Part I — Situation overview

On 2 and 3 June 2026 a single, dense institutional day unfolded. According to 444.hu’s report, the bill abolishing the Sovereignty Protection Office was posted on the parliament’s website; according to its justification it abolishes the body created in 2023 because it ‘performs no actual public task’, and its real purpose was political pressure exerted on citizens, organisations and press products. In the same days the interior minister dismissed Tamás Terdik, the Budapest police chief (his place was taken, on an interim basis, by his deputy for criminal affairs, Norbert Tamás Baricska), and then also János Balogh, the national police chief in office since 2018 — the latter’s successor was not yet known at the time of the 444.hu and HVG reports. According to 24.hu, the health minister, Zsolt Hegedűs, dismissed Gábor Csató, the director-general of the National Ambulance Service, for whose post an open call for applications is being announced. And Magyar Nemzet and Mandiner reported the recall of several ambassadors (according to press reports the heads of mission in Warsaw, Sofia and Helsinki), which took place in the form of decisions published in the Hungarian Gazette, ‘with recognition of their merits’.

The topic stands out from the daily news flow because it concerns not a single but parallel reshuffles: the same week after the change of government touches public-security (the police), healthcare (the ambulance service), foreign-policy (the ambassadors) and democracy-theory (the Sovereignty Protection Office) institutions. This makes it the first substantive test of the change of government of whether a reshaping of power points towards the dismantling of power concentration, or merely changes the political colour of the leaders. The departing head of the office, Tamás Lánczi, according to 444.hu called the abolition a ‘Brussels order’ — the debate is therefore at once about the concrete institutions and about what ‘institutional spring-clean’ means.

In MIAK’s reading the dismissal and the abolition are in themselves neither good nor bad: the question is always what comes after. The dissolution of a body created for political pressure may be justified; the replacement of a top official is a legitimate instrument of the executive power. But the lasting result is given not by the departure of persons but by the rule-based and depoliticised selection system that follows them — the character of the problem is therefore institutional, not personal.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame. According to Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, economists and authors of Spin Dictators, which analyses modern authoritarian systems, formal democratic institutions do not in themselves constrain the leader: modern autocrats hide power concentration precisely behind these façades, eliminate the checks and balances, and fill the key institutions with loyalists — from which it follows that the abolition of an over-politicised body is progress only if a simple loyalty-swap does not take place. Susan Rose-Ackerman, an American jurist-economist and one of the classics of corruption research, shows that a personnel system resting on patronage and political loyalty undermines the efficiency of public services; the aim is not the complete isolation of public administration from politics but a politically neutral, tenure-protected expert apparatus recruited on the basis of merit. And Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, economists and authors awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2024, give the broader frame with the distinction between inclusive and extractive institutions: inclusive institutions distribute power widely and constrain its exercise, while in the extractive one power is concentrated in the hands of a narrow elite. From these three sources together comes MIAK’s frame: institutional transformation is successful if it genuinely deconcentrates power and puts a merit-based, neutral apparatus in its place — not if it merely replaces the elite. The detailed literature treatment can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that make the ‘what comes instead’ question after the dismissals rule-based.

3.1 A merit-based, public selection and rotation system for the top posts

Following the KI7 programme point, MIAK proposes that the filling of the top law-enforcement, healthcare and diplomatic posts take place along pre-fixed, public application and competency criteria, with pre-appointment vetting and mandatory rotation in corruption-risk areas. In the Rose-Ackerman frame (see 6.4.2) this directly realises the principle of a politically neutral, merit-based expert apparatus: the executive power has the right to choose a leader, but the logic of selection should be transparent, not political loyalty. The responsible parties are the appointing minister and the legislator regulating the civil-service personnel system; the measure does not restrict the right of dismissal but makes the filling of posts accountable.

3.2 A genuine, accountable control institution instead of the abolished office

The abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office is progress if no control vacuum remains after it. Following the A10 programme point, MIAK proposes that, instead of the body used for political pressure — where a justified task remains at all — a control institution should be created that is independent in its operation, with guarantees fixed in law, which does not serve the government but also checks it. In the Guriev–Treisman frame (see 6.4.1) this is the essential difference: the dismantling of an authoritarian toolkit only democratises if another, loyal tool is not built in its place. The responsible party is the legislator (with a two-thirds law); the time frame is the legislative cycle following the office’s termination.

3.3 Law-enforcement accountability and internal oversight beyond the change of leaders

The replacement of the two police chiefs is an opportunity for the system too to be strengthened beyond the personnel change. Following the KB7 and KB6 programme points, MIAK proposes strengthening the internal oversight of the law-enforcement bodies, a rotation audit, asset-declaration monitoring and a public, auditable code of ethics, with an independent complaints committee with civil participation. Thus the accountability of the police depends not on the person of the current chief but on institutional guarantees. Legal precision: the dismissal of the police chief is within the competence of the interior minister — the executive power — and is not to be confused with the question of judicial independence; law enforcement falls under the Ministry of the Interior.

The common principle of the three proposals is that it shifts the emphasis from the who departs question to the along what system the successor arrives question. Dismissal is a legitimate instrument of power; depoliticisation is realised if selection, control and accountability are rule-based — not a daily function of political will. This is what links the proposals to the literature frame of Part II: power must not merely be handed over, it must be deconcentrated.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Public administration Transparent, merit-based selection strengthens professional continuity The wave of dismissals may bring the loss of professional knowledge and institutional memory
Democratic institutional system The dissolution of a political-pressure body deconcentrates power If a loyal successor institution is built in its place, only the label changes
Public security and care Strengthened internal oversight and an independent complaints committee increase trust The interim leadership of the police and the ambulance service may cause operational disruption

The main consideration is the balance of speed and rule-based procedure. The reshuffle after the change of government is understandably fast, but the proposal works if speed does not override public, merit-based selection. It tips to the risk side if the dismissals are not followed by transparent applications and institutional guarantees — then the promise of depoliticisation may itself appear as a mere power-grab. And an abolished control body brings a genuine gain only if no unaccountable vacuum arises in its place.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK considers the following suggested performance indicators (KPIs) worth tracking:

  • Open-application ratio: what percentage of the top-official appointments after the change of government took place on the basis of pre-announced, public application and fixed competency criteria — the aim is the highest possible ratio.
  • Institutional continuity: the evolution of the operational indicators (e.g. ambulance response time, crime clearance rate) of the organisations under the dismissed leaders during the transition — the aim is that the change of leaders should not worsen the service.
  • Control coverage: whether, in the place of the abolished Sovereignty Protection Office, a genuinely accountable control function actually remains, or an oversight vacuum arises.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message is that the institutional reshuffle after the change of government is credible if behind the dismissals there stands a rule-based, depoliticised selection and genuine accountability — not merely the swapping of the colour of power. From decision-makers MIAK asks for a public, merit-based appointment system, a genuinely accountable institution in the place of the abolished control body, and the strengthening of the internal oversight of law enforcement. The topic moves two MIAK foundational values: accountability, because an office serves the public interest if it does not protect the government but also checks it; and the ideology-free approach, because for MIAK the yardstick in the selection of leaders is expertise and not party sympathy — and it is precisely this that distinguishes depoliticisation from a reverse over-politicisation.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal and public-affairs band highlighted the procedural facts of the reshuffle and the serial character: 444.hu detailed the justification of the abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office and the dismissal of the Budapest police chief, HVG the dismissal of the national chief and the question of the successor, and 24.hu the dismissal of the ambulance-service leader and the planned renewal of the OMSZ (the National Ambulance Service). The economic band (Portfolio) put this topic less in top focus on this day. The pro-government conservative band offered two different frames: Magyar Nemzet put the foreign-affairs ‘spring-clean’, the ambassador recalls, to the fore, while the departing office head’s reaction conveyed by 444.hu framed the abolition as a ‘Brussels order’ — that is, as external pressure, not internal democratisation. For MIAK it is precisely the difference of framings that reveals the stake: the question is not ‘who ordered it’ but whether the change deconcentrates power, or merely redirects it.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Sovereignty Protection Office: according to the justification of the abolishing bill, the body created in 2023 ‘performs no actual public task’; the abolition, according to the government side’s communication, would mean some HUF 6 billion in savings (444.hu, 3 June 2026).
  • Law-enforcement leadership change: the interior minister dismissed the Budapest (Tamás Terdik) and the national (János Balogh, in office since 2018) police chiefs; the capital post was taken on an interim basis by Norbert Tamás Baricska (444.hu, HVG, 3 June 2026).
  • Healthcare: the director-general of the National Ambulance Service (Gábor Csató) was dismissed; an open call for applications is being launched for the post, with the new leadership from 1 September (24.hu, 3 June 2026).
  • Foreign affairs: according to decisions published in the Hungarian Gazette, ambassadors were recalled (according to press reports Warsaw, Sofia, Helsinki), ‘with recognition of their merits’ (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner, 3 June 2026).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — merit-based official selection, a rotation system and competitive civil-service pay;
  • Public security and law enforcement (programme points) — a police code of ethics, an independent complaints committee and anti-corruption internal oversight;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the strengthening of checks and balances, a genuine control institution in the place of the abolished body;
  • Justice (background material) — the limit of depoliticisation: judicial independence is not to be confused with the law-enforcement leadership change that falls under the executive power.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Guriev and Treisman: Spin Dictators

Guriev and Treisman’s thesis is that modern authoritarian systems operate not by open repression but by maintaining the appearance of democratic institutions — while hollowing out the control mechanisms and filling the key posts with loyalists:

“The essence of spin dictatorships is that their tyrants hide the autocracy behind the façade of formally democratic institutions. Modern autocrats manipulate elections, eliminate the system of checks and balances, rewrite constitutions and pack the courts with loyal followers.”

From this follows, for MIAK, the yardstick of abolition and dismissal: the dissolution of a ‘sovereignty-protection’-type body used for political pressure points towards the dismantling of power concentration — but only if another tool, this time loyal to the new majority, is not built in its place, and if the successors of the dismissed leaders take up their positions not on the basis of loyalty but of merit.

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev–Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

6.4.2 Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman’s main thesis is that a personnel system built on political loyalty undermines the performance and integrity of public administration; the solution is not the complete exclusion of politics but the regulated mediation of the relationship — merit-based recruitment, official stability, conflict-of-interest limits:

“A personnel system based on patronage and political loyalty undermines the efficient delivery of services … civil servants should not be hired and fired for political reasons.”

In the frame of the current leadership changes this means that the executive power has the right to choose new leaders, but lasting quality is given if the selection rests not on party sympathy but on public, merit-based criteria — especially in the law-enforcement, healthcare and diplomatic top posts, where continuity and expertise directly affect the public service.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.3 Acemoglu and Robinson: Why Nations Fail

Acemoglu and Robinson’s distinction between inclusive and extractive institutions gives the broader frame: inclusive political institutions distribute power widely and constrain its exercise, while in the extractive one power is concentrated in the hands of a narrow elite:

“In an extractive political institutional system power is concentrated in the hands of a narrow elite, and these institutions do not really constrain the exercise of power.”

The authors’ warning — that a change of power often merely ‘raises another elite in its place’ — speaks directly to the current institutional spring-clean: the abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office and the top-official swaps point towards an inclusive institutional system only if they genuinely deconcentrate power, and do not merely replace the old loyalty network with a new one.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu–James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

6.5 International comparison

The classic reference for the depoliticisation of top-official selection is the professional, merit-based civil service of the Singaporean and Nordic models: public application, competency-based screening, official stability protected from the political cycle. And the yardstick for dismantling the authoritarian toolkit is given by the operational confirmation of the Guriev–Treisman frame: several post-authoritarian transitions failed because the old control bodies were replaced not by neutral institutions but by the loyal tools of the new power. The common lesson is that the quality of institutional transformation is measured not by the number of dismissals but by the independence of the rule system built after them.

Public administration and e-government

  • KI6 — Competitive civil-service pay system
  • KI7 — Official selection and rotation system
  • KI8 — Drucker-style efficiency measurement in public administration

Public security and law enforcement

  • KB6 — Police code of ethics and accountability
  • KB7 — Anti-corruption internal-oversight reform

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A7 — Media pluralism as an institutional guarantee
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)

Justice

  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 4 June 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Sergei Guriev–Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu–James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

Note: the books’ local file path does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI6, KI7)
  • MIAK policy area: Public security and law enforcement (programme points; programme point ID: KB6, KB7)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 4 June 2026 — topic 2, score: 88/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Issues of the Hungarian Gazette from June 2026 (ambassador dismissal decisions)
  • Venice Commission institutional standards

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