamentary party promises to name rank-and-file staff as well. A political code does not deal with this, because its addressee can reject the code. The other arises from within: the leaders of investigating bodies can be removed without giving reasons. Today the new government is doing this; tomorrow another one could do the same. The answer to both is the same: a statutory guarantee that works the same way under every government.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three sources provide the framework for interpreting the situation. Susan Rose-Ackerman (lawyer and economist at Yale University, one of the founders of the economics of corruption) lists political neutrality and security of tenure among the characteristics of a professional civil service in Corruption and Government. According to her, even today’s critics of the traditional model accept that civil servants should not be hired or fired for political reasons, and that alternation in government is incompatible with a party-based personnel system. Robert Klitgaard (American economist, classic author of anti-corruption institutional design) illustrates the difference in Controlling Corruption through the example of the Philippine revenue bureau. One path is mass, summary dismissal carried out by presidential decree. The other is an evidence-based, individually documented change of leadership. Klitgaard also warns that the strong powers of anti-corruption agencies can become instruments of oppression in the wrong hands, which is why safeguards are needed. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) protects both respect for private life and freedom of expression. Both can be restricted only for reasons prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. None of them takes a position on the individual responsibility of Miklós Seszták, Balázs Hankó or the removed NAV leaders, and none of them interferes in pending proceedings. All three are symmetrical: they protect today’s and future investigators alike, and bind today’s and future governments alike.

3.1 Statutory name protection for the rank-and-file staff of investigating bodies (legislative amendment by 31 December 2026)

Today’s regulation leaves a gap. The name and position of persons acting at a body performing public functions are, as a main rule, data public in the public interest. According to MIAK’s analysis of 30 September, based on the complainant’s account, the prosecution service also regarded the data of NVVH staff as such in a rejection decision. The offence of misuse of personal data in the Criminal Code, in turn, requires the aim of gaining a profit or a significant harm to interests, so it does not cover the typical case of listing for the purpose of intimidation. MIAK therefore proposes that the National Assembly amend the Freedom of Information Act and the acts on the legal status of investigating bodies by 31 December 2026. The rule has three elements. First: the names, CVs and decision-making powers of the leaders of investigating bodies — the police, the criminal investigation bodies of the NAV, the NVVH and the investigating units of the prosecution service — remain public. Anna Unger herself called it acceptable that her own and her deputy’s professional background are public. Second: the names of rank-and-file investigators, analysts and asset tracers do not qualify as data public in the public interest. Their identity is, however, recorded for every procedural act, and can be accessed by the court, the prosecutor, the defence lawyer and the supervisory bodies. Accountability comes from the traceability of decisions, not from mass publication. Third: anyone who publicly collects or publishes the personal data of the staff of investigating bodies — or of defence lawyers, witnesses, whistleblowers — with the intention of intimidation bears legal responsibility. This does not affect criticism of the offices and their leaders, the analysis of their decisions or criticism of leaders by name. The employing body is obliged to prepare a risk assessment and provide legal assistance to the threatened staff member. The rule is symmetrical: it protects the defence lawyer in the same way. According to Miklós Seszták’s lawyer, the registration number of his own car was also recorded in the investigation files. This allegation must be investigated by the supervisory body. The yardstick of Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR (see 6.4.3) permits precisely such a restriction, prescribed by law and tied to a purpose. The proposal extends the prohibition of retaliation of the A5 programme point and the independence-protection logic of I4 to investigators.

3.2 Reasoned withdrawal of senior appointments in the NAV’s criminal investigation leadership, public by category (instruction of the NAV President within 30 days, legislative amendment by 30 June 2027)

The NAV’s answer is legally accurate: under the act on the legal status of the NAV’s personnel, a senior appointment can be withdrawn without giving reasons. At a tax authority, however, this rule serves general managerial flexibility. The Directorate-General for Criminal Affairs is different: it is an investigating authority that also acts in politically sensitive cases — including money-laundering cases involving former government actors. If the leader of such a unit is removed without reasons, two opposing suspicions remain open. One is that the leader was removed for political reasons, without any professional failing. The other is that there was a real integrity problem, of which the public will never learn. MIAK therefore proposes a two-stage rule. The first stage: in an instruction issued within 30 days, the President of the NAV undertakes to record the reason in writing whenever the appointment of criminal investigation and law enforcement leaders is withdrawn. The NAV also publishes the reason by category within 15 days: organisational restructuring, performance, loss of confidence linked to a concrete event, disciplinary or integrity proceedings. The personal data of the person concerned and the details of pending proceedings are left out of this. The second stage: the law rules out withdrawal without reasons for the Director-General for Criminal Affairs and his deputies. The grounds for withdrawal should be listed in the law, and the person concerned should be able to challenge the decision before a court. The successor should be appointed through an open competition, after an integrity check. This does not slow down the clean-up: according to Klitgaard’s example (see 6.4.2), the reform of the Philippine revenue bureau was credible precisely because of the documented, evidence-based leadership changes. Rose-Ackerman’s proposition (see 6.4.1), in turn, warns that with alternation in government, the practice of changes without reasons can be reversed in the same way at the next change of government. The proposal applies the internal oversight reform of KB7 and the public-reasoning principle of G19 to the NAV.

3.3 A quarterly register of leadership changes and a concluding integrity report on the NAV’s spring cases (first register by 31 December 2026, integrity report by 30 November 2026)

Since the change of government, the leadership of the investigating bodies has been replaced in several stages. The NAV’s Vice-President for Criminal Affairs and Law Enforcement was dismissed by the Finance Minister in May, his successor took office on 16 September, and now the Director-General for Criminal Affairs and his deputy have been removed. The individual decisions may well all be justified, but the overall picture can today only be pieced together from press reports. MIAK proposes two steps. The first: a public register of leadership changes at the NAV, the police and the NVVH should be prepared every quarter — for the NAV and the police published by the Government, for the NVVH by the office itself. The register should record the position, the date and legal basis of the decision, the category of reason under 3.2 and the method of selecting the successor. The second: the NAV should publish the concluding summary of the internal inquiry that the Prime Minister requested in June into the roles played in the gold convoy case and into the March event. Parts affecting pending criminal proceedings may be placed in a confidential annex. The summary should also state who, after the leadership change, is responsible for the pending high-priority cases of the Directorate-General for Criminal Affairs, and how they ensure that none of the cases stalls. The register could be one of the data sources of the institutional independence index of the A6 programme point, since the index also measures the political composition of appointments. The concluding report, in turn, shows that the leadership change was the result of fact-finding, not a substitute for it. According to Klitgaard’s warning (see 6.4.2), a recurring risk in the history of anti-corruption campaigns is that changes of personnel serve to remove political opponents. Regular, verifiable publication is the cheapest safeguard against this.

The common principle of the three proposals is that the credibility of accountability comes not from its momentum but from its rules. The investigator should be protected by the law, not by political goodwill. The reason for a leadership change should be shown by a document, not by a press report. And the overall picture of the changes should be recorded by a public register, not by the parties’ contradictory narratives. Rose-Ackerman and Klitgaard (see 6.4.1 and 6.4.2) arrive at the same point from two directions: a clean-up is lasting only if the next government cannot turn the same tools in the opposite direction either.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Public administration and law enforcement The recruitment of investigating bodies becomes more stable, and intimidation becomes costly; changes of criminal investigation leaders are documented, and the person responsible for pending cases is clear Name protection may become a tool for the offices to close themselves off if the notion of “investigator” is interpreted too broadly; the duty to give reasons may slow down genuinely urgent integrity-driven changes
Political discourse and freedom of expression Criticism of the offices and their leaders remains free, but pillorying rank-and-file staff by name is given a legal limit “Intention to intimidate” is hard to prove; applying the rule too strictly could also suppress legitimate public criticism
Economy and trust in the tax authority The neutrality of the NAV’s criminal investigation leadership becomes more predictable, which strengthens willingness to pay taxes and business confidence Reasoning by category may become a superficial formality if the NAV chooses the most general category (“organisational restructuring”) in every case
Justice The court and the defence lawyer can identify whoever carried out each procedural act, so name protection does not impair a fair trial If the supervisory body does not investigate the allegation about surveillance of the defence lawyer, symmetry exists only on paper

The main question to weigh for name protection is where the line is drawn. MIAK proposes that the line run along position and purpose. The names of leaders with decision-making powers are public, those of rank-and-file staff are not. And liability arises not for communication, but for collection and publication for the purpose of intimidation. For the NAV proposal the risk is that it is hollowed out: this is addressed jointly by the grounds listed in the law, judicial remedy and the quarterly register. A formal statement of reasons in itself proves nothing, but a pattern visible in the register does. The proposal becomes risky if the government does not keep the register, or if the offices use name protection to shield their own decisions from the court and the defence as well. That is why 3.1 expressly states that procedural identifiability cannot be restricted.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests following the performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators) below:

  • Name-protection rule: amendment of the Freedom of Information Act and of the acts on the legal status of investigating bodies by 31 December 2026. After that it is worth publishing annually how many cases of threats and criminal complaints the investigating bodies reported to protect their staff, broken down by body and by the source of the threat (political actor, suspect, other).
  • Rate of reasoning at the NAV: for what percentage of withdrawals of criminal investigation and law enforcement senior appointments the reason by category appeared within 15 days. Suggested target: 100% from the issuing of the NAV President’s instruction.
  • Register of leadership changes: publication of the first quarterly register by 31 December 2026, and what percentage of the successor appointments in the register were made through open competition.
  • Concluding integrity report: a public summary of the internal inquiry requested from the NAV in June, by 30 November 2026, including the allocation of responsibility for the high-priority cases of the Directorate-General for Criminal Affairs.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is twofold. Of political actors and the National Assembly it asks that the rank-and-file staff of investigating bodies be protected by law against being pilloried by name, while criticism of the offices and their leaders remains free. Of the Government and the NAV leadership it asks that the reason for removing criminal investigation leaders be recorded in writing and published by category, and that the overall picture of leadership changes be made verifiable in a quarterly register. None of the proposals slows down accountability, and none of them shields anyone from proceedings. Both are about ensuring that a later government cannot turn today’s tools of accountability in the opposite direction in the same way.

The proposal touches two MIAK foundational values. Accountability, because the credibility of investigating bodies comes not from the speed of leadership changes but from the traceability of decisions — for the rank-and-file investigator in the procedural file, for the removed leader in the reason recorded in writing. Ideology-free politics, because the same standard protects the NVVH investigator from being listed by the former governing party and the defence lawyer from overreach by the investigating authority. And in the removal of NAV leaders the same standard binds today’s government as any subsequent one.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal band Telex ran two separate threads. In one it put Anna Unger’s ATV statement in the headline: the President of the NVVH regards the comparison as unworthy towards the victims of the ÁVH. The outlet highlighted that, according to the office, the listing does not yet reach the threshold for a criminal complaint, but they will act if it escalates. In the other it reported the allegations of Miklós Seszták’s lawyer about surveillance, together with Anna Unger’s denial. On the NAV leadership change it took over the 24.hu report, with the NAV’s legal response. Népszava dealt with the topic in two articles. One presented the structure of the office in interview form (first four cases, an initial staff of 30-40, unfilled vice-president posts). In the other the historian Krisztián Ungváry called the ÁVH parallel “blasphemy”, and in his view the accusation can be refuted by the greatest possible transparency. HVG reported the investigators starting work and the dismissal of the NAV leaders, linking the latter to the March NAV event. 444.hu updated its own earlier European comparison from 2014. According to this, Hungary was among the few European countries where not a single minister had been convicted with final effect since 1989, and a possible conviction of Seszták or Hankó would change this.

In the mainstream band 24.hu was the first source on the NAV leadership change. In its short news item it published the NAV’s confirmation, and in Seszták’s case it set out in detail the reasons for the court decision, the content of the suspicion and the defence lawyer’s allegations. The outlet noted separately that Fidesz stood up for Hankó in an organised way, but not for Seszták. Index discussed the NAV leadership change in a “personnel restructuring” frame, against the background of the March event and the gold convoy case. In Hankó’s case it quoted the prosecution spokesperson as saying that the investigating judge does not decide on the merits of the case. ATV’s news programme presented the “ÁVH Watch” as Fidesz’s “counter” to the NVVH (video; only the programme description was available as text). In the economic band Portfolio, based on MTI, matter-of-factly set the cases of the two former ministers side by side. It noted separately that the proceedings are independent of each other, and that the acts reported are for now suspicions, not findings of a court.

In the conservative band close to the former governing parties Magyar Nemzet reported the launch of the “ÁVH Watch” with a quote from the Fidesz chairman and the arguments of Fidesz MP Alexandra Szentkirályi. According to the latter, the NVVH’s statutory powers may affect anyone connected to public money, subsidies or public procurement. The outlet used the ÁVH name without explanation, as Fidesz’s terminology. On Balázs Hankó’s case the outlet published a short news item whose lead says that the former minister maintains his innocence (the article was not publicly downloadable). On the NAV leadership change the band published no material among the sources processed by the monitor today. Mandiner did not appear among the sources processed by the monitor today on this topic.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Pre-trial detention of Miklós Seszták 30 September 2026, for 30 days; investigating judge of the Central District Court of Buda; ground: risk of interference with evidence; not final, appealed Budapest-Capital Regional Court (24.hu, Telex)
Case of Balázs Hankó request for pre-trial detention: Bács-Kiskun County Chief Prosecutor’s Office, 30 September 2026; hearing: Kecskemét District Court, 1 October 2026, 10 a.m. Chief prosecutor’s office spokesperson (Index), Portfolio
Withdrawal of the appointments of the NAV’s criminal investigation leaders Brigadier General Ferenc Domokos and Colonel Gábor László Szűcs; effective: 1 October 2026; without reasons, under the NAV personnel status act NAV (24.hu, HVG, Index)
Post of the NAV’s Vice-President for Criminal Affairs and Law Enforcement dismissal of Tamás Demeter in May 2026 (Finance Minister’s decision); successor: Attila Sisák, from 16 September 2026 HVG, Index (according to Telex the successor arrived “at the end of the summer”)
The NVVH’s first investigators 30-40 people, starting work on 1 October 2026; prosecutors, investigators, police and prosecution service staff, staff coming from the NAV Anna Unger (HVG, Telex, Népszava)
The NVVH’s unfilled leadership posts one of the four vice-president posts filled; setting up the appeals (investigative remedy) area is given priority Magyar Nemzet, Népszava, HVG
“ÁVH Watch” launched on 30 September 2026, on the Fidesz website; content at launch: CVs of the NVVH President and the Vice-President for Investigations Magyar Nemzet, Népszava
Background 13 September 2026: on Hír TV Viktor Orbán held out the prospect of “tracking” and making public those taking jobs at the office HVG
Ministers convicted with final effect in Europe since 1989 in the author’s 2014 compilation Hungary was one of ten countries where this had not happened 444.hu

Three elements are relevant as the public-law framework. First: pre-trial detention is ordered by the court (the investigating judge); the prosecuting authority only requests it. The investigating judge examines the reasonable suspicion and the grounds for the coercive measure, and does not decide on guilt. Second: the NVVH and the NAV are investigating authorities, not part of the judicial branch of power. On ATV Anna Unger called the office part of the system of justice; in the strict public-law sense, the administration of justice belongs to the courts, and investigating authorities belong to the organisational system of the executive power. Third: under Section 26(2) of Act CXII of 2011 on Freedom of Information, the name, scope of duties, position and senior appointment of a person acting within the duties and powers of a body performing public functions are data public in the public interest. The offence of misuse of personal data in the Criminal Code (Section 219) makes punishability conditional on the aim of gaining a profit or on a significant harm to interests.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — protecting the staff of the independent anti-corruption office as a condition of the office’s ability to function, extending the prohibition of retaliation to investigators, and making appointments and removals measurable in the institutional independence index (programme point ID: A10, A5, A6);
  • Justice (programme points) — the analogy, for investigators, of protecting the personal independence of judges, and the separation of the investigating judge’s decision from criminal liability (programme point ID: I4);
  • Public security and law enforcement (programme points) — internal oversight of the NAV and the law enforcement bodies, documenting leadership changes, and concluding the integrity inquiry into the spring cases (programme point ID: KB7);
  • Economy (programme points) — the NAV as the authority that most directly affects economic actors: the neutrality of its criminal investigation leadership and the public reasoning of its decisions are a condition of business confidence and of willingness to pay taxes (programme point ID: G19).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

In the chapter on civil service reform, Rose-Ackerman starts from the premise that a personnel system built on party loyalty degrades the quality of public services and leads to the unfair application of tax and regulatory laws. In her view the goal is not the complete insulation of public administration from politics — which is impossible — but the regulation of the relationship between the two. She summarises the characteristics of the traditional professional civil service as follows: political neutrality, security of tenure, decent pay, merit-based recruitment and promotion, and the absence of conflicting interests. She adds that even today’s critics of the model accept that civil servants should not be hired and fired for political reasons. Of countries emerging from a one-party or authoritarian period she writes that a democracy built on alternation in government is incompatible with a civil service based on political patronage. She also recalls a 17th-century English example, according to which it was already recognised then that the security of tenure of officials handling money is itself an anti-corruption tool. Applied to the NAV’s criminal investigation leadership: the possibility of withdrawal without reasons is today in the hands of the new government, tomorrow in the hands of the next one. If the rule remains unchanged, a later government could replace in the same way those who are carrying out accountability today (3.2, 3.3).

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (chapter on civil service reform)

6.4.2 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

One of the main case studies of Klitgaard’s book is the reform of the Philippine revenue bureau after 1975. President Marcos first responded to the corruption crisis with the summary dismissal of some two thousand state officials on the basis of a comprehensive “performance audit”. The new head of the revenue bureau, Judge Efren Plana, then chose a different path. He introduced risk screening based on indirect indicators (late payments, untraceable transfers, inconsistent records), and placed under investigation only those for whom several signals coincided. According to the author, in the first two years an infraction was found in every employee selected in this way. Plana reviewed the dismissals carried out at management level one by one, over more than a year, and from this the bureau’s staff understood that the reform was serious. At the end of the book Klitgaard records as an open question that anti-corruption campaigns have at times been used to remove political opponents. Because of their strong powers, the Singaporean and Hong Kong anti-corruption agencies could degenerate into a secret police in the wrong hands, so it must be examined which powers are the most vulnerable and what safeguards are needed. For the Hungarian situation this carries a twofold lesson. In the NAV’s leadership changes, credibility comes from documented decisions, each individually reasoned, not from speed (3.2, 3.3). And the answer to the concern behind the “ÁVH Watch” — that a strongly empowered office can be abused — is not naming rank-and-file staff, but safeguards tied to the powers: judicial control, a forum for remedy, public operating data (3.1).

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption (the case study of the Philippine revenue bureau and the closing chapter on further research directions)

6.4.3 Council of Europe: European Convention on Human Rights

Article 8 of the Convention guarantees everyone the right to respect for private and family life, and Article 10 freedom of expression. Here the two rights pull against each other: the freedom of expression of a political party and the private life of the investigator. Under Article 10(2), the exercise of freedom of expression carries with it duties and responsibilities, and may therefore be subject to restrictions:

“…as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society […] for the protection of the reputation or rights of others […]”

(that is: the restriction must be prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, among other things for the protection of the reputation or rights of others). The yardstick binds in two directions. On the one hand, the protection of rank-and-file investigators can only be laid down in law, not in authority practice or in a political code — which is why 3.1 proposes a legislative amendment. On the other hand, the restriction must be necessary and proportionate: the office, its leaders and its decisions can still be freely criticised, and the rule applies only to naming rank-and-file staff for the purpose of intimidation. The same Article 8 also protects the defence lawyer against surveillance without a legal basis.

📖 Source: Council of Europe: European Convention on Human Rights (Articles 8 and 10)

6.5 International comparison

Among the international principles for the functioning of anti-corruption agencies, the 2012 Jakarta Statement on Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies is worth highlighting. The document was drafted by current and former heads of anti-corruption agencies at the invitation of the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission, the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. According to the statement, the heads of the agency can be removed only through a procedure established by law. Staff must be protected against malicious civil and criminal proceedings, and the agency’s own staff should be recruited and dismissed according to clear and transparent internal procedures. This yardstick can be applied to the NVVH directly, and to the NAV’s criminal investigation leaders by analogy (3.1, 3.2). United States federal criminal law (Section 119 of Title 18 of the United States Code) makes it a criminal offence to publish the personal data of certain officials for the purpose of intimidation. The protection covers federal officials, as well as state and local officials assisting in federal criminal investigations: it is prohibited to make their home address, telephone number or personal e-mail address publicly available with the intent to threaten or intimidate them, or to incite violence against them. The rule does not affect criticism of offices and decisions, only the disclosure of data for the purpose of intimidation. Proposal 3.1 follows this purpose-bound structure. On leadership removals, Klitgaard’s Philippine case (see 6.4.2) shows the two extreme paths: summary mass dismissal and individually documented, evidence-based leadership change. The 444.hu compilation, in turn, recalls that in the past decade several countries in Europe have reached the final conviction of former ministers. There too, the rule-of-law yardstick was not the verdict but the integrity of the procedure.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A10 — Independent Anti-Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)
  • A5 — Whistleblower system
  • A6 — Reinforcing checks and balances

Justice

  • I4 — Protecting judicial independence (as an analogy)

Public security and law enforcement

  • KB7 — Anti-corruption internal oversight reform

Economy

  • G19 — Radical transparency in economic decision-making

Proposed new programme point: Statutory name protection for the staff of investigating bodies and a duty to give reasons for the removal of criminal investigation leaders — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 1 October 2026 — topic 1):

Supplementary press source (background):

Knowledge-base references (books and sources of law):

  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Council of Europe: European Convention on Human Rights (Articles 8 and 10)
  • 📖 Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code (Section 219)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points and background material; programme point ID: A10, A5, A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4)
  • MIAK policy area: Public security and law enforcement (programme points; programme point ID: KB7)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G19)
  • MIAK legal foundations: common conceptual errors concerning the branches of power and institutional competences
  • MIAK press monitor, 1 October 2026 — topic 1, score: 93/100

Supplementary public data sources:

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