Part I — Situation overview

On 2 June 2026 the Central Investigating Chief Prosecutor’s Office (KNYF — the investigative body within the prosecution service that proceeds in high-priority cases, including those involving public officials) carried out a large-scale operation in a Budapest, Óbuda park-maintenance corruption case. According to 24.hu’s report this is a case spanning parties and districts: among others, Fidesz politicians Zsolt Láng, Csaba Gór and Péter Puskás and the mayor of District II, Gergely Őrsi, were taken in, while according to Telex and ATV the arrest of former MSZP MP Zsolt Molnár was also initiated. Citing the KNYF’s statement, 444.hu wrote of an investigation affecting several municipalities, in the course of which searches and seizures were carried out at numerous locations. According to Zsolt Molnár’s defence counsel, his client is suspected of trading in influence; according to the reports the politician denies everything. In connection with the case, Népszava also reported that an earlier investigation had been reopened on a submission by the Integrity Authority.

The topic stands out from the daily news flow because the proceedings are cross-party: both government and opposition figures are involved. This makes it one of the first substantive tests of the period after the change of government as to whether the justice and prosecution system operates in a politically neutral way — that is, whether accountability is a function of the facts of the case, not of the political side.

In MIAK’s reading the news is not in itself a verdict, nor is it MIAK’s task to take a position on an individual criminal case. What is substantive for MIAK: corruption is not a matter of individual character but the product of system-level incentives. Well-functioning prevention forestalls what otherwise has to be dealt with afterwards by investigation — the character of the problem is therefore structural, not individual.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame. According to Robert Klitgaard, an American economist and one of the founders of the economic modelling of corruption, corruption appears where a monopoly position and broad discretion meet weak accountability — this is condensed in his formula corruption = monopoly + discretion − accountability. It follows that the lasting solution is not (only) holding the individual perpetrator to account, but changing the conditions: narrowing discretion and strengthening accountability. Daniel Kaufmann, an economist and co-author of the World Bank’s governance-measurement programme (Worldwide Governance Indicators), in turn shows that the quality of governance — including the control of corruption — can be turned into a measurable, comparable indicator, and that better governance leads causally to better development outcomes. From these two authors together MIAK’s frame follows: we prevent corruption by transforming the conditions, and we judge success not on the basis of individual cases but on public, data-driven indicators. The detailed literature treatment can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that transform the structural conditions behind individual criminal cases.

3.1 Machine-readable, public asset declarations

In line with programme point A3, MIAK proposes that politicians’ asset declarations should not be scanned PDFs but machine-readable data comparable from year to year. In the Klitgaard frame (see 6.4.1) this directly strengthens the accountability factor: unjustified wealth accumulation only stands out if wealth can be tracked publicly, as a time series. The responsible parties are the legislator and the body managing the asset declarations; the measure does not in itself punish, but makes visible.

3.2 A mandatory, public lobby register

Trading in influence — which according to the reports is one of the suspicions that has arisen — flourishes precisely where the informal channels leading to the decision-maker are invisible. In line with programme point A4, MIAK proposes a mandatory, public lobby register: who consulted with whom, about what. This does not abolish discretion — the decision-maker is free to deliberate — but it makes the route of influence transparent, and thus makes the discretion term of the Klitgaard equation controllable.

3.3 An independent Corruption-Investigation Office (following the Singapore model)

MIAK’s most emphatic proposal is programme point A10: a corruption-investigation office on the Singapore model (CPIB model), independent in its operation, which can investigate any public official and politician, and in the case of unjustified wealth accumulation the burden of proof is reversed. An important distinction: this office — like the prosecution service itself — stands on the fact-finding/prosecution side, it is not part of the judiciary (the courts); adjudication remains exclusively a matter for the independent courts. The strength of the model is that cross-party, neutral action is guaranteed not by the day’s political will but by institutional independence — exactly what the present case, involving both pro-government and opposition figures, also requires.

The common principle of the three proposals is that they shift the emphasis from after-the-fact retribution to prevention: if wealth is transparent, influence is registered and the investigation is independent, then the structure of corruption incentives itself weakens — not a single case but the system as a whole becomes cleaner.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Justice Party-neutral action strengthens trust in the system Damage to the appearance of neutrality if the proceedings seem selective
Society Declining tolerance of corruption, rising expectation of transparency Disappointment if fact-finding operations are not followed by structural reforms
Public administration Strengthening prevention (asset declaration, lobby register, independent office) A new investigative office may itself be politicised if its independence is not guaranteed

The main dilemma is the order of fact-finding action and structural reform. The proposal works if prevention does not replace but complements individual cases. It tips to the risk side if, after strong, spectacular operations, the quieter but lasting institutional changes fail to materialise — then the public may perceive accountability as ‘campaign-like’. An independent investigative office only fulfils its role if its appointment and operational guarantees genuinely remove it from day-to-day political influence.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK considers the following suggested performance indicators (KPIs) worth tracking:

  • Party-neutrality ratio: the distribution of public figures involved in corruption proceedings, broken down by pro-government/opposition — the aim is not a given ratio but that it should be the facts of the case, not party affiliation, that determine who is placed under proceedings.
  • Asset-declaration coverage: what percentage of those obliged have their asset declaration available in a machine-readable, comparable form.
  • Control-of-corruption indicator: Hungary’s value in the control-of-corruption dimension of the World Bank’s governance indicators (WGI) (2024 baseline: −0.17) — the aim is a multi-year, substantive improvement.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message is that accountability after the change of government is credible if it is party-neutral and structural: alongside individual cases, the publicity of asset declarations, a lobby register and an independent corruption-investigation office make the result lasting. From decision-makers MIAK requests the establishment of these three preventive institutions. The topic moves two MIAK foundational values: accountability, because action against corruption is only legitimate if it applies equally to everyone — pro-government and opposition alike — and is built on prevention rather than after-the-fact retribution; and non-ideological conduct, because for MIAK the facts of the case, not the political side, are the measure — and it is precisely this that distinguishes policy analysis from campaign rhetoric.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The public-affairs and left-liberal band highlighted the cross-party nature of the case: 24.hu framed it as a ‘case spanning parties and districts’ and put the Fidesz figures (Zsolt Láng, Csaba Gór, Péter Puskás) in the headline, Telex and ATV the arrest motion against Zsolt Molnár and the denial, and 444.hu the procedural facts of the investigation affecting several municipalities and involving searches. Népszava brought in the related investigation reopened on the Integrity Authority’s submission. The economic band (Portfolio) recorded the fact of the proceedings objectively (the taking-in of a former MP and a district mayor). The pro-government/conservative band placed the topic less in top focus on this day; where it appeared, it typically emphasised the opposition involvement (Zsolt Molnár, Gergely Őrsi), in contrast with the left-liberal band’s framing of Fidesz involvement. For MIAK it is precisely the two framings together that show the essence: the credibility of the case comes from the fact that both sides are involved — that is, it is driven by the facts, not by party affiliation.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Proceeding body: Central Investigating Chief Prosecutor’s Office (KNYF); the case affects several municipalities, with searches and seizures (444.hu, 2 June 2026).
  • Taken in (according to the reports): Zsolt Láng, Csaba Gór, Péter Puskás (Fidesz politicians), Gergely Őrsi (mayor of District II); an arrest motion against former MP Zsolt Molnár, the suspicion according to the defence being trading in influence (Telex, ATV, 24.hu).
  • Reference indicator: according to the World Bank’s governance indicators (WGI) 2024, Hungary’s control-of-corruption value is −0.17 (source: World Bank WGI 2024) — system-level improvement can be measured against this baseline.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — asset declaration, lobby register, independent corruption-investigation office;
  • Justice (background material) — distinguishing prosecutorial independence and judicial transparency;
  • Public safety and law enforcement (programme points) — a data-driven criminal record system and the impact assessment of prevention vs. punishment.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

According to Klitgaard’s model, illicit gain is greatest when the official actor holds monopoly power and great discretion while their accountability is weak:

„Illicit behavior flourishes when agents have monopoly power over clients, when agents have great discretion, and when accountability of agents to the principal is weak."

From this Klitgaard draws the conclusion that the decision-maker must analyse the extent and costs of corruption and then change the conditions — not merely punish individual perpetrators. In the case of the present Óbuda case this means: the taking-ins do not in themselves solve the problem; the lasting result comes from building institutions that narrow discretion (a lobby register) and increase accountability (public asset declarations, an independent investigative office).

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.2 Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters

The main thesis of the work of Kaufmann and his co-authors is that the six basic dimensions of governance — including the control of corruption and the rule of law — can be turned into aggregate, internationally comparable indicators, and that better governance leads causally to better development outcomes:

„Six new aggregate measures capturing various dimensions of governance provide new evidence of a strong causal relationship from better governance to better development outcomes."

In the frame of the Hungarian case this means that the success of accountability is signalled not by a single, spectacular investigation but by the lasting improvement of the measurable quality of governance. MIAK therefore proposes that the result of the action be judged on the basis of the multi-year trend of the control-of-corruption indicator — in a data-driven, party-neutral way.

📖 Source: Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters

6.5 International comparison

The classic example of the independent corruption-investigation office model is Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), which is subordinate directly to the head of government but independent in its operation, and whose competence covers every public official and politician. The lesson of the model is the operational confirmation of the Klitgaard–Kaufmann frame: party-neutral action is lasting if institutional guarantees — not the political will of the day — secure it. Several European countries approach this goal with a standalone anti-corruption agency or a reinforced prosecutorial investigative body; the common element is independence and the universality of competence.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A2 — Procurement transparency
  • A3 — Publicity of asset declarations
  • A4 — Lobby register
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A10 — Independent Corruption-Investigation Office (CPIB model)

Justice

  • I1 — Judicial transparency
  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence

Public safety and law enforcement

  • KB1 — Criminal data platform
  • KB3 — Crime prevention vs. punishment impact assessment

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 3 June 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters

Note: the books’ local file path does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A3, A4, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Public safety and law enforcement (programme points; programme point ID: KB1, KB3)
  • MIAK press monitor, 3 June 2026 — topic 2, score: 93/100

Additional public data sources:

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024 — control-of-corruption indicator
  • Integrity Authority annual reports

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