Part I — Situation overview

Today, on 26 May 2026, with Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s pre-agenda address, the new National Assembly convenes, and the week compresses into a single session several key questions of the rule-of-law turn. This week the MPs decide on the setting up of five parliamentary committees of inquiry, the suspension of the parliamentary immunity of Máté Kocsis (former parliamentary group leader of Fidesz), the sixteenth amendment of the Fundamental Law, and — according to Magyar Nemzet’s forecast, on Wednesday — they may withdraw Hungary’s exit from the International Criminal Court (ICC, the international tribunal seated in The Hague that investigates war crimes and crimes against humanity) by repealing the denunciation of the Rome Statute (the international treaty that created the ICC).

The topic is at the centre now because this is the first full parliamentary week in which the new, 141-mandate governing majority (according to the National Election Office’s, NVI’s finalisation of 19 April 2026) reaches at once for the constitutional structure, the tools of parliamentary oversight and an international commitment. The contested legacy of the period between 2010 and 2026 — the series of constitutional amendments, the hollowing-out of the committees of inquiry and the initiation of the exit from the ICC — now comes onto the agenda with the opposite sign. According to ATV’s report, the International Criminal Court itself sent a message to the Hungarian government, signalling the stakes of the return.

In MIAK’s reading the stake is not whether accountability and the restoration of the international commitment should happen — MIAK supports these — but in what procedure. The question decided this week is whether the new majority strengthens the logic of checks and balances, or reverses the very tools whose concentration it stood up against.

Part II — Literature audit

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scholarly framework within which the week’s decisions can be assessed. Montesquieu (French legal philosopher of the Enlightenment) set out in his work The Spirit of the Laws that there is no freedom where the same actor makes, executes and adjudicates the rules — the separation of powers is not a formality but a condition of freedom. H. L. A. Hart (20th-century British legal philosopher) describes the rule of law in his work The Concept of Law as a system of general, knowable-in-advance rules applying equally to everyone, contrasted with a tailored, case-by-case act of power — this standard governs both the constitutional amendment and the suspension of immunity. And the book Spin Dictators by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman warns that formally democratic tools (constitutional amendment, prosecutorial procedure, inquiry) can also be turned to political ends — which is precisely why procedural guarantees are the tests of the turn’s credibility. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable procedural guarantees, subject to which the week’s decisions mean the strengthening of the rule of law, not the mere reversal of the tools of power.

3.1 Constitutional amendment with an impact-assessment and consultation filter (from submission to vote)

MIAK proposes that the sixteenth amendment of the Fundamental Law pass through parliament not in an accelerated procedure but with a public impact assessment and broad professional-social consultation. The principle of I3 (mandatory, public legislative impact assessment) must be applied to constitutional-level amendment too: alongside the submitted text there should be an analysis of what it solves, whom it affects, and how it fits the European constitutional tradition. And in the spirit of I9 (lawmaking with citizen feedback), the amendment should come with a structured, public feedback phase. Where possible, it is worth requesting the opinion of the Venice Commission (the constitutional-law advisory body of the Council of Europe) on the risks of accelerated constitution-making — it was precisely this body’s earlier recommendations that criticised the rapid post-2010 constitutional amendments.

3.2 The committees of inquiry with a clear competence limit, as a tool of oversight rather than in place of the court

The five committees of inquiry are a legitimate tool of parliamentary oversight, but MIAK insists on the precise delimitation of their competence. The task of a committee of inquiry is to uncover political responsibility and to draw the legislative lesson — not to pronounce guilt, which is the business of the independent court and prosecution. In the logic of the A6 (strengthening checks and balances) programme point, the committees should receive a pre-fixed mandate, a deadline, and guaranteed opposition participation; the procedural rights of those heard (legal representation, the right to silence) should remain intact. In this way the inquiry remains a tool of accountability and does not become a show trial before a public that is also protected by A7 (media pluralism as an institutional guarantee).

3.3 The individual, justified suspension of immunity — and the clean restoration of the ICC commitment

Parliamentary immunity is not a personal privilege but a guarantee of the MP’s independence; its suspension should therefore always be an individual, justified and documented decision, not a political message. In the case of Máté Kocsis, MIAK asks that the suspension be tailored solely to the concrete procedural necessity. MIAK clearly supports the withdrawal of the ICC exit: the return to the Rome Statute is a principled commitment to international accountability, which fits the A14 (international institutional participation and accountability) programme point. In public-law terms a clean process matters: the (re-)recognition of the binding force of the international treaty is the ratification competence of the National Assembly — the Government submits, the parliament adopts.

These three proposals are bound by a single principle: the turn is credible if it applies the same yardstick it demands of the old system. Accountability and the international return strengthen the system of checks and balances — provided the tools are used, according to the Montesquieu and Hart standard (see 6.4.1 and 6.4.2), along general and pre-fixed rules.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Rule of law The ICC return and the limited committee of inquiry strengthen predictable, rule-based operation The accelerated constitutional amendment sets a precedent for future hasty constitution-making
Politics Accountability restores the authority of parliamentary oversight The committee of inquiry can become a tool of political settling-of-scores if there is no competence limit
Foreign policy The return to the Rome Statute improves Hungary’s international standing The commitment can become the object of a domestic-political dispute

The main judgement question is the balance of pace and guarantee. A constitutional amendment tips to the risk side if the magnitude of the political force (the two-thirds majority) places speed ahead of thoroughness — it is precisely this distortion that Spin Dictators (see 6.4.3) describes. The proposals work if the majority voluntarily undertakes the impact assessment, the consultation and the competence limit — that is, restrains itself where the constitution does not yet oblige it to.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

The following suggested performance indicators (KPIs, i.e. verifiable metrics that measure success) are worth tracking for the quality of the turn 6–12 months out:

  • Whether the amendment of the Fundamental Law was accompanied by a public impact assessment and a documented consultation phase (yes/no).
  • Whether the committees of inquiry have a mandate fixed in writing with a deadline and guaranteed opposition membership (of five committees, how many).
  • Whether the restoration of the binding force of the Rome Statute took place through parliamentary ratification (yes/no, date).
  • Whether the opinion of the Venice Commission was requested on the constitutional amendment (yes/no).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers: uncovering the past and restoring the international commitment are the right direction, but the manner decides whether the turn strengthens the rule of law. Concretely, it asks that the amendment of the Fundamental Law proceed with an impact assessment and consultation, the committees of inquiry with a limited competence, and the immunity decision with individual justification. Two MIAK foundational values move directly here: accountability — because the uncovering and the ICC return strengthen the institutions of holding to account — and transparency — because the public impact assessment and the documented procedure make verifiable whether power truly binds itself to rules. These two values stand at the centre precisely because the credibility of the turn is proved not by intent but by the procedure observed.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The liberal and public-affairs lane focused on the procedural stake and the situation of the opposition: Telex’s preview probed how Péter Magyar would treat the opposition MPs in the debate, while 24.hu and HVG focused on the order of business of the committees of inquiry and Máté Kocsis’s immunity case. 444.hu’s morning press review (“What will happen in Parliament?”) summed up the stakes of the week.

On this day the economic–public-affairs lane (Portfolio) put into top focus not the parliamentary super-week but the macroeconomic and energy-market developments — which is why here the framing of the topic is confined to the political lanes.

The conservative lane with a government-critical past, and the current opposition lane, brought out the constitutional and international dimension: Magyar Nemzet put on the front page the Wednesday withdrawal of the exit from the International Criminal Court, while Mandiner gave a critical, questioning frame under the title “Seven questions about the 16th amendment of the Fundamental Law, and about the promise of the rule of law” — formulating from the opposition side precisely the impact-assessment and guarantee demand that MIAK also voices. ATV foregrounded the message of the International Criminal Court.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The mandate distribution of the new National Assembly: Tisza 141, Fidesz–KDNP 52, Mi Hazánk 6 (NVI, finalisation of 19 April 2026).
  • In the 199-seat National Assembly the two-thirds threshold required for a constitutional amendment is 134 mandates (the governing majority is above this).
  • Hungary’s “rule of law” indicator according to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2024) is +0.35, and “control of corruption” -0.17 — that is, the rule-of-law restoration has a measurable base from which to improve (World Bank WGI 2024).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (programme points) — mandatory impact assessment (I3), citizen feedback (I9) and judicial independence (I4) provide the procedural frame of the constitutional amendment and the committee of inquiry;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — strengthening checks and balances (A6), media pluralism (A7) and international institutional participation (A14) frame accountability and the ICC return;
  • Foreign policy (background material) — the return to the Rome Statute is a commitment to the international rule of law.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

Montesquieu’s classic thesis is that the concentration of powers is the opposite of freedom: where the same actor is at once under and above the law, freedom ceases. As he puts it, “it seems to subject the very same persons to the power of the laws, and at the same time to exempt them” — that is, the danger is precisely when someone is at once subject to the law and exempt from it. In the case of the constitutional amendment and the committee of inquiry this means: the new majority remains on the ground of the separation of powers if it subjects its own tools too to a general rule, rather than treating them as instruments of the momentary political aim.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

6.4.2 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

Hart describes the rule of law as a system of general, knowable-in-advance rules applied equally to everyone, held together by the so-called rule of recognition — as opposed to a tailored, case-by-case command of power. In this frame the suspension of immunity is rule-of-law-based if it takes place according to a general, pre-fixed procedure, justified individually, not on the basis of political discretion. The Hungarian constitutional amendment meets this standard if the rule applies equally to everyone going forward, rather than being designed to handle a given situation or actor.

📖 Source: H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

6.4.3 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

Guriev and Treisman describe the pattern of 21st-century “soft” authoritarianism, in which power operates not through open violence but through the appropriation of formally democratic tools. The authors show through concrete examples how certain leaders cement their power with a “democratic” constitutional amendment, or go after their political opponents “in the characteristic spin-dictator manner — seemingly for non-political crimes”. This illuminates the stake of the Hungarian super-week: the same tools (constitutional amendment, prosecutorial procedure, inquiry) can both strengthen and weaken democracy — the difference is made by the procedural guarantee and the competence limit.

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

6.5 International comparison

On the question of constitutional procedural guarantees the practice of the Venice Commission is authoritative: the body has criticised the rapid constitutional amendments of several countries (including Hungary’s after 2011), and consistently recommends broad consultation, impact assessment and temporal maturity. For the competence limit of parliamentary committees of inquiry the German and British practice provides a model, where the committee confines itself to uncovering political responsibility and does not step into the place of the court. As regards membership of the International Criminal Court, the overwhelming majority of EU member states are parties to the Rome Statute — Hungary’s return fits the mainstream.

Justice

  • I3 — Mandatory, public legislative impact assessment
  • I9 — Lawmaking with citizen feedback
  • I4 — Protection of judicial independence
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A7 — Media pluralism as an institutional guarantee
  • A14 — International institutional participation and accountability

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 26 May 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws
  • 📖 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law
  • 📖 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

Note: the visible text of the blog does not show the books’ local file path — only the author and title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I3, I9)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A14)
  • MIAK press monitor, 26 May 2026 — topic 1, score: 93/100

Additional public data sources:

  • National Election Office (NVI) — final result of the 2026 parliamentary election
  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 — rule of law, control of corruption
  • Venice Commission (Council of Europe) — recommendations on accelerated constitution-making

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