Part I — Situation overview

According to the Ministry of Finance’s (PM) monthly general-government report of 8 May 2026, 91 per cent of the annual deficit envelope had already been used up by the end of April. The report is the last substantive financial communication of the outgoing caretaker Orbán government, and was issued one day before the inaugural session of the new parliament. According to Portfolio’s analysis, with the current deficit level of the 2026 central budget, only nine per cent of the total annual envelope remains for the last eight months — out of which the summer wage waves, the start of the school year and the winter energy procurement must be financed. Based on the pattern of previous years, this is structurally unfeasible, hence the new government must initiate either a supplementary budget or a reallocation of envelopes.

The decision was taken on 9 May 2026: András Kármán (the new finance minister, having taken over the portfolio according to the announcement of 21 April 2026) announced in a Portfolio article that he will prepare a supplementary budget this year. Meanwhile, HVG’s summary on 7 May 2026 disclosed that the outgoing government — in the weeks preceding the 2026 election — moved a total of HUF 1,666 billion within the budget: typically from reserve-type and earmarked (EU co-financed) lines towards politically sensitive pre-election expenditures (public-procurement payments, propaganda contracts, state subsidies). The HVG analysis of 10 May 2026 (linked to the 2025–2026 state contracts of propaganda-firm head Gyula Balásy) characterised the fiscal situation by saying that “even Péter Magyar may weep when he sees the figures”.

MIAK’s reading is simple and non-triumphalist: the 91 per cent deficit utilisation and the HUF 1,666 billion reallocation are not normal fiscal business as usual, but part of the outgoing government’s electoral and handover strategy. The soft budget constraint — the concept of János Kornai (Hungarian-born economist, originator of the soft budget constraint theory; Harvard professor 1986–2002): the losing economic agent is regularly bailed out by the state, so the agent’s behaviour is no longer tied to its own solvency — manifesting at the level of public finances is the classic Hungarian pattern of self-destructive end-of-cycle politics. The supplementary budget is therefore not merely a technical statute: it is the new government’s first public opening-balance act, that is, an itemised review of inherited liabilities, pending projects and uncovered promises. The historical precedent for this reallocation pattern is not new — both the 1994 and 2010 changes of government encountered similar handover situations — but the scale (HUF 1,666 billion, around two per cent of the estimated 2026 annual gross domestic product (GDP)) is unprecedented in the Third Hungarian Republic of parliamentary democracy.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth recording the scientific framework in which the 91 per cent deficit utilisation and the HUF 1,666 billion reallocation can be interpreted. János Kornai, in his 1980 work A hiány (Economics of Shortage), elaborated the concept of the soft budget constraint: where the persistent survival of the economic unit does not depend on its own solvency, the behavioural constraint “may be broken without trouble or consequences” — the real cost of resource management disappears from the decision-maker’s horizon. Compared with the original example of the socialist large enterprise, the Hungarian general government in 2026 displays an extreme form of political soft constraint: at the end of the electoral cycle, the cabinet has spent what a successor cabinet would have to recover. In Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson’s Why Nations Fail (2012) framework, this is the exit strategy of the extractive elite: at the moment of handover, the beneficiaries of extractive institutions realise even the remaining public funds as rent before inclusive institutions can sprout anew. The OECD’s Economic Outlook — Testing Resilience (2026) macro framework adds that the European financial situation is generally tightening in 2026 (energy-price shock, higher interest-rate environment) — Hungary’s domestic fiscal slippage therefore came at the wrong time. The detailed literature treatment — by author, with citations — is contained in section 6.4 Literature details.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable, deadline-bound measures within and alongside the supplementary budget. Their common principle: the supplementary budget should not merely be deficit management, but a transparency reset (reset) — the fiscal and institutional wounds of the legacy left by the outgoing government can be addressed simultaneously.

3.1 Public-money dashboard within 60 days — every 2025–2026 payment, item by item

As the first substantive annex of the supplementary budget, the government should launch within 60 days a public, machine-readable public-money dashboard that retroactively covers the entire budgetary years 2025 and 2026. Under MIAK’s joint G1 (data-driven budget) and A1 (public-money dashboard) proposal, every payment above HUF 100 million should appear on a separate line: beneficiary, legal basis, public-procurement procedure ID, payment date, share of EU co-financing. The HUF 1,666 billion reallocation (HVG 7 May 2026) will thus be traceable line by line: from which chapter to which, on what legal basis. In Kornai’s soft-constraint framework (see 6.4.1), the dashboard precisely restores the hard behavioural constraint: what we can see publicly is harder to abuse in the next cycle. Quantitative target: by end-2026, 100 per cent of 2025–2026 payments are accessible in itemised form; at least three independent newsrooms and research workshops integrate them into their own analytical pipelines.

3.2 Balásy–Tiborcz audit within three months — risk-weighted contract review

The state contracts linked to propaganda-firm head Gyula Balásy and the István Tiborcz circle in 2025–2026 — on the order of several thousand billion forints in value — must be subjected to an independent professional audit within three months. Under MIAK’s A2 (public-procurement transparency) proposal, the review starts with an AI-based anomaly detector (single-bidder procedures, price/m² benchmark values, artificially narrowed specifications), and the high-risk cases then enter itemised legal scrutiny. The aim is not political revenge, but fiscal recovery: based on the gap between the service in the contract and actual delivery, repayment, or referral to the public-prosecutor’s office in case of suspected criminal conduct. Under A6 (checks and balances), the audit is led by the State Audit Office (ÁSZ), with the direct presence of the prosecution service. Quantitative target: by 31 October 2026, the audit results of the top-50 highest-value contracts are public; in the first half of 2027, the recovered amount appears as a separate line on the financing side of the supplementary budget.

3.3 Recovery of EU Recovery Facility funds — with a conditional institutional reform package (within 12 months)

According to ATV’s analysis of 8 May 2026, part of the suspended Hungarian shares of the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) can be recovered — but only if the institutional conditions (rule of law, independence of the State Audit Office, prosecution-service reform, public-procurement transparency) show substantive improvement. Under MIAK’s A8 (cohesion-policy accountability) proposal, the government should submit to Brussels within 12 months an integrated reform package: A6 (checks and balances), G6 (anti-rent-seeking programme) and A2 jointly fulfilling the conditions necessary to avoid the EU’s Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and to lift the RRF suspension. MIAK reads the “money for reform” formula not as a political compromise, but as alignment with the Hungarian interest: the reform is worth doing in itself, the EU funds only accelerate the pace. Quantitative target: in the first half of 2027, a positive Brussels assessment for at least two RRF pillars; the resumption of EU disbursements covering at least 50 per cent of the total suspended amount. The professional backbone of the reform package consists of strengthening the State Audit Office (ÁSZ) and elevating the Fiscal Council into an independent fiscal institution (IFI), supplemented by organisational reform of the prosecution service and a transparency upgrade of the public-procurement system.

The common principle of the three proposals: the supplementary budget should not be the quiet ironing-out of burdens piled up by the outgoing government, but the quantified product of normalisation. In Kornai’s soft-budget-constraint framework, this is the restoration of the political hard constraint — and in the language of Acemoglu and Robinson, the reversal of the extractive elite’s exit strategy in favour of inclusive institutions.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Economy A transparent adjustment of the supplementary budget can stabilise the risk premium (spread) — the difference between a given government bond’s yield and the reference yield; a forint-yield decline could mean HUF 100–200 billion in annual interest savings The absence of “cool-headed” communication after the HUF 1,666 billion reallocation can lead to immediate activation of the EU’s Excessive Deficit Procedure, which can raise the financing cost by 0.5–1 percentage points per year
Society The public-money dashboard could generate restoration of public trust: the perceived level of transparency (Eurobarometer measurement) could improve by 10–15 percentage points in the medium term The Balásy–Tiborcz audit may slip into a political-revenge framing; if the inquiry does not stick to professional-legal frames, the targets may end up in martyr positions and the voting majority may tip
Public administration The data pipelines of the Ministry of Finance and the Hungarian State Treasury are modernised in line with dashboard requirements; the payment turnaround time may fall by 30–40 per cent The soft budget constraint, in Kornai’s sense, may also appear under the new government, if the resumption of the EU funding tap relieves the savings imperative; G15 counter-cyclical stabiliser is precisely meant to prevent this pattern
Foreign policy A positive Brussels assessment may also strengthen Hungary in the V4 constellation (the post-2023 Polish pattern); the operational phase of Tisza–EU bargaining has been under way since the run-up to the 8 May 2026 inaugural session The supporters of the outgoing Orbán cabinet may frame EU-side conditionality as a Brussels diktat, which may strengthen the domestic opposition position into the 2030 electoral cycle

The main dilemma is the balance between speed and sustainability. Rapid adoption of the supplementary budget (within 90 days) carries political-symbolic value, but the hidden risk of a quick fix is that it postpones the structural problems (restoration of the soft constraint, systematic review of rent-seeking contracts). MIAK’s position: speed is not a value in itself — the structure and transparency of the supplementary budget are the yardstick. A rapidly adopted but not detailed supplementary budget will easily generate further supplementary budgets in the next cycle (2027–2030); a slower but structurally clean supplementary budget, in contrast, will lay the multi-year groundwork for fiscal normalisation.

A second, more subtle dilemma is the balance between the use of the domestic political mandate and the market communication message. If the narrative of the supplementary budget focuses too much on the responsibility of the outgoing government (this may be politically justified, since the voter legitimacy is built on this 2026 mandate), signals may emerge on the investor side towards political instability — which is contrary to the goal of reducing the risk premium. MIAK’s recommended communication band is therefore: a frame that is hard on the past in numbers, but focused on institutional reforms going forward. The responsibility of the outgoing government is factually anchored in the figures; the new government’s narrative can be positioned along recovery and restoration, rather than revenge and revision.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed key performance indicators (KPIs))

The proposed indicators of the effectiveness of the supplementary budget and the transparency reset for a 12–24-month horizon:

  • Annual general-government deficit relative to gross domestic product (GDP): the deviation of the 2026 closing deficit-ratio from the planned (modified supplementary-budget) target. Target: the actual deficit-ratio stays within ±0.5 percentage points (pp) of the supplementary-budget target.
  • Amount recovered from the Balásy–Tiborcz audit: public funds repaid following audit findings or recovered through court proceedings, expressed in billion HUF, shown as a separate line on the financing side of the supplementary budget. Target: at least HUF 200 billion recovered in the first half of 2027.
  • Disbursement ratio of the EU Recovery Facility: what proportion of the suspended RRF resources has been freed up on the basis of compliance with EU conditionality. Target: by mid-2027, the launching of disbursements for at least 50 per cent of the total suspended amount.
  • Public-money dashboard usage indicators: the public dashboard’s monthly unique-user count; the number of analyses based on dashboard data published by independent newsrooms and research centres. Target: in the first half of 2027, 100,000 monthly unique users and at least 20 independent analyses.
  • Independent fiscal institution (IFI — Independent Fiscal Institution) assessment: the annual evaluation of the Fiscal Council and/or a re-established independent fiscal institution on the sustainability of the supplementary budget and the subsequent 2027 original budget. Target: positive or “improving” assessment for both budgetary cycles.

5.2 Summary

The supplementary budget is not a question of political success or failure, but of fiscal diagnosis and therapy: the 91 per cent deficit utilisation and the HUF 1,666 billion reallocation accumulated by the outgoing government are a hard, quantifiable legacy. MIAK’s request to the new government is simple: let the structure of the supplementary budget be the professional foundation of the normalisation lasting until 2030, not the campaign device of the next political cycle. The three proposals — public-money dashboard, Balásy–Tiborcz audit, recovery of EU funds with a conditional reform package — together rest on a single principle: restoring the soft-constraint is the precondition for lasting consolidation, and this restoration is possible only publicly and measurably.

Among MIAK’s foundational values, transparency and data-drivenness are the two most directly involved in this topic: fiscal normalisation is not a matter of political rhetoric, but of every public-money flow being machine-readable, verifiable and traceable in real time. Here “accountability” is not a slogan but the actual rule-set of the coming years: the outcome of the Balásy–Tiborcz audit and the State Audit Office’s investigations will tell us whether the 2026 fiscal legacy is consigned to the past, or reproduced in a new form by the new government.

Part VI — Justifications and additional sources

6.1 Press framing across the spectrum

Liberal-left (HVG, 444.hu, Telex, Népszava): the focus is on quantifying the inherited fiscal burden and the outgoing government’s pre-election asset reallocation. HVG’s 8 May 2026 headline — “The Fidesz government has completely fleeced the till, by end-April 91 per cent of the annual plan was hit” — sharply pushes the responsibility question forward. The HVG analysis of 7 May 2026 (“This is how the Orbán government moved HUF 1,666 billion in this year’s budget before handing power to Péter Magyar”) itemises the inter-chapter reallocations. HVG’s 10 May 2026 analysis linking to Gyula Balásy joins the two cases: the propaganda contracts and the fiscal situation are part of a common NER-asset-extraction pattern.

Public-affairs (24.hu, ATV): schedule and fact-reporting focus. ATV’s video summary of 8 May 2026 (“The money is there, only not in the state till but with someone”) provides a plain-language narrative of the over-90-per-cent deficit utilisation, and accompanies it with a separate analysis on the risk of partial loss of EU funds (“In vain TISZA tries, part of the EU money may still be lost”). This band works with less framing and more pure fact-reporting.

Economic (Portfolio): professional-analytical tone. Portfolio’s article of 8 May 2026 (“The data is in: the Tisza government takes over the budget in horrendous condition”) and the Portfolio podcast of 8 May 2026 (“The till echoes empty after Fidesz — what can Tisza do?”) interpret the situation from the market-investor perspective: what the fiscal legacy means for risk premia, the forint exchange rate and the 2026–2027 economic path. Portfolio’s article on the Kármán announcement of 9 May 2026 frames the supplementary budget as an orderly, technical act — deliberately with a stabilisation emphasis. Portfolio’s analysis of 8 May 2026 on the last-day-before-the-election Szerencsejáték Zrt. payments is a concrete micro-case of one NER channel.

Government-aligned / conservative (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner): on this day the band did not bring the topic into top focus — the choreography of the parliamentary inauguration and the personnel disputes around the Tisza cabinet dominated. Where the fiscal topic was touched, the framing was typically a “Tisza-inherited crisis, not a Fidesz legacy” narrative reversal — yet the band on the days under review did not have substantive article-level analysis. This absence is itself a signal: the postponement of an important policy topic shows that the band this week focused on the defensive framing of the inauguration narrative, not on an independent analysis of the fiscal legacy.

International (AP, Bloomberg, Reuters, Financial Times): in the days under review, the Hungarian supplementary-budget announcement appeared as a stand-alone item in the international financial press — the focus was on Central and Eastern European investor risk premia (spreads) and on forint volatility tied to compliance with EU-funds conditionality. This band typically communicates moderately: the 91 per cent deficit utilisation should be recorded as a negative fiscal starting point, while the Kármán announcement is to be evaluated as a positive, expected step.

The spectrum difference therefore runs along the responsibility narrative: the liberal-left and economic bands hold the outgoing government responsible for the legacy, the government-aligned band pushes the topic into the background while building expectations of the new government.

6.2 Facts and data

Indicator Value Source
Annual deficit-envelope utilisation by end-April 2026 91% Ministry of Finance general-government report, 8 May 2026
Pre-election budget reallocation (2026) HUF 1,666 billion HVG 7 May 2026
Supplementary-budget announcement 9 May 2026 Portfolio (András Kármán)
New finance minister (Tisza cabinet) András Kármán Tisza Party announcement, 21 April 2026
Hungary’s current WGI control-of-corruption indicator -0.17 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024
Hungary’s current WGI government-effectiveness +0.42 World Bank WGI 2024
Pre-election Szerencsejáték Zrt. payment peak HUF 1.3 billion / day HVG 8 May 2026

6.3 Policy aspects

The topic directly concerns two MIAK policy areas:

  • Economy (programme points and background) — data-driven budget, anti-rent-seeking programme, counter-cyclical fiscal stabiliser; the sub-chapters on fiscal capacity, EU funds and deficit management.
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points and background) — public-money dashboard, public-procurement transparency, cohesion-policy accountability, strengthening of checks and balances.

Secondarily affected are Public administration and e-government (modernisation of the data pipelines of the Ministry of Finance and the Hungarian State Treasury), and Justice (independence of the prosecutorial and judicial phases of the Balásy–Tiborcz audit).

6.4 Literature details

6.4.1 János Kornai: Economics of Shortage

János Kornai’s foundational work, A hiány (Economics of Shortage), published in 1980, was the first systematic description of the systemic shortage dynamics of the socialist economy, and from it began the international literature career of the soft budget constraint concept. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 of the book detail the logic of the concept: where the persistent survival of the firm (or other economic unit) does not depend on its own solvency, the behavioural constraint “may be virtually as hard as the physical constraint, or moderate, or expressly soft, that is, may be broken without trouble or consequences” — and “the soft behavioural constraint (apart from exceptional cases) is never effective”.

“An economic unit that has a soft budget constraint, that is, whose persistent survival [does not depend on its own solvency], will not in its behaviour assert the hard constraint of solvency.”

In the case of Hungarian general government in 2026, this concept manifests as a political soft constraint: at the end of the electoral cycle, the outgoing cabinet does not feel its own solvency constraint, because it knows that in the next cycle the bill will be paid by another government. The HUF 1,666 billion reallocation and the 91 per cent deficit utilisation are precisely the classic Kornai-type pattern of soft constraint. MIAK’s 3.1 (public-money dashboard) and 3.2 (Balásy–Tiborcz audit) proposals restore the hard behavioural constraint at the political level: what we can see publicly and hold to account is harder to abuse in the next cycle.

📖 Source: János Kornai: A hiány (Economics of Shortage, 1980).

6.4.2 Acemoglu, D. — Robinson, J. A.: Why Nations Fail

The 2012 work of Acemoglu (Turkish-American economist, 2024 Nobel Memorial Prize laureate in economics) and Robinson works with the dichotomy of inclusive and extractive economic-political institutions. Extractive institutions concentrate power in the hands of a narrow elite and allow capital and income to be drawn out at the expense of the majority — the HUF 1,666 billion pre-election reallocation in 2026 fits this type. In the authors’ line of thought, the critical moment comes when an extractive regime hands over power: three scenarios are then possible. (1) The new coalition itself becomes extractive, only with a different beneficiary network. (2) The old elite’s exit strategy — outsourcing the remaining public funds as rent — is successful, and inclusive institutions cannot grow stronger. (3) The new coalition undertakes substantive inclusive-institutional reform, which underpins the growth path for the years ahead.

“Poor countries are poor for the same reason as Egypt is poor. […] Rich countries became rich because their citizens overthrew the elites holding power, and built a society in which […] the government was held accountable and felt responsible to the citizens.”

The Hungarian supplementary budget of 2026, in this framework, is the new government’s first institutional test: whether the choice is scenario 3 (inclusive-institutional reform), or a softer version (permitted exit of the old elite + minimal cosmetic reform). MIAK’s 3.2 (Balásy–Tiborcz audit) and 3.3 (EU conditional reform package) proposals together represent the operational steps of scenario 3. Acemoglu and Robinson explicitly warn: the build-up of inclusive institutions does not follow automatically from the handover of power — active, measurable institutional steps are required, and the voter legitimacy (the 70.85 per cent mandate share) provides a rare political space for this now, the squandering of which would carry serious long-term growth costs.

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu — James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail.

6.4.3 OECD: Economic Outlook — Testing Resilience (2026)

The OECD’s 2026 interim Economic Outlook report provides the framework for the global and European fiscal situation in 2026: the energy-price shock, the higher interest-rate environment and the upward shift in medium-term inflation expectations everywhere narrow member states’ budgetary space. The report explicitly notes that fiscal actions to cushion the impact of energy costs add to the pressures on the public finances, that is, energy-crisis mitigation packages already strain public finances in the majority of member states. Hungary arrives on this 2026 path with a worse-than-EU-average fiscal starting point (91 per cent deficit utilisation in April, HUF 1,666 billion reallocation) — meaning that the OECD-level adjustment pressure here is stronger than in other member states.

“Fiscal actions to cushion the impact of energy costs add to the pressures on the public finances.”

The Hungarian supplementary budget cannot therefore be interpreted in the international OECD framework as an exceptional adjustment — other member states face similar dilemmas. The difference is not in the necessity of the adjustment, but in the severity of the starting point: the pressure on Hungary is greater here, and the investor-confidence risk (risk premium, forint volatility) is also more direct. MIAK’s 3.3 (EU conditional reform package) proposal is meant precisely to narrow this international–Hungarian path gap.

📖 Source: OECD: Economic Outlook — Testing Resilience (March 2026).

6.5 International comparison

Two recent European examples of post-election fiscal normalisation: Poland (the post-2023 Tusk government) and Slovakia (the post-2018 transition government after the Kuciak murder). The fiscal side of the Polish example is instructive: the 2024 Polish supplementary budget subjected the Ministry of Finance’s pre-election payments to itemised audit, and shaped the structure of the 2025 original budget along inclusive-institutional lines from the outset — the recovery of EU funds has gradually resumed since mid-2024. The weaker performance of the Slovak transition government (short mandate, little political space) shows that a stable, multi-year governmental cycle is also necessary for fiscal normalisation — a one-off supplementary budget is not enough.

The Scandinavian pattern (the Swedish fiscal framework since 1997) is a long-term lesson: a rule-based, counter-cyclical fiscal stabiliser (G15) and an independent fiscal institution (Finanspolitiska rådet) keep the public finances at hard-constraint level independent of political cycles. Hungary is not yet ready for this path, but the structure of the supplementary budget will now decide whether the coming cycle moves towards it. On the international yardstick of the fiscal transparency index (OBI — Open Budget Index), the Hungarian value has gradually deteriorated over the past decade; the structure of the supplementary budget and the introduction of the dashboard alongside it could also bring measurable OBI improvement by 2027–2028, which would be a stand-alone investor-confidence signal.

The Greek 2010–2018 case is a cautionary example — not as a model, but as a counterpoint. The Greek fiscal normalisation evolved uncontrollably from the collision of the trio of political legitimacy, EU conditionality and societal tolerance, and the Greek voter majority framed EU-fund conditionality as a Brussels diktat. The Hungarian situation in 2026 is structurally different: the new government itself announced the supplementary budget and the alignment with EU conditionality, and the 70.85 per cent electoral mandate also secures the domestic-political legitimacy of fiscal normalisation. The Greek counterpoint is therefore a lesson for communication, not a template for execution.

Economy

  • G1 — Data-driven budget (Open Fiscal Data Package, real-time API)
  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture
  • G15 — Counter-cyclical fiscal stabiliser (rule-based mechanism)
  • G20 — Economic-policy impact assessment system (Drucker audit)
  • G23 — Public-debt sustainability framework

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard (real-time, machine-readable)
  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency (AI-based anomaly detector)
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances (independence of ÁSZ, prosecution, Constitutional Court)
  • A8 — Cohesion-policy accountability (full RRF monitoring)

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 10 May 2026 — topic 2, score: 92/100):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 János Kornai: A hiány (Economics of Shortage, 1980)
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu — James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail
  • 📖 OECD: Economic Outlook — Testing Resilience (March 2026)

Note: the local file path of the book does not appear in the visible text of the blog — only the author and title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process, not for the reader.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point IDs: G1, G6, G15, G20, G23)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point IDs: A1, A2, A6, A8)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (background — fiscal capacity, EU funds, deficit management)
  • MIAK press monitor, 10 May 2026 — topic 2, score: 92/100

Additional public data sources:

  • Ministry of Finance — monthly general-government report (8 May 2026)
  • Fiscal Council — annual report and statements
  • State Audit Office — annual report 2025
  • European Commission — fiscal surveillance and Excessive Deficit Procedure
  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024
  • Hungarian State Treasury — monthly budgetary payment statistics

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