Part I — Situation overview

One of the highest-stakes questions of European security has emerged not on a new war front, but in the internal realignment of the alliance system. US President Donald Trump had earlier signalled that beyond the roughly 5,000-strong troop withdrawal from Germany announced by the Pentagon he would cut the number of American troops stationed in Europe “a lot further” — thereby sharpening the dispute with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, while America scales back its commitment to European security. The fresh turn is the timetable of execution: according to reports by the AP and Euractiv, the United States is expected to clarify at the start of June the troop and asset deployments it maintains within the framework of NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the transatlantic collective-defence alliance). German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius reacted calmly: the withdrawal was to be expected, and the European countries have to take greater responsibility for their own defence.

The region is not waiting idly for the June clarification. The fresh element is the build-up of regional self-insurance: on 27 May 2026 Poland signed a defence and security treaty with the United Kingdom (the London “Northolt Treaty”), which envisages the joint development of a new-generation medium-range air-defence missile, large-scale joint military exercises and cooperation against Russian hybrid attacks — according to British Prime Minister Keir Starmer “the biggest step forward in a generation”, and according to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk an instrument of deterrence. Linked to this is the Polish–Canadian defence rapprochement. Meanwhile French President Emmanuel Macron — together with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis — made clear: the European defence effort is not an alternative to NATO, but a response to the long-voiced American expectation; Europe cannot weaken NATO.

In MIAK’s reading, the question for Hungary is not rhetorical but a concrete task of defence planning and alliance policy. The security of a NATO member state depends on the security of the region as a whole; the realignment of the American presence makes it urgent to accelerate Hungarian defence-capability development and to take a predictable, issue-based alliance position — without either panic-mongering or playing it down.

Part II — Literature audit

The interpretive frame of the realignment is provided by two official sources. The European Union’s 2016 Global Strategy (EU Global Strategy) records the key connection: although NATO exists to defend its members against external attack, Europeans must be better prepared, trained and organised in order to contribute meaningfully to the common defence and, if necessary, to act autonomously as well — “European strategic autonomy” is therefore not the opposite of NATO, but its complement. The European Commission’s 2026 macroeconomic report adds the economic side: joint procurement brings an economies-of-scale advantage, and increased defence spending raises GDP (gross domestic product) when it goes into domestic investment and research and development, not mere imports. Together the two propositions give MIAK’s frame: the Hungarian response to the declining American presence should be, alongside maintaining NATO primacy, the targeted and economically rational development of its own and the common European capabilities. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures, so that the realignment becomes not a risk but an opportunity to strengthen the Hungarian defence position.

3.1 Accelerating Hungarian defence-capability development — domestic investment and joint procurement

MIAK proposes that Hungary accelerate the development of its own defensive capability along HV9 (independent defensive capability — the “own weapons” doctrine), and tie this to European joint procurement (HV4 — EU defence-industrial base and joint procurement). The economic logic is clear: joint procurement gives an economies-of-scale advantage, and defence spending strengthens the Hungarian economy too if it builds on domestic production and research and development, not on the purchase of finished imported equipment. Military capability development is the competence of the Ministry of Defence (HM); the defence budget belonging to it, however — an important legal-institutional point — is adopted by the National Assembly, not by the government on its own.

3.2 Studying the Polish minilateral guarantee model

The Polish example shows one viable path of adaptation: complementing the NATO frame with bilateral or small-group (minilateral) defence guarantees — Poland deepened defence cooperation with both the United Kingdom and Canada, through joint development and military exercises. Within the framework of HV12 (geostrategic defence planning) MIAK proposes that Hungary study this model in order to expand its own alliance network — with particular regard to regional partners. The international-treaty side of military alliance agreements falls within the coordination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (KKM), while substantive international treaties are ratified by the National Assembly — the clear delimitation of competences is a precondition of a credible foreign policy.

3.3 A predictable, issue-based alliance position — not grievance politics

The third proposal is about alliance conduct. Within the framework of KP24 (“Year of EU/NATO” — the cyclical maintenance of alliance relations) and KP23 (alliance-credibility audit), MIAK holds that in the burden-sharing debate the Hungarian position should be predictable, issue-based and planned in advance — neither reflexive grievance politics, nor unconditional following. Alongside maintaining NATO primacy, within the framework of strategic-balance policy (KP11) Hungary must hold a clear, realistic position. A single principle ties the three proposals together: the realignment of the American presence calls for a more independent, economically rational and within the alliance predictable strengthening of Hungarian defence — the translation of the literature frame (NATO-complementary strategic autonomy) into practice.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Defence Domestic capability development and joint procurement provide a lasting, more independent defence capacity If the preparation is missed, the decline of the American presence opens a defence gap on the eastern flank
Foreign policy A predictable, issue-based position raises Hungarian alliance credibility Grievance politics or an ambiguous position marginalises Hungary in the burden-sharing debate
Economics Defence spending built on domestic investment can also bring GDP and jobs Mere import purchasing and front-loaded, debt-financed spending may worsen the fiscal path

The main dilemma is the balance of NATO primacy and European independence. The position of Macron and Mitsotakis is clear: the European defence effort is not the weakening of NATO, but a response to the American expectation. The proposal tips to the risk side if the Hungarian defence-spending increase becomes mere import purchasing, or undisciplined, debt-front-loaded expenditure — in which case the economic benefit fails to materialise and the fiscal path is damaged. Conversely: medium-term planned spending built on domestic production and joint procurement strengthens defence and the economy at once.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested performance indicators)

MIAK proposes monitoring the following performance indicators (KPIs, in English Key Performance Indicator):

  • Hungarian defence spending as a share of GDP, measured against the NATO-pledged level;
  • the share of defence spending going to domestic production and research and development, compared with imports;
  • Hungarian participation in joint European procurement (number and value of projects);
  • the number of new, bilateral or regional defence-cooperation agreements.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to the decision-maker: the realignment of the American presence is cause not for alarmism, but for concrete planning — domestic capability development must be accelerated, joint European procurement must be joined, and a predictable, issue-based alliance position must be held. To the public: the question is not panic or playing-down, but responsible preparation within the NATO framework. All this moves two MIAK foundational values. Accountability, because the defence budget is decided by the National Assembly, and the clear delimitation of competences (HM, KKM, National Assembly) is the precondition of a credible decision — air defence, for example, is a defence task, not an interior-ministry one. And ideology-free handling, because MIAK treats the question not with bloc logic but with an objective weighing of the Hungarian security interest: NATO primacy and a more independent European capability are not opposites, but complements of each other.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The topic appeared in the international press as a frame of transatlantic burden-sharing. The US-leading news agency (AP) highlighted the Trump–Merz tension and the calm reaction of the German defence minister, as well as the joint message of Macron and Mitsotakis that the European defence effort is not an alternative to NATO. The European specialist-paper band (Euractiv) focused on the looming early-June American clarification milestone (this source was not publicly downloadable for technical reasons, so the analysis relied only on the news-agency and Polish reports). The Polish source (Notes from Poland) placed the build-up of regional self-insurance at the centre: the British–Polish “Northolt Treaty” and the Canadian rapprochement — highlighting that according to a report by an international research institute (ICCT) Poland is the most frequently targeted country in Russia’s European sabotage campaign (31 of 151 incidents in Poland since 2022). For MIAK the lesson of the spectrum is that the facts (declining American presence, European adaptation) are common; the question is not whether this is a threat, but what concrete, predictable response is the right one — and this is the question MIAK places at the centre of Hungarian defence planning.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The originally announced troop withdrawal from Germany: about 5,000 troops; according to Trump the reduction goes “a lot further”. (Source: AP.)
  • The US is expected to clarify its NATO troop and asset deployments in early June 2026. (Source: AP, Euractiv.)
  • Signing of the British–Polish “Northolt Treaty”: 27 May 2026 — joint air-defence missile development, joint military exercises, cooperation against hybrid threats. (Source: Notes from Poland.)
  • ICCT report: 31 of 151 sabotage incidents in Poland since 2022 — the most among the member states.
  • Poland’s 2024 contract worth ~GBP 4 billion with Britain’s MBDA for 1,000+ CAMM-ER (medium-range, surface-to-air) air-defence missiles — the precedent of the bilateral cooperation.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Defence (programme points) — the core of the topic: independent defensive capability (HV9), EU joint procurement (HV4), geostrategic defence planning (HV12).
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — alliance maintenance (KP24), credibility audit (KP23), strategic-balance policy (KP11).
  • Economics (background) — the macroeconomic impact of defence spending and the economies of scale of joint procurement.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 EU Global Strategy (2016)

The EU’s 2016 Global Strategy formulates strategic autonomy expressly as a complement to, not an alternative to, cooperation with NATO:

“While NATO exists to defend its members — most of which are European — from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organised to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary.”

In the case of the Hungarian response this is precisely the principled basis of proposals 3.1 and 3.2: alongside maintaining NATO primacy, the development of one’s own and the common European capabilities.

📖 Source: EU Global Strategy (European Union, 2016)

6.4.2 European Commission: 2026 European Macroeconomic Report

The Commission’s report models the economic conditions of defence spending, and gives clear guidance:

“Pooling procurement efforts could help achieve economies of scale… the increase in defence spending has positive effects especially if the additional defence spending focuses on domestic investment and R&D, rather than just imports.”

In the Hungarian context this directly grounds proposal 3.1: defence spending also strengthens the economy if it builds on domestic production and joint procurement.

📖 Source: European Commission: 2026 European Macroeconomic Report (IP328)

6.5 International comparison

The Polish model is the operative realisation of the theory: Warsaw builds minilateral guarantees alongside the NATO frame (British and Canadian cooperation), and as a precedent concluded in 2024 a significant air-defence missile procurement with the British defence industry. The Greek–French position represents the same balance: European independence serves the strengthening, not the weakening, of NATO. For Hungary the lesson is that expanding the regional alliance network and joint procurement are at once a defence and an economic rationale — provided they also strengthen the domestic industrial base.

Defence

  • HV9 — Independent defensive capability (the “own weapons” doctrine)
  • HV4 — EU defence-industrial base and joint procurement
  • HV12 — Geostrategic defence planning

Foreign policy

  • KP24 — “Year of EU/NATO” — cyclical maintenance of alliance relations
  • KP23 — Alliance-credibility audit
  • KP11 — Strategic-balance policy

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK foreign press monitor, 31 May 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 EU Global Strategy (European Union, 2016)
  • 📖 European Commission: 2026 European Macroeconomic Report (IP328)

Note: the local file path of the books does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Defence (programme points; programme point ID: HV9)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP24)
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 31 May 2026 — topic 1, score: 82/100

Additional public data sources:

  • NATO defence-spending statistics (2% GDP target); European Defence Agency (EDA) capability reports; Hungarian defence-ministry communiqués.

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