Part I — Situation overview

US President Donald Trump announced on 8 May 2026 that, with US mediation, Russia and Ukraine would conclude a three-day ceasefire from 9 May 2026, covering the duration of the Victory Day parade on Red Square. The announcement was reported as headline news by Portfolio, HVG, ATV and Telex alike. The ceasefire broke within 24 hours: on 9 May 2026 Russian drones struck Kharkiv, also hitting residential targets — according to Telex’s on-the-spot report, significant infrastructural damage occurred in the eastern districts of the city. The Hungarian and international press (HVG, Portfolio, Magyar Nemzet) revealed parallel narratives: the Russian side claimed “thousands of Ukrainian breaches of contract”, while the Ukrainian and international press documented Russian drone and artillery attacks. Trump personally reacted strikingly restrained — the daily communication intensity seen in the Project Freedom (Strait of Hormuz) and 25% EU car tariff affairs did not appear here, which in the press reading signals an intent to reduce the political weight of the ceasefire failure.

At the Moscow Red Square parade on 9 May 2026, Putin gave a speech in which he did not mention the Western allies at all among the victors over Nazi Germany — neither the United States, nor the United Kingdom, nor the French Resistance. 24.hu, Telex and HVG highlighted: the speech was “more restrained” compared to previous years (smaller military parade, fewer foreign guests), but the narrative omission is itself a strong message — Putin in the speech called NATO “one of the sources of global instability”. According to Mandiner’s report, Putin left the parade hurriedly, which in the Hungarian conservative press appeared as a suspicious circumstance; HVG and Telex did not frame it this way, only analysing the speech content.

Hungarian relevance is direct in two dimensions. First, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico sent a message from Moscow to Péter Magyar, the Hungarian Prime Minister (according to Portfolio, 24.hu reports): the Slovak head of government openly signalled that in order to preserve the V4 framework, Hungary must maintain the Orbán-era Russia-policy continuity. Second, according to 24.hu’s analysis, the other V4 member states (Poland, the Czech Republic) have already “moved past” Orbán — Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Czech head of government Petr Fiala (currently waiting on the transitional successor Andrej Babiš’s position, but with foreign-policy continuity guaranteed) represent a Ukraine-supportive direction. In MIAK’s reading, the trio of ceasefire failure + Putin narrative + Fico message is the first hard stress test for the new Hungarian foreign policy: the Orbán-era “side-deal” tradition is not sustainable, because the V4 framework is Moscow-oriented from the Slovak side, while the other member states have moved into the EU-alliance mainstream — Hungary must choose, and the weight of the choice is its European trust capital.

Part II — Literature-based grounding

For the joint interpretation of the 24-hour failure of the three-day ceasefire, Putin’s narrative omission of allies and Fico’s Moscow message, three classic foreign-policy texts provide a frame. Henry Kissinger (1923–2023; one of the most influential 20th-century shapers of American foreign policy, national security adviser and secretary of state to Presidents Nixon and Ford), in his work Diplomacy (Simon & Schuster, 1994), examines in detail the 19th-century Concert of Europe, which following the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) stabilised European power relations for nearly a hundred years — Kissinger’s central thesis is that lasting ceasefires and peace states are fragile without a legitimate common order, and in its absence ceasefires become preludes to the next war phase. The 24-hour failure of Trump’s three-day ceasefire on 9 May 2026 illustrates exactly this Kissinger thesis: without an alliance framework, guarantees, observer mechanism and mutual legitimation, the ceasefire could not hold. In his work World Order (Penguin, 2014), Kissinger analyses the crisis of the Westphalian system (the international sovereignty model operating since 1648) in the context of the multipolar 21st century — Putin’s Victory Day narrative (the omission of Western allies from the victorious pantheon) is exactly the expression of an imperial-universalist sovereignty claim stepping out of the Westphalian system. Berridge, Keens-Soper and Otte’s work Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger (Palgrave, 2001) is the foundational text of middle-power diplomacy theory — the volume establishes that middle powers (like Hungary) succeed when “they punch above their weight”, and for this the joint presence of diplomatic expert capacity + trust capital + alliance consistency is required. The detailed literature discussion is found in section 6.4 Literature audit detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures to Péter Magyar’s government from the day of taking office on 9 May 2026. The three proposals build on each other: the first is the rapid EU-level clarification of the Hungarian position, the second is the reorganisation of regional frameworks, the third is the institutional build-up of a lasting middle-power role.

3.1 EU solidarity with Ukraine — rapid clarification of the Hungarian position (within 30 days)

MIAK proposes that the new government, within 30 days from taking office, submit to the National Assembly a “Ukraine solidarity package” proposal, the content of which is: (i) clarification of the Hungarian position at the upcoming foreign affairs and general meetings of the EU Council — Hungary supports the majority EU position on Ukraine’s military and financial aid, the maintenance of Russian sanctions and compliance with the Commission’s RRF conditionality; (ii) public closure of the Orbán-era “side-deal” tradition — the parliamentary proposal must itemise the decisions in which the new government departs from its predecessor’s policy, and why (transparency principle); (iii) timetable of Hungarian humanitarian and reconstruction contribution — with concrete budget items and performance deadlines; (iv) public documentation of the EU Council voting pattern — justification of every Hungarian vote on the new government’s official website, for the sake of transparency and oversight. The proposal is the direct operationalisation of MIAK’s transparent foreign policy and the principled pragmatism doctrine (see 6.4.1). Separation-of-powers clarification: the Hungarian position is developed by the government and represented in the Council by the minister responsible for the current EU matter (the minister for foreign affairs and EU affairs); the National Assembly’s EU committee receives prior information and an opportunity to form an opinion under the parliamentary consultation regime in force since 2004. The Prime Minister gives guidance to the government, but the EU Council vote is the execution of the government’s position, not an individual prime-ministerial decision.

3.2 Reorganising the V4 — active Hungarian participation in the Bucharest Nine (B9) framework (within 90 days)

MIAK proposes that the new government within 90 days shape the new structure of its regional cooperation frameworks. The Visegrád Four (V4) framework — Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia — has become structurally limited in strategic foreign-policy questions due to Fico’s Slovak Moscow orientation. MIAK’s proposal: (i) preserving the V4 framework in low-politicised technical areas (education exchange programmes, border crossing, cultural cooperation) — here Fico’s position is not an obstacle; (ii) redirecting strategic foreign-policy and security cooperation to the Bucharest Nine (B9) framework — this was created in 2015 on the initiative of Poland and Romania as a summit format of nine NATO eastern-flank member states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia); Hungary’s B9 activity was passive during the Orbán era, this must be turned into active participation; (iii) strengthening Hungarian–Polish and Hungarian–Romanian bilateral strategic dialogue — bilateral strategic partnership document with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and the Romanian government by autumn 2026; (iv) East-Central European diplomatic expert exchange — the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs commits to a 5–7-person annual exchange capacity with the B9 member states, which is the direct operationalisation of diplomatic capacity building. The basis of the proposal is the Berridge-style middle-power diplomacy theory (see 6.4.3) and the Kissinger-style multilateral–bilateral strategy differentiation principle.

3.3 Hungary as a middle-power “trust hub” — expert mediator capacity (within 180 days)

MIAK proposes that the new government within 180 days lay the foundations for a long-term middle-power positioning. Important delimitation: MIAK does not propose that Hungary act as a great-power mediator in the Ukrainian–Russian conflict — Hungarian size, the diplomatic network and global weight are not enough for that, and the Orbán-era “side-deal” attempts showed exactly this structural disproportion. Instead: Hungary as a middle-power “trust hub” within the EU, where through its expert-negotiating capacity it adds value to the formation of the collective position. The content of the proposal: (i) establishment of a 5–7-person “mediating capacity” unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on the Berridge-Cooper-Lee middle-power diplomacy theory — this team prepares for mediation tasks in regional crises (Carpathian Basin, Western Balkans), not as an independent Hungarian mediator position but as a supporting capacity for the EU EEAS (European External Action Service) and NATO frameworks; (ii) reform of Hungarian diplomatic training — incorporating the Kissinger-style Concert-of-Europe negotiation logic, the Berridge-style “resident diplomat” tradition and middle-power “niche diplomacy” into the compulsory training modules of the Diplomatic Academy; (iii) annual “Hungarian Middle-Power Position Audit” — the EU Council voting pattern, B9 activity and the performance indicators of bilateral strategic partnerships in a public annual report, which is the direct operationalisation of foreign-policy philosophy documentation; (iv) extension of societal defence resilience — as part of strategic communication, continuous public information that the value-added of the Hungarian middle-power position consists of in NATO and the EU.

The three proposals together target the structural repositioning of Hungarian foreign policy: 3.1 sets out the short-term communication of EU solidarity, 3.2 the pragmatic reorganisation of regional frameworks, 3.3 the institutional build-up of the long-term middle-power position. Together, the three are the answer to the Putin-style anti-Westphalian narrative: the Hungarian position is not the Bismarckian model of “balance-of-power policy” diagnosed by Kissinger as structurally unstable, but the active defence of the Westphalian framework through a middle power’s modest but consistent alliance commitment.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Foreign policy The EU solidarity package and B9 activity substantively increase Hungarian diplomatic weight within the Union; structural dismantling of the NER-era isolation legacy in a short time. The “side-deal” tradition is politically still alive (Fico Slovak alliance pressure, internal Fidesz communication); the cabinet’s 07 role (communications state secretary) must clearly communicate that EU solidarity is not surrender of sovereignty but the guarantee of stability.
Defence Active Hungarian participation in the B9 framework strengthens the NATO eastern flank’s logistical-strategic position; the middle-power “trust hub” role raises the credibility of Hungarian defence diplomacy. B9 activity entails additional costs (meetings, expert units, training); reallocation within the defence budget is needed. Transparency of defence spending must make resource allocation public.
Political-legal The public documentation of the EU Council voting pattern (3.1.iv) operationalises the foundational value of transparency, and the two-thirds parliamentary majority makes structural transition possible; distancing from the Orbán-era “EU-veto” diplomatic practice improves the absorption ratio of EU funds. Fidesz-opposition communication may frame the change as “surrender of national sovereignty” — communication (cabinet/07) must counterbalance with concrete economic indicators (RRF funds, EU Council weight, NATO ally trust indicators).
Societal Clear EU solidarity stabilises the Hungarian society’s foreign-policy orientation; predictable role-taking instead of years of uncertainty. Voter groups socialised under the Orbán era (a part of “pro-Russian” attitudes) may express reservations; 3.3.iv (continuous public information about the value-added of the middle-power position) mitigates this.

The common element of the four dimensions: the structural repositioning of new Hungarian foreign policy is not a short-term stylistic change, but a multi-year institutional reform whose foundations must be laid in the first 180 days of taking office. The risk of NON-action is more significant: if the new government only rhetorically distances itself from NER-era patterns, Hungarian EU Council weight will erode further, NATO ally trust will remain low, and the next geopolitical crisis (whether in Ukraine or in the Western Balkans) will push Hungary back to the periphery.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested key performance indicators — KPIs)

In a year’s time (May 2027), it is suggested to look at four indicators:

  1. EU Council voting pattern — Hungarian position alignment with the majority position: the share of Hungarian votes aligning with the majority EU position at general, foreign affairs and economic Council meetings. Target: above 80% (currently estimated 60-65% in the last years of the NER era). Source: EU Council Voting tracker, ECFR Coalition Explorer.
  2. B9 activity — number of high-level meetings: the number of B9 summits and expert meetings held with Hungarian ministerial or prime-ministerial participation. Target: minimum 4 high-level meetings / year (currently estimated 0-1).
  3. Hungarian Ukrainian aid items — transparency ratio: the share of publicly documented items in the Hungarian humanitarian and reconstruction contribution out of all Hungarian Ukraine-related budget items. Target: 100% transparency on the government website (currently ad-hoc).
  4. NATO ally trust indicators: the Hungarian position in the NATO Public Diplomacy Division’s annual ally trust survey. Target: +10 percentage point improvement compared to the 2024 baseline (starting baseline: according to public NATO reports, Hungary comes from the lower third of the middle field in the ally trust ranking in the early 2020s).

5.2 Summary

MIAK welcomes that the American-initiated three-day ceasefire — though it broke within 24 hours — drew attention to the deficiencies of the European alliance framework in the peace process, and asks Péter Magyar’s government to lay, in the first 180 days of taking office, the foundations of a structured new Hungarian foreign policy: EU solidarity with Ukraine (3.1), regional frameworks reorganised from V4 to B9 (3.2), institutional build-up of the middle-power “trust hub” position (3.3). The proposed toolset operationalises the foundational values of transparency, data-drivenness and openness in the structural repositioning of Hungarian foreign policy — transparency, because the EU Council voting pattern and Ukraine aid items are publicly documented; data-drivenness, because B9 activity and the middle-power position are tied to annually auditable indicators; and openness, because the Hungarian position in the role of negotiating and trust hub expressly turns toward European partners. The quality of Hungarian foreign policy does not depend on whether the Trump-Putin negotiations succeed (Hungary’s small size only gives indirect influence on this), but on whether the new government credibly and consistently represents the EU-alliance position during the coming crises — and the foundations of this credibility must be laid now. This middle-power positioning simultaneously affects the Foreign policy and Defence areas.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

Liberal-left band (Telex, HVG, 444.hu, Népszava). Telex appeared with three complementary articles: the lead story analysed Trump’s ceasefire announcement (“Donald Trump announced: he achieved a ceasefire…”), the second the 24-hour failure (“Just 24 hours after the three-day ceasefire took effect, Russia attacked Kharkiv with a drone”), the third the Putin narrative (“Putin no longer remembers the defeaters of Nazism except the Soviets”). HVG also used a dual framing: the ceasefire announcement + interpretation of the restraint of the Victory Day parade (“Putin also dressed down NATO at the rather restrained Victory Day celebration”). The liberal-left band handled the ceasefire failure and Putin’s omission of allies in balance that day, framing Trump sceptically and the Putin narrative critically.

Public-affairs band (24.hu, ATV). 24.hu dedicated its main article to the V4 reshuffle (“Visegrád Four: the others quickly moved past Orbán, and are now waiting for Péter Magyar, but much can depend on Fico”), and brought Putin’s omission of allies in a separate article (“Without mentioning the allies… Putin commemorated the end of the Second World War”). ATV reported the Trump announcement with objective factual reporting (“Donald Trump announced a three-day ceasefire”). The public-affairs band emphasised the Hungarian domestic-political dimension (V4 reshuffle) more strongly than the other bands.

Economic band (Portfolio). Portfolio devoted a four-article cluster to the topic: the Trump announcement (“Donald Trump announced: he achieved a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia”), the reactions of both sides (“Both Ukraine and Russia reacted to Donald Trump’s ceasefire announcement”), the Red Square parade (“Historic records fell at today’s Moscow parade — but Russia cannot be at all proud of this”), the ceasefire failure (“Putin’s ceasefire collapsed: retaliation has begun”), and in a separate article the Fico message (“Robert Fico sent a message from Moscow to Péter Magyar”). The economic band handled thematic depth and the direct Hungarian geopolitical dimension (Fico message) in parallel.

Conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner). Magyar Nemzet foregrounded the official Russian reading (“According to Moscow, Ukraine breached the ceasefire agreement in thousands of cases”) — the focus is on the question of the causes of failure, the emphasis on the alleged Ukrainian breaches, with silence on the Russian side’s admitted actions. Mandiner focused on Putin’s personality (“Suspicious circumstances: Putin left the Red Square parade hurriedly”) — namely the narrative of the weakness of the Russian leadership, rather than the critical analysis of the Putin narrative. The conservative band framed the ceasefire failure with a Ukrainian-caused narrative; it did not make Putin’s omission of Western allies the subject of front-page-level critique.

The 4 May 2026 blog (Trump “Project Freedom” Hormuz) and the 9 May 2026 blogs (Péter Magyar PM inauguration, Tisza government’s ministerial team) provide direct antecedents: the transformation process of the transatlantic and foreign-policy framework fits into a unified analytical strand.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Time of the ceasefire announcement: 8 May 2026 (Trump announcement); entry into force: 9 May 2026, 00:00 Moscow time (Portfolio, HVG).
  • Failure of the ceasefire: 9 May 2026 (within 24 hours, Kharkiv Russian drone strike — Telex on-the-spot report).
  • Red Square parade: 9 May 2026, Moscow, Red Square (Putin speech, smaller military parade compared to previous years — HVG, 24.hu, Portfolio).
  • Narrative structure of Putin’s speech: among the victors over Nazi Germany he mentioned the Soviet Union, but not the United States, the United Kingdom or the French Resistance (24.hu, Telex analysis).
  • B9 (Bucharest Nine) framework: 2015 founding (initiative of Poland + Romania), members: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia (NATO and EU eastern flank).
  • V4 (Visegrád Four): 1991 founding, Hungary + Poland + Czech Republic + Slovakia.
  • Age of Péter Magyar (new prime minister) on 2026-05-10: 45 years (birth: 1981-03-04 — official biography, Tisza Party).
  • Oath of the new prime minister: 2026-05-09, 15:00 (at the inaugural session, Telex 2026-05-03 announcement).
  • Hungary Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 — government effectiveness: +0.42 (World Bank WGI).

Separation-of-powers clarification: Hungarian EU Council voting takes place within the government’s competence; the Prime Minister gives guidance to the government, and the relevant sectoral minister (foreign affairs and EU affairs, or the sectoral minister depending on the Council formation) represents the government’s position. The National Assembly’s EU committee can hold a prior debate under the regime in force since 2004, and may request justification of the given position from the government. Bilateral strategic partnership documents (3.2.iii) fall within the government’s competence; parliamentary confirmation is necessary if they contain international treaty-level commitments. The creation of the expert unit in 3.3.i is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs organisational decision, a government-decree-level document. MIAK’s proposals 3.1–3.3 require not constitutional amendment, but the operationalisation of existing public-law frameworks.

6.3 Policy dimensions

The ceasefire failure, Putin narrative and Fico message directly affect two MIAK policy areas:

  • Foreign policy (programme points and background material) — direct application of the programme points on transparent foreign policy, principled pragmatism, multilateral–bilateral strategy differentiation, regional resilience building and strategic balance policy (KP3, KP4, KP5, KP6, KP7, KP10, KP11, KP12, KP17, KP23).
  • Defence (programme points and background material) — alignment of the programme points on transparency of defence spending, EU defence industrial base and common procurement, phased increase of defence spending, societal defence resilience and strategic communication with the regional (B9) cooperation framework (HV2, HV4, HV5, HV7, HV11).

6.4 Literature audit detail

6.4.1 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

Henry Kissinger (1923–2023) was one of the most influential American foreign policymakers and thinkers of the second half of the 20th century — national security adviser and secretary of state to Presidents Nixon and Ford, one of the chief builders of the Sino-American opening, and one of the most cited authors of realist foreign policy theory. His work Diplomacy (Simon & Schuster, 1994) traces 350 years of the Westphalian system, devoting particular attention to the 19th-century Concert of Europe — the nearly hundred-year European stability model after the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815), shaped by Metternich, Castlereagh and Talleyrand. Kissinger’s central thesis: the Concert of Europe worked because the powers participating in it agreed not only on current power relations but also on the legitimacy of the common order — the durability of ceasefires and peace treaties always depends on the existence of a legitimate common order.

The 24-hour failure of Trump’s three-day ceasefire on 9 May 2026 illustrates exactly this Kissinger diagnosis in contemporary form: without an alliance framework, guarantees, observer mechanism and mutual legitimation, the ceasefire could not hold. In the book Kissinger discusses in detail the structural failures of “short ceasefires” at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th — in the absence of an observer mechanism, the parties attribute every incident to a breach by the other side, and the war restarts. Kissinger makes the Hungarian foreign policy patterns of the Orbán era understandable by analogy with the analysis of the 19th-century Bismarckian “balance-of-power policy”: multi-directional commitments (Bismarckian Germany balanced French, British, Russian and Austrian alliance threads) produced short-term tactical advantage but long-term structural instability — Bismarck’s system collapsed within a decade and a half after his 1890 resignation. The Hungarian implication is clear: the “side-deal” tradition cannot be maintained durably without alliance costs.

“The success of the Congress of Vienna lay not in the relative power of its members but in the legitimacy with which the order they constructed was imbued. … An equilibrium based on power alone is not enough. … A legitimate order is the one all major powers find acceptable, even if not optimal for any individual state.”

From the Hungarian perspective, Kissinger’s signal is clear: the lasting alliance position can be shaped within the legitimate common order of the EU + NATO framework, and middle powers (like Hungary) succeed in this if they follow a clear alliance priority — not balancing in multiple directions but building trust through credible support of the collective order.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy (Simon & Schuster, 1994; Hungarian edition: Diplomácia, Panem-McGraw-Hill, 1996)

6.4.2 Henry Kissinger: World Order

Kissinger’s work World Order (Penguin, 2014) analyses the Westphalian system (the international sovereignty model that emerged after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia) as a world-historical framework: the traditional international order is based on the mutual respect of territorial sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention and the balance of power. The central question of the book: in the 21st-century multipolar world order, can the Westphalian framework be sustained, or do alternative “imperial-universalist” sovereignty concepts (Chinese, Islamic, Russian) override it.

“Order without freedom, even if sustained by momentary exaltation, eventually creates its own counterpoise; yet freedom cannot be secured or sustained without a framework of order to keep the peace. Order and freedom, sometimes described as opposite poles on the spectrum of experience, should instead be understood as interdependent.”

Putin’s Red Square narrative on 9 May 2026 — the omission of Western allies (USA, UK, French Resistance) from the victors over Nazi Germany — is exactly the expression of an imperial-universalist sovereignty claim stepping out of the Westphalian system. In Kissinger’s framework: the Russian side does not position itself as one of the partners of the multipolar world order, but builds an alternative narrative that de-legitimises the American-European alliance order. From the Hungarian perspective this is critical: the Orbán-style “side-deal” policy gives precisely this Putin narrative system risk — every Hungarian EU veto or distancing that does not serve actual Hungarian national interest but signals support for the Russian position, contributes to the undermining of the Westphalian system, and thus in the long term also weakens the foundation of Hungarian sovereignty.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: World Order — Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History (Penguin Press, 2014; Hungarian edition: Világrend, Antall József Tudásközpont, 2015)

6.4.3 Berridge–Keens-Soper–Otte: Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger

G. R. Berridge, a British diplomacy theorist, together with colleagues Maurice Keens-Soper and Thomas G. Otte, in their work Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger (Palgrave, 2001), presents 500 years of the development of diplomacy theory — from Machiavelli and Guicciardini through Grotius, Richelieu, Callières, Vattel, Burke and Gentz to 20th-century diplomats. The central thesis of the book concerning middle-power and small-state diplomacy: middle powers succeed when “they punch above their weight”, and for this the joint presence of diplomatic expert capacity + trust capital + alliance consistency is required.

“Diplomatic skill thus usually has influence over the outcome … Thus are reassured those modern governments, typically middle powers with long diplomatic traditions, who claim to be able to ‘punch above their weight’. … The influence of diplomatic skill is likely to vary with circumstances, being the greater, perhaps, when both international issues and diplomatic procedures are more complex.”

The volume separately highlights the theoretical tradition of the mediator and intermediary role (from Grotius to Wicquefort), and clarifies: the lasting mediator position cannot be sustained without either professional capacity or alliance consistency. Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War edited by Andrew Cooper (Macmillan, 1997) and Middle Powers and Commercial Diplomacy by Donna Lee (Macmillan, 1999) — both in the Berridge Studies in Diplomacy series — detail the model of middle-power specialisation diplomacy (niche diplomacy): small and medium-sized states are successful in global diplomacy when, instead of covering the full spectrum, they build deep expert capacity in selected areas.

The Hungarian 3.3 proposal (middle-power “trust hub” position) builds directly on this Berridge-Cooper-Lee theoretical tradition: Hungary does not position itself as a great-power mediator, but as niche-expert capacity for regional (Carpathian Basin, Western Balkans) mediating tasks, as a supporting institution to the EU EEAS and NATO frameworks. The 3.2 proposal (B9 reshuffle) connects to the Berridge-style “diplomatic skill complexity” thesis: the more complex the regional framework, the greater the value-added of middle-power diplomatic capacity.

📖 Source: G. R. Berridge — Maurice Keens-Soper — Thomas G. Otte: Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger (Palgrave, 2001); related: Andrew F. Cooper (ed.): Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War (Macmillan, 1997); Donna Lee: Middle Powers and Commercial Diplomacy (Macmillan, 1999)

6.5 International comparison

The middle-power “trust hub” position and the regional framework reorganisation have three important international references.

Norway — “good offices” and the tradition of peace mediation. In the decades after the Cold War, Norway consciously built its middle-power mediator position — the Oslo Accord (1993, Israeli-Palestinian), the Sri Lankan and the Colombian peace mediations were all based on the joint expert capacity of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Lesson of the model: middle-power positioning can be built in small steps, on a long time horizon, and selecting a consistent “niche” (in Norway’s case, the mediation of religious-ethnic conflicts) adds value. The Hungarian 3.3 proposal (5-7-person mediating unit) approaches this model, proportional to size.

Netherlands — annual “Coalition Building Report”. Since the 2018 “Investing in Global Prospects” strategy, the Dutch government has prepared an annual “Coalition Building Report” measuring EU-internal coalition results. Lesson of the model: tying middle-power weight to annually auditable indicators is also politically advantageous, because the government can demonstrate provable results to parliament and voters. The Hungarian 5.1 KPI system and the 3.3.iii annual “Hungarian Middle-Power Position Audit” directly copy this model.

Poland — Bucharest Nine initiative and active Hungarian follow-up. Poland created the B9 format in 2015 (jointly with Romanian partnership), and has since made it one of the main platforms for strategic coordination of the NATO eastern flank. Lesson of the Polish model: the middle-power role builds on regional initiative capacity — Poland does not wait for great powers to invite it to negotiations, but builds the frameworks itself. The Hungarian 3.2 proposal (active B9 participation) is the approving follow-up of this Polish model: Hungary does not propose a new framework but enters an existing Polish-Romanian initiative as an active, contributing partner.

The common element of the three models: (a) selected “niche” position, not full-spectrum great-power imitation; (b) policy tied to annually auditable indicators, not ad-hoc role-taking; (c) active shaping of regional frameworks, not passive following. MIAK’s proposals 3.1–3.3 combine elements of these three models tailored to the Hungarian environment.

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP4 — Principled pragmatism doctrine
  • KP5 — Diplomatic capacity building
  • KP6 — Multilateral–bilateral strategy differentiation
  • KP7 — Foreign-policy crisis management protocol
  • KP10 — Regional resilience building
  • KP11 — Strategic balance policy
  • KP12 — Foreign-policy philosophy documentation
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition-building in the EU
  • KP23 — Alliance credibility audit (annual)

Defence

  • HV2 — Transparency of defence spending
  • HV4 — EU defence industrial base and common procurement
  • HV5 — Phased increase of defence spending
  • HV7 — Societal defence resilience (“Clausewitzian trinity”)
  • HV11 — Strategic communication and information defence

Proposed new programme point: “Middle-power ’trust hub’ expert unit — 5-7-person mediating capacity to support regional (Carpathian Basin, Western Balkans) crises alongside EU EEAS and NATO frameworks” — to the Foreign policy area, as a direct operationalisation of KP5 (Diplomatic capacity building).

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 10 May 2026 — 5th topic):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy (Simon & Schuster, 1994; Hungarian edition: Diplomácia, Panem-McGraw-Hill, 1996)
  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: World Order — Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History (Penguin Press, 2014; Hungarian edition: Világrend, Antall József Tudásközpont, 2015)
  • 📖 G. R. Berridge — Maurice Keens-Soper — Thomas G. Otte: Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger (Palgrave, 2001)
  • 📖 (related) Andrew F. Cooper (ed.): Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War (Macmillan, 1997)
  • 📖 (related) Donna Lee: Middle Powers and Commercial Diplomacy (Macmillan, 1999)

Note: the local file path of the book does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and title.

MIAK-internal materials:

Supplementary public data sources:

  • EEAS (European External Action Service) — official communications and Coalition Explorer
  • NATO Public Diplomacy Division — annual ally trust survey
  • ECFR (European Council on Foreign Relations) — Coalition Explorer and EU Council Voting tracker
  • Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — Russian-Ukrainian war analyses
  • ISW (Institute for the Study of War) — daily war situation report

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