Part I — Situation overview

On the morning of 22 May 2026 the Sándor Palace published on its official website the documents kept at the head-of-state office in the matter of the presidential pardon granted by then President Novák Katalin to Endre Kónya. Among the released documents are a note on the verdict in the Hunnia case, a 3 April 2023 note on the current state of pardon submissions, and the cover sheet of the Justice Minister’s 4th pardon submission of 2023. The released documents confirm what until now could only be known from press reports: the cabinet of the President of the Republic (the professional apparatus led by the chief of cabinet) did not support the pardon, and in his 17 April 2023 submission then Justice State Secretary Róbert Répássy recommended pardon for only three out of 49 defendants in 51 pardon cases — K. Endre’s monogram was not among them. Despite all this, Novák Katalin in her 27 April 2023 presidential decision — without justification — granted pardon to Endre Kónya, including the lifting of the disqualification from a profession.

The chain of events that led to publication is itself a sign of institutional pathology: in recent days there have been exchanges of communiqués between the office of the President of the Republic and Prime Minister Magyar Péter about whether the government must formally request the documents or whether the Sándor Palace must release them on its own initiative. Communication between the two branches shifted onto social media — which Sulyok Tamás himself called unacceptable in his communiqué, while signalling that the President fully supports the investigation from the outset. The Sándor Palace website crashed within minutes of the document release, presumably unable to handle the load — a technical signal too of how unprepared the institution was for the transparency of its own decisions.

In MIAK’s reading the scandal has two dimensions: on the one hand the justification-free granting of the 2023 concrete pardon shows a conceptual-legal problem (presidential discretion without control); on the other hand the two-week tussle in May 2026 about how to release shows that the institution does not have procedural routine even with its own previous decisions. The present analysis offers a MIAK-perspective policy answer to these two dimensions.

Part II — Literature audit

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the scholarly framework within which the topic can be interpreted. The C = M + D − A formula laid out by Robert Klitgaard in Controlling Corruption (1988) states that corruption (and more broadly: abuse of public power) flourishes where monopoly position and discretionary competence meet a lack of accountability — pardon power is affected in all three dimensions: Article 9(3)(f) of the Fundamental Law places it within the exclusive competence of the President (M), under the current rules the decision need not be justified (D), and there is no remedy against it (A in the negative sense). In Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (1999) Susan Rose-Ackerman analyses in detail the abuse patterns of discretionary public-power decisions: if the authority assesses the applicant’s eligibility individually, without justification, the system is more sensitive to the operation of personal influences (informal relations, lobby interests). In The Concept of Law (1961, 2nd edition 1994) H. L. A. Hart discusses the theoretical analysis of discretionary power: within the Hart positivist frame discretion is not free will but a justifiable choice within the bounds of rules — it is precisely the duty of justification that makes discretion a legal matter and not a political gesture. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures to ensure the professional grounding and transparency of pardon decision-making. All three proposals are achievable while leaving the current constitutional structure — the pardon power as the presidential competence under Article 9(3)(f) of the Fundamental Law — untouched, partly by amending a cardinal act, partly in the procedural rules of the office of the President itself.

3.1 Duty of justification for every granting pardon decision (within 90 days)

In future the President should be required to justify in writing every granting pardon decision. The length of the justification cannot be fixed; the substantive requirement is: the President should make explicit which factors (personal circumstances, public interest, equity) led to the decision and — if the Justice Minister’s submission or the office’s internal expert opinion contained a contrary view — why she/he departed from these. The justification becomes public together with the pardon decision, with the anonymisation of the data subject’s personal data (name, file number). This is not part of the general assets-declaration framework under A11, but a standalone public-law transparency requirement — within the Klitgaard C = M + D − A framework (see 6.4.1) it does not narrow the D (discretion) factor but strengthens the A (accountability) factor. Legal form: amendment of Act CCXII of 2011 on the exercise of public clemency and the rules of the pardon procedure — a cardinal act requiring a two-thirds vote, which is available with Tisza’s 141-mandate caucus (NVI 19 April 2026).

3.2 Publication of the professional opinion of the President’s office (within 180 days)

The professional opinion of the President’s office (the apparatus led by the chief of cabinet) formed on pardon applications — in the present case the “did not support the pardon” formula — should in future not remain among the office’s internal documents but be placed on the public website of the Sándor Palace automatically, simultaneously with the presidential decision. The opinion form is textual, with a fixed structure (background, file analysis, recommendation), typically 1-2 pages long. Publicity serves a double function: on the one hand it places the frame of presidential discretion (based on Rose-Ackerman’s analysis — see 6.4.2) in a professional-organisational context; on the other hand it creates a procedural guarantee for the President: by making the apparatus’s stance public the office itself can be reassured that the political decision (the final pardon decision) is NOT confused with the professional assessment. Legal form: amendment of the standing orders of the President’s office (the Sándor Palace’s own rules) — does NOT require statutory amendment, the President can introduce it by unilateral decision.

3.3 Independent ex-post transparency review of pardons granted since 2020 (within 12 months)

The documents of pardons granted in the 2020-2026 period (Justice Minister’s submission, cabinet opinion, presidential decision) should be subject to ex-post review by an independent expert group — with members including constitutional lawyer, criminologist, ethics expert. The review does NOT aim at the withdrawal of final pardons (this is constitutionally precluded a priori, since the pardon’s validity takes effect with countersignature and the rule-of-law prohibition on retroactivity applies), but at the retroactive restoration of transparency: in every case the cabinet opinion and — where available — the Justice Minister’s submission should be published in anonymised form (in the structure under 3.2). The outcome of the review is public, does not found institutional-legal responsibility, but serves to restore the public trust damaged by the 2024 pardon scandal. Legal form: a parliamentary resolution ordering the inquiry + insertion of a transitional provision in Act CCXII of 2011 on the framework of the review procedure.

The common principle of the three proposals is the strengthening of the A (accountability) factor of the Klitgaard C = M + D − A formula while preserving D (discretion) — that is, leaving the President’s power untouched but building systemic guarantees of transparency. This fits the logic of MIAK’s A4 lobby-register extension and A12 public-office holders accountability framework.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Rule of law The pardon decision becomes transparent, power-branch disputes (the present case: Sándor Palace vs. Prime Minister) stay within procedural frames The duty of justification could be met formally with boilerplate text — substantive quality cannot be guaranteed by statutory language
Public trust The ex-post transparency of pardon decisions for 2020-2026 can restore the public trust shaken by the 2024 scandal If the review is poorly communicated, it can attract witch-hunt accusations, which would only worsen the already fragile public trust
Justice Publication of the cabinet opinion obliges the President in future pardons to a professional-organisational dialogue with her/his own apparatus Some pardon applicants (especially in press-sensitive cases) may withdraw their application, because even anonymisation cannot fully guarantee avoidance of identification

The most significant of the three main dilemmas is the tension between transparency and the discretionary nature of the pardon institution. If we oblige the President to provide legally precise, long justifications in every decision, the institution may turn into a second-instance judicial body — which is contrary to the classical function of the pardon (the principle of equity, which precisely counterbalances the strictness of categorical legal rules). That is why MIAK considers it important that the duty of justification be of unrestricted length: the President herself/himself decides how much to write — the requirement is only that there be justification, not what format it should take.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested performance indicators — KPIs)

  • Justification rate: what percentage of pardons granted in 2027-2028 contain a written justification in the presidential decision (target: 100% if proposal 3.1 is adopted).
  • Cabinet opinion publication rate: under the rule introduced based on proposal 3.2, what percentage of granted pardons have the office cabinet opinion on the Sándor Palace website within 30 days (target: 100%).
  • Review coverage: under proposal 3.3, what percentage of pardons in 2020-2026 succeed in having the cabinet opinion and/or Justice Minister submission published ex post (target: at least 80% of the surviving documents).
  • Procedural conflict indicator: the number of communiqués issued annually between the office of the President and the government in pardon cases (to avoid the pattern of the May 2026 two-week tussle — target: minimum, because proposals 3.1-3.3 automate it).

5.2 Summary

The 2024 pardon scandal exploded out of the justification-free decision of then President Novák Katalin against the position of her own office — the 22 May 2026 document release confirmed ex post that presidential discretion without effective institutional control is reduced to the personal conscience-judgement of a single office holder. MIAK’s proposal — duty of justification, publicity of the cabinet opinion, ex-post transparency review — does not narrow the President’s power but builds systemic guarantees of transparency into the existing constitutional frame. The package of proposals directly touches two of MIAK’s foundational values — transparency and accountability: the first because the pardon decision (as an act of public power) becomes visible beyond the applicant to the entire public; the second because the President’s duty of justification creates the possibility of ex-post professional-political assessment without aiming at the reversibility of the final decision.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the liberal spectrum Telex gave a detailed treatment titled “Sándor Palace publishes pardon case documents”, with concrete content analysis of the documents (Répássy submission 3 recommendations from 51 cases, Novák decision 27 April 2023, lifting of the disqualification from a profession); this is the most document-oriented coverage. 444.hu foregrounded the refusas thread (the Trans-Tisza Reformed bishop’s criticism of Zoltán Balog) — this is an ecclesiastical-moral framing, not a constitutional one. HVG highlighted the technical aspect of the release (the crash of the Sándor Palace website under load), which points to institutional unpreparedness. Népszava focused on Novák Katalin’s decision without head-of-department support.

In the public-affairs lane 24.hu placed alongside the Sándor Palace communiqué Magyar Péter’s Thursday post urging release — a procedural-political framing, less focused on the content of the documents. Portfolio highlighted the economic-political consequences (the fulfilment of Magyar Péter’s request, the Sulyok-Magyar relationship).

The conservative-pro-government lane appeared in Index and Mandiner: Mandiner presented the fact — “The Sándor Palace published the official documents in its possession in the pardon case” — without commentary, without substantive framing. Magyar Nemzet’s front page carried the news Sulyok Tamás published the pardon case documents, but the 22 May 2026 morning article URL showed temporary unavailability (the link kept in the source list is the main reference point; the article was not publicly downloadable at generation time). Magyar Nemzet in a separate analysis piece published an interview with Péter Hack and Péter Farkas Zárug — where the formula “Magyar Péter is starting to settle into this absolute republic” appeared, which is a counter-narrative in the framing of the pardon-transparency dispute.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Pardon case chronological points:
    • 3 April 2023: note on the state of pardon submissions (based on Telex 22 May 2026)
    • 17 April 2023: submission of then Justice State Secretary Róbert Répássy — 3 recommendations among 49 defendants / 51 cases, NOT K. Endre
    • 27 April 2023: Novák Katalin presidential decision — pardon for K. Endre, lifting of disqualification from a profession
    • February 2024: the pardon case becomes public; Novák Katalin and Judit Varga step down
    • 21 May 2026: Sulyok Tamás communiqué on transfer of documents on official request
    • 22 May 2026 morning: Sándor Palace publishes the documents on its own website
  • Presidential pardon power:
    • Article 9(3)(f) of the Fundamental Law — individual pardon as the exclusive presidential competence
    • Act CCXII of 2011 on the exercise of public clemency and the rules of the pardon procedure
    • Countersignature by the Justice Minister — validity condition of the pardon decision
  • 2026 new National Assembly mandate distribution (NVI 19 April 2026):
    • Tisza: 141/199 mandates (70.85%), sufficient for cardinal-act amendment (≥ 132)
    • Fidesz-KDNP: 52
    • Mi Hazánk: 6

6.3 Policy aspects

The topic directly affects two MIAK policy areas, and indirectly a third:

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the accountability framework of discretionary decisions by public-office holders is the common intersection of the A4 lobby register and A12 public-power office-holders accountability programme points.
  • Justice (background material) — the pardon institution is part of the criminal-justice system; the duty of justification in pardons directly affects the frame of ex-post review of judgments.
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — the procedural order of the Sándor Palace as a public-law office and the publication procedures are linked to the KI4 institutional transparency theme.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard’s C = M + D − A formula provides an economic explanation of abuse of power: the public-power agent acts abusively if expected benefit exceeds expected cost — benefit rises with the size of discretion and the monopoly position, cost rises with the level of accountability. In the pardon case this formula is directly applicable: the monopoly position of the President (a single office-holder decides), the discretion (override power without a duty of justification) and the low accountability (no remedy, no ex-post sanction) together create a high value of D — the 2024 scandal is the regular consequence of the formula, not an anomaly outside the system.

“Corruption is particularly harmful when it distorts incentives. The combination of monopoly power and discretion — so often involved in the public sector — invites various forms of ‘rent-seeking’ or ‘directly unproductive profit-seeking activities.’”

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption (University of California Press, 1988)

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

Rose-Ackerman distinguishes three types of discretionary public-power decisions according to whether the authority has influence over the quantity of the benefit: (1) strictly fixed, (2) under authority influence, (3) condition-based. The pardon decision belongs to the third type — the President decides individually, weighing the applicant’s eligibility. According to Rose-Ackerman this is precisely the type most sensitive to the operation of personal influences (informal relations, lobby interests, political influence), since the decision-maker can freely determine whether the applicant meets the conditions — and the evaluation criterion itself is left to the decision-maker’s judgement.

“Discretion to determine who meets the requirements” — this is the third category of Rose-Ackerman’s typology, and Hungarian pardon practice fits precisely here.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge University Press, 1999)

6.4.3 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

In Hart’s positivist legal-philosophical frame discretion is a justifiable choice within the bounds of rules — as opposed to a political gesture, which is power exercised outside the rules without justification. According to Hart, pardon power can only be qualified as law (and not a political privilege) if the decision-maker is able — even ex post — to justify the choice with rule-based reasoning. The absence of the duty of justification therefore weakens, in Hart’s analysis, the legal character of pardon power and turns it into an act of political-sovereignty nature. The Hungarian 2024 pardon case is a textbook example of this Hart-style category slippage.

📖 Source: H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition 1994)

6.5 International comparison

In the practice of the German Bundespräsident publication of the cabinet opinion is not mandatory, but cases generally receive a short communiqué stating the reason for the decision in general terms. In the case of the Austrian Bundespräsident the standing orders prescribe internal handling of the cabinet opinion, but the justification of the pardon decision is part of the decision itself. The French grâce présidentielle is the most unconstrained — here neither justification nor publication of the cabinet opinion is mandatory, and the French system is regularly criticised precisely because of the opacity of pardon practice (see the relevant decisions of the Conseil d’État). Proposals 3.1 and 3.2 of MIAK lean towards the German-Austrian model and avoid the shortcomings of the French model.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A4 — Extension of the lobby register to public-office holders
  • A12 — Public-power office-holders accountability

Justice

  • I3 — Judicial and criminal law reform programme

Public administration and e-government

  • KI4 — Office transparency and publication procedures

Proposed new programme point: Duty of justification for presidential pardon decisions and publicity of the cabinet opinion — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy policy area.

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 22 May 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption (University of California Press, 1988)
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge University Press, 1999)
  • 📖 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edition 1994)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point IDs: A4, A12)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I3)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI4)
  • MIAK press monitor, 22 May 2026 — topic 1, score: 96/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 9(3)(f) — presidential individual pardon power
  • Act CCXII of 2011 on the exercise of public clemency and the rules of the pardon procedure
  • National Election Office (NVI) 19 April 2026 finalisation — National Assembly mandate distribution

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