Part I — Situation overview

On 31 May 2026 the affair of the Hungarian public media took a sharp turn. According to internal electronic correspondence obtained by RTL Híradó, the news director of the foundation operating the public media (MTVA) instructed his colleagues on the morning of election day to “please start looking for right-wing analysts […], because only the left-wing narrative is running”, and during the campaign repeatedly prescribed keeping a document called the Tisza energy programme on the agenda. The leaked material shows that the daily topics and speakers of news production were designated by political considerations outside the editorial office. Reacting to this, Prime Minister Péter Magyar said in parliament: the two directors-general of the state news service “are being given a chance to leave of their own accord”, and publicly called on them to go.

The affair does not stand alone. At the same time the publisher Mediaworks terminated the contract of Népszava’s print edition, endangering the survival of the more than a hundred-year-old left-wing daily — the European Federation of Journalists even called on the EU’s media authority to act. And a few days earlier the readership of several pro-government news sites (Origo, Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner’s online surface) fell at once after the election defeat. The three developments together sketch the picture of a major realignment: the political logic of the former media system is crumbling, while the contours of the new arrangement are not yet visible.

In MIAK’s reading two mutually opposed dangers strain against each other here. On the one hand, dismantling the revealed culture of out-of-editorial instruction is justified and necessary — media maintained from public money cannot be the assembly line of a single political narrative. On the other hand, the immediate removal of leaders at a prime-ministerial call may itself be a new form of political influence, if it does not happen in a lawful, transparent procedure. The question is not whether change is needed in the public media, but whether the change points towards depoliticisation or re-politicisation.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. The propaganda model expounded by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (American media scholars) in their work Manufacturing Consent (1988) — that is, the theory that explains, through five “filters” (ownership structure, advertising revenue, source dependence, the flak from criticism, and the dominant ideologies), why the media produces content aligned with elite interests — highlights that media distortion is not necessarily open censorship but a mechanism coded into ownership and financing structures. According to Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman (an economist–political-scientist author pair, analysts of modern authoritarianism), in their book Spin Dictators (2022), today’s strongmen gain a mass base not through open violence but through the clever handling of information (the co-optation of the media, frequency withdrawals justified on pseudo-technical grounds) — which is exactly why the restoration of media pluralism is not the continuation of the old propaganda with an opposite sign, but the rebuilding of institutional neutrality. The detailed literature treatment — by author — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measures that do not subordinate the public media to a new political direction, but institutionally withdraw it from the scope of daily politics.

3.1 An independent board of trustees and open competition for the leadership of the public media (within 60 days)

MIAK proposes that the question of the public media’s leaders be settled not by a prime-ministerial call but by a depoliticised procedure fixed in law: an independent, multi-actor board of trustees (with a balance of professional organisations, the academy, journalists’ associations, and opposition and governing-party nomination) and a public competition based on professional criteria. On the basis of the leaked correspondence a professional-ethical procedure against the current leaders may be justified, but the legal ground for removal is the rule-breaking, not the political side. By the logic of the propaganda model (see 6.4.1), the real stake is the ownership and control structure: if the leader can be replaced by the sitting prime minister, the direction of the distortion changes but the mechanism remains. This is the direct application of programme point A7 (media pluralism as an institutional guarantee).

3.2 Measuring media-market concentration and monitoring the narrowing of pluralism

The demise of Népszava’s print edition is a direct narrowing of press diversity — in a market where the supply is already concentrated. MIAK proposes setting up a public, regular measurement of the concentration of the media-ownership structure and the advertising market, and that at critical points (the demise of a national paper, an ownership entanglement) there be an automatic, transparent review. The use of the tools of the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) — which protects at the EU level against the concentration of the media market and the impairment of public-service media independence — is also justified. This is the content of programme point KU2 (media-pluralism monitoring): public data on the ownership structure and market concentration.

3.3 Disinformation resilience and media-literacy programme

The realignment of the media system leads to a lasting result if it also strengthens the reader side. MIAK proposes a national media-literacy programme — school and adult-education modules for recognising fake news, manipulated content and propaganda techniques. According to the analysis of Guriev and Treisman (see 6.4.2), modern manipulation is built precisely on reshaping citizens’ worldview; the antidote to this is the society-wide ability of critical media consumption. This is programme point KU7 (disinformation resilience and media-literacy programme).

These three proposals are tied together by a single principle: media independence does not mean the opposite political control, but institutional neutrality. Depoliticisation is credible if the public media works just as in a balanced way after the next change of government — whoever is in power.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Democratic public sphere The balance of the public media is restored; the diversity of sources and the quality of information grow The leadership change may turn into a mere change of direction (hammering home a new narrative), which does not remedy the structural problem
Media market / economy Transparent concentration measurement creates a more predictable market; the EMFA tools protect pluralism Népszava-type paper closures may further narrow the supply if there is no institutional safety net
Institutional system The independent board of trustees gives a lasting, cross-government guarantee If the reform fails and only a personnel change happens, the political influence stays institutionalised

The main dilemma is stretched between speed and durability. The prime-ministerial call promises an immediate, spectacular result, but sacrifices precisely institutional neutrality; the statutory reform is slower but lasting. The proposal tips to the risk side if the political intent aims at “replacing” the old system rather than “neutralising” it. It works if the reform also ties the hands of the next government.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes watching the following performance indicators (KPIs) over the next 12–24 months:

  • Whether an independent, competition-based leader selection is set up at the public media (yes/no), and whether the composition of the board of trustees is transparent.
  • Hungary’s ranking in international press-freedom indexes (e.g. Reporters Without Borders’ annual index) should improve — an indirect indicator of the media environment as a whole.
  • The publication of a public measure of media-market concentration (yes/no), and the evolution of the number of national dailies and news sources.
  • The balance of the public media’s news service based on independent, methodologically transparent content analysis.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: the current realignment of the public media and the press market must be steered towards depoliticisation, not re-politicisation — the leaders should be selected by a transparent, statute-based procedure, not by the prime minister, and the narrowing of pluralism (the demise of Népszava) should receive institutional protection. This request connects to two MIAK foundational values. The first is openness: the democratic public sphere is the healthier the more independent sources the citizen can inform themselves from — media pluralism is its institutional condition. The second is ideology-free operation: MIAK defends a neutral, balanced public media even when that conflicts with the new government’s interest — because media maintained from public money is the tool not of one side or the other, but of the entire public sphere.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The left-liberal and public-affairs band put the revelation and the institutional question at the centre: HVG and Telex detail the content of the leaked MTVA correspondence (the news director’s topic-designating instructions), 444.hu publishes the verbatim details of the internal communication, and 24.hu highlights the call on the directors-general and the failure of the earlier “immediate suspension” promise. Népszava — as an affected party — reported the demise of its own print edition and the European Federation of Journalists’ request for action. The economic band (Portfolio) discusses the call on the leaders factually, fitting it into the broader process of the public-media transformation. The conservative, pro-government band did not bring the topic into top focus on this day — which is itself telling in an affair where this side was previously the main beneficiary of the public-media system. MIAK focuses, instead of the framing differences, on the institutional substance.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The source of the leaked correspondence is RTL Híradó’s report; the news director sent the instruction on the designation of topics and speakers on the morning of election day.
  • Mediaworks terminated the contract of Népszava’s print edition; the European Federation of Journalists requested action by the EU’s media authority.
  • Hungary’s institutional indicators (World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024): control of corruption −0.17, rule of law +0.35 — the media environment is part of the broader institutional quality.
  • The public media is a service financed from public money; the question of its leaders is therefore a direct accountability matter.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — media pluralism as a democratic institutional guarantee, not merely a cultural question.
  • Culture (programme points) — the transparent monitoring of the media-ownership structure and market concentration; the media-literacy programme.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Edward Herman – Noam Chomsky: Manufacturing Consent

The work is a classic of the critical analysis of mass media: the propaganda model explains, through five filters, how the seemingly free media nonetheless produces content aligned with elite interests. According to the authors, the determining factors are structural — the ownership and control relations, the financing sources (advertisers), the dependence on news sources, and the fact that certain principles are treated as self-evident by media workers. The essence of the model: the distortion is not necessarily an open command but the consequence of incentives and constraints built into the structure. In the current Hungarian case this is exactly the key lesson: the leaked correspondence is a document of the open instruction culture, but the lasting solution is not the replacement of the instructors but the transformation of the control structure itself — otherwise in the next cycle the same mechanism is reproduced, with an opposite sign.

📖 Source: Edward Herman – Noam Chomsky: Manufacturing Consent — The Political Economy of the Mass Media

6.4.2 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

The authors show that 21st-century authoritarianism is typically built not on open violence but on the handling of information: leaders gain a mass base by reshaping citizens’ worldview while avoiding the appearance of hard repression. The book specifically discusses the Hungarian media environment — for example the relocation of radio stations from the airwaves to the internet, licence withdrawals justified on pseudo-technical grounds (frequency use, “not enough Hungarian music”) — while the government denied the political intent. For MIAK this has two consequences: on the one hand, the restoration of media independence is a system-level, institutional question (not a personnel one); on the other hand, the response to captured media cannot be the application of the old techniques with an opposite sign — because that perpetuates the same logic.

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

6.5 International comparison

In European practice the independence of public-service media is increasingly protected by an EU-level tool too, the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA): this prescribes the editorial independence of public-service media, their stable and transparent financing, and a transparent, non-arbitrary order for the appointment of leaders, and gives frameworks for controlling media-market concentration. The experience of several member states shows that the key to lasting depoliticisation is the withdrawal of the appointment of leaders from governmental competence (an independent board of trustees, multi-actor nomination), not the politically directed replacement of the leaders. For handling Népszava-type paper closures, the European models use pluralism support and transparent media-support systems (public money not dependent on the editorial office).

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A7 — Media pluralism as an institutional guarantee
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

Culture

  • KU2 — Media-pluralism monitoring
  • KU7 — Disinformation resilience and media-literacy programme

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 1 June 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Edward Herman – Noam Chomsky: Manufacturing Consent — The Political Economy of the Mass Media
  • 📖 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

Note: the book’s local file path does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A7, A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Culture (programme points; programme point ID: KU2, KU7)
  • MIAK press monitor, 1 June 2026 — topic 3, score: 85/100

Additional public data sources (if used):

  • Reporters Without Borders — annual press-freedom index
  • European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) — EU media-regulation framework

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