Part I — Situation overview

The press day of 27 May 2026 was dominated by a new foreign-policy and transparency affair: according to the parliamentary state secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the departing cabinet’s foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó, diplomatic passports were issued without justification, partly on a crony basis — according to the 24.hu report, friends, family members of “sidelined” politicians and figures linked to foreign business circles also received such documents. The government spokespersons announced, at a press conference held in parallel with the parliamentary sitting, that Anita Orbán — a representative of the new foreign-affairs leadership — proposes revoking nearly three-quarters of the service and diplomatic passports. By contrast, the conservative-leaning Magyar Nemzet, close to the departing governing party, wrote that the issuance of diplomatic passports “complied with the laws”, and Fidesz denied Tisza’s accusations.

A diplomatic passport is not a rank and not a reward: it is a public document that provides special border-crossing and protocol facilities, and carries national-security as well as foreign-policy weight. (An important distinction: the passport itself is not identical to full diplomatic immunity, which belongs to posted diplomats in the receiving state — but the document is a significant instrument nonetheless.) The issuance and revocation of the document fall within the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Government), in a regulated procedure. The framing of the sources differs markedly — 24.hu, 444.hu and HVG frame it as a scandal, Magyar Nemzet emphasises lawfulness — and so the affair requires a distinctly non-ideological, fact-based treatment.

In MIAK’s reading, the essence of the question is not the search for individual culprits, but a systemic flaw: if a diplomatic passport can be handed out by a discretionary, unchecked decision, without public criteria, then abuse becomes structurally embedded — regardless of who is in government. The revocation may be justified, but on its own it is only symptomatic treatment; the lasting solution is the criteria-based, transparent re-regulation of issuance.

Part II — Literature audit

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive framework. Geoff Berridge (the British scholar of diplomatic theory) sets out, in his work Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, the “functional theory” of diplomatic privileges and immunities: these privileges are justified because they are necessary for the undisturbed performance of the diplomatic function — not because of the bearer’s personal rank or connections. It follows directly that a crony- or business-based distribution unrelated to the function departs from the original purpose of the privilege. Robert Klitgaard (the American economist of corruption research) summarised the conditions of corruption, in his work Controlling Corruption, in the formula C = M + D − A: corruption flourishes where monopoly (M) and discretionary decision-making power (D) meet the absence of accountability (A). The issuance of a diplomatic passport is exactly such a situation, if it is the discretionary right of a single ministry, without public criteria and subsequent oversight. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures so that a systemic reform, rather than a mere political purge, is born of the scandal.

3.1 A public, criteria-based issuing rule system (within 90 days)

MIAK proposes that the issuance of diplomatic and service passports be tied to pre-set, public criteria: precisely defining which offices and tasks (active diplomats, specified state leaders, a concrete, verifiable official foreign-service function) entitle the holder to the document, and for what duration. Anonymised, aggregated statistics kept on issuance should be public (how many documents, on what legal grounds), so that within Klitgaard’s C = M + D − A framework (see 6.4.2) rule replaces discretion (D), and publicity replaces the absence of accountability (A). This fits the logic of A3 (asset declarations / public-office transparency) and A1 (public-funds-dashboard-style public data disclosure).

3.2 Revocation in a regulated, lawful, case-by-case procedure

MIAK supports the revocation of unlawfully issued documents, but stresses: revocation cannot be an automatic, collective political act. In every case a reasoned, individual decision open to legal remedy is needed, which separates the genuinely function-tied, lawful documents from those issued on a crony-business basis. In this way the step also meets the requirement of due process, and does not become the object of a “political purge” suspicion. Respecting the presumption of innocence, the review examines the legal title, it does not stigmatise the person.

3.3 Strengthening diplomatic capacity — the document tied to the function

MIAK proposes that the review be linked to the professional strengthening of the Hungarian diplomatic service: the document should be tied to an actual, performance-based diplomatic function, not be a political reward. According to Berridge’s functional theory (see 6.4.1) the privilege serves the performance of the task — this is operationalised by the KP5 (diplomatic capacity development) programme point: alongside a professional, performance-based diplomatic corps, document issuance too becomes a transparent, justified system.

The shared principle of the three proposals is that the instruments of public power should be distributed by rule and publicity, not by acquaintance — this is reinforced by both sources of the scholarly frame.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Foreign policy The restoration of the credibility of the Hungarian diplomatic document system If the revocation is collective and unreasoned, it breeds a foreign-policy and legal dispute
Transparency A public, criteria-based system replaces discretionary issuance The development of the criteria may drag on, and the scandal may get stuck at symptomatic treatment
Public administration A regulated, verifiable issuance and revocation procedure Without case-by-case assessment, revocation may cause a wave of legal remedies and stigmatisation

The main judgement question is the choice between a swift purge and a systemic reform. The political demand to revoke unlawful documents is understandable, but if the step is collective and unreasoned, then it itself falls into the error of the discretionary, rule-less decision — only with the opposite sign. The proposal tips to the risk side if the revocation becomes a political gesture; and it works if it is paired with case-by-case assessment, and is followed by the criteria-based re-regulation of issuance.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

On the basis of the following performance indicators (KPIs, in English: Key Performance Indicator) it will be possible to judge in 6–18 months whether the systemic settlement has succeeded:

  • whether a public, criteria-based issuing rule system was adopted (yes/no);
  • whether the aggregated statistics of issued diplomatic and service passports are public (number, legal title);
  • whether the revocation took place through an individual, reasoned procedure open to legal remedy (the proportion of collective acts);
  • whether the number of documents not tied to a function fell substantially.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message: we support the review and revocation of unjustified diplomatic passports, but we ask the decision-maker that the step take place through a case-by-case, regulated procedure, and be followed by the public, criteria-based re-regulation of issuance — so that the problem ceases at the systemic level, and not merely that the current circle of beneficiaries is swapped. This request stems from two MIAK foundational values: from transparency, because the instruments of public power must be distributed by public rule, not by discretionary acquaintance; and from being non-ideological, because we treat the question not as a political reckoning, but as a neutral institutional reform applying equally to both sides. Without these two values, the purge reproduces exactly the rule-less discretion it seeks to eliminate.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The liberal and public-affairs lane (24.hu, 444.hu, HVG) framed the affair as a scandal: 24.hu highlighted the parliamentary state secretary’s claim (cronies and family members of third-rate politicians also got documents) and Anita Orbán’s revocation proposal, 444.hu the revocation of passports handed out on a crony basis, and HVG the circle of beneficiaries (cronies, sports clubs, foreigners). The conservative lane (Magyar Nemzet), by contrast, emphasised lawfulness: the issuance “complied with the laws”, and Fidesz denied the accusations. The common point of the spectrum is the facts (the review, the revocation proposal); the difference is the emphasis: systemic abuse, or a lawful practice attacked without foundation. MIAK deliberately treats these two framings as sources of equal rank, and focuses on the facts — the absence of regulation in the issuance.

6.2 Facts and data

  • According to the parliamentary state secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the Szijjártó era diplomatic passports were also given to cronies, family members of “sidelined” politicians and figures linked to foreign business circles (24.hu, HVG, 27 May 2026).
  • Anita Orbán proposed the revocation of nearly three-quarters of the service and diplomatic passports at the government spokespersons’ press conference (24.hu, 444.hu, 27 May 2026).
  • According to Magyar Nemzet, close to the departing governing party, the issuance complied with the laws; Fidesz denied the accusations (Magyar Nemzet, 27 May 2026).
  • The issuance and revocation of a diplomatic passport is the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Government), in a regulated procedure.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — KP5 (diplomatic capacity development): the document tied to an actual, performance-based diplomatic function;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — A3 (asset declarations / public-office transparency), A1 (public-funds-dashboard-style public data disclosure): the criteria-based, public system of issuance;
  • Public administration and e-government (background material) — the regulated, lawful framework of the issuance and revocation procedure.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Geoff Berridge: Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger

Berridge shows that, according to the “functional theory” of diplomatic privileges and immunities, international law attributes these privileges to their practitioners because they are necessary for the undisturbed performance of the diplomatic task — they are not justified by the bearer’s personal rank or connections. In the case of a diplomatic passport it follows that the document is a function-tied instrument: a crony- or business-based distribution not connected to the function departs from the original purpose of the privilege, and thereby undermines the credibility of the diplomatic service.

📖 Source: Geoff Berridge: Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger

6.4.2 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard summarised the conditions of corruption in the formula C = M + D − A: corruption flourishes where monopoly (M) and discretionary decision-making power (D) meet the absence of accountability (A). In his own words: “corruption flourishes where monopoly and discretion are paired with the absence of accountability”. The issuance of a diplomatic passport is exactly such a situation, if it is the discretionary right of a single ministry, without pre-set public criteria and subsequent oversight: the solution is the regulation of D (discretion) and the restoration of A (accountability) through publicity — which is exactly what MIAK’s criteria-based proposal targets.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.5 International comparison

Most developed foreign services tie the issuance of diplomatic and service passports to strict, function-tied criteria, and regularly review the range of issued documents. The lesson of international practice is that the problem is solved lastingly not by revocation but by the regulation of issuance: where entitlement rests on clear, verifiable criteria, there is no room for crony distribution. This is the shared operative realisation of Berridge’s functional theory and Klitgaard’s formula: the privilege remains manageable when it is tied to the function and discretion is brought under rule.

Foreign policy

  • KP5 — Diplomatic capacity development

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A3 — Asset declarations / public-office transparency
  • A1 — Public-funds dashboard

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 28 May 2026 — topic 5):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Geoff Berridge: Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Note: the visible text of the blog does not show the sources’ local file path — only the author and title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP5)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A3, A1)
  • MIAK press monitor, 28 May 2026 — topic 5, score: 82/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Ministry of Foreign Affairs passport-issuance statistics (to be requested, aggregated)
  • State Audit Office (ÁSZ) earlier reports on public-office document issuance

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