Part I — Situation overview

A week before the parliamentary inaugural session of 9 May 2026, a confrontation of constitutional significance emerged between the outgoing government and the President of the Republic. The subject of the dispute is the April 2026 judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-769/22: the court ruled with final force that the 2021 Hungarian “child protection” law amendment violates EU law — particularly the prohibition of discrimination, respect for private and family life, and freedom of expression and information. The court recognised that child protection may be a legitimate goal, but the concrete measures (foiling of LGBTI+ content, restriction of media-market access) “go beyond this and are discriminatory in nature”. The judgment is final, no appeal is available — Hungary must repeal those provisions which violate EU law. From the blocked EU funds, about EUR 700–800 million is unavailable to the country due to this law.

The confrontation took shape in two steps. On 2 May 2026 (Saturday), outgoing prime minister Viktor Orbán wrote a long letter to President Tamás Sulyok, in which he announced that the Fidesz government will not execute the European Court’s decision. The letter was published by future parliamentary group leader Gergely Gulyás on his social-media page. Orbán’s argument has three pillars: (i) according to him, the court took a political decision, which raises EU-law and constitutional-law concerns; (ii) by referring to internal-market regulation, the court empties the educational competence of member states (although the Treaties classify this area into member-state competence); (iii) the court disregarded the family conception of the Fundamental Law (which says a person is “either a man or a woman”). The closing thought of the letter: the judgment “raises serious damage to member-state sovereignty and constitutional identity”, so the government will not execute the decision.

On 4 May 2026 (Monday), in his official reply published on his social-media page, President Tamás Sulyok contradicted the outgoing prime minister. Sulyok writes, “Following the judgment of the European Court, the national legislative task arising from the principle of legal certainty is to develop a legislative solution that, alongside maintaining the appropriate level of legal protection of children, is able to create a sufficient harmony of EU law, the constitutional requirements of the Fundamental Law and the relevant international legal provisions, by ensuring an equitable balance”. The head of state expects the representatives of the parties admitted to parliament as a result of the election and the new government taking office to fulfil this in a manner reassuring also from the perspective of social expectations. In his Facebook post Sulyok added: he wishes to work in a partnership relationship with the new government, and is confident that the cooperation duty of constitutional bodies will be jointly enforced.

The debate marks a constitutional risk. The public-law order of forming a government is clear: the parliamentary majority (the Tisza parliamentary group with 141 mandates) elects the prime minister at the inaugural session, and the President of the Republic appoints the ministers at the prime minister’s proposal. The primacy of EU law is directly enforceable in the Hungarian legal order on the basis of Article E of the Fundamental Law — this is not a political question, but a treaty obligation. In MIAK’s reading, the substantive thesis of the debate is: in the days of the change of government, the President activates the duty of cooperation of constitutional bodies, while the outgoing prime minister, by refusing execution, anchors a risk into the inheritance of the new government. The solution is not rhetorical positioning, but the legislative repeal of the contested law provisions — this is a step technically performable in the first week of the change of government.

Part II — Literature foundation

The interpretation of the debate becomes complete in the framework of three modern legal-theoretical and constitutional-theoretical foundational texts. H. L. A. Hart (Oxford legal philosopher, one of the most influential legal-theoretical thinkers of the 20th century) in his The Concept of Law (1961) analyses the legal system through the distinction of primary rules and secondary rules; among them, the rule of recognition sets out what counts as valid law in the given legal system — and Article E of the Hungarian Fundamental Law itself elevates EU law into the domestic rule of recognition. Hans Kelsen (Austrian-American legal philosopher, founder of the pure theory of law) in his Pure Theory of Law (1934, 1960) orders the legal-source hierarchy in a Grundnorm pyramid; since Costa v ENEL (1964), the Kelsenian hierarchy extends to the European level, where EU law stands above member-state rules. Joseph Weiler (European constitutional theory) in The Constitution of Europe (1999) discusses in detail the relationship between constitutional identity and the primacy of EU law, and warns: the “constitutional identity” argument is legitimate, but cannot empty the application of binding EU law — where this is the danger, the member-state constitutional court or court enters into dialogue with the European Court, instead of calling for unilateral refusal of execution. The detailed literature treatment is contained in section 6.4 Literature details.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measures, building on each other, for the structural closure of the constitutional debate. The time horizon of the proposals differs: the first concerns the first week of the parliamentary inaugural session, the third concerns an institutional pattern maturing over years.

3.1 Repeal of the contested law provisions (first week of the inaugural session)

MIAK proposes that parliament, in the first week following the 9 May 2026 inaugural session, submit and adopt the omnibus law that repeals the provisions of the 2021 “child protection” law contested by the European Court in Case C-769/22. The legislative schedule: (i) the future ministry of justice prepares the repeal within 72 hours, exactly following the formulations of the court judgment; (ii) parliament places it on the agenda within an urgent procedure on the first sitting day after the inaugural session; (iii) the debate also takes into account the recommendations of the Venice Commission. The protection of children as a legitimate goal is not sacrificed — the court itself recorded this; the new law ensures the protection of children within the framework of age-based access restrictions and transparent media regulation, without repeating the stigmatising patterns regarding LGBTI+ content. The proposal serves the cleanness of the Hartian rule of recognition (see 6.4.1) — the primacy of EU law in the Hungarian legal order is settled on the basis of Article E of the Fundamental Law.

3.2 Application for technical release of the EUR 700–800 million blocked funding (within 30 days)

MIAK proposes that the new government, within 30 days following the repeal, turn to the European Commission with an official application for the technical release of the EUR 700–800 million blocked due to the 2021 “child protection” law. The content of the application: (i) the textual attachment of the repealing law; (ii) implementation calendar fitting into the Commission’s rule-of-law conditionality system; (iii) offering an independent monitoring mechanism for Commission-traceable execution. The direct policy effect of the application: the released funds can be channelled into the existing cohesion-funds drawdown schedule, for concrete transport, healthcare and education investments (see the parallel blog on EU funds and EPPO accession). The proposal is the public-administration operationalisation of the Kelsenian legal-source hierarchy (see 6.4.2): enforcement of the hierarchy between the member-state legal system and the European legal system through the financing mechanism.

3.3 Precedent-setting application of Article 9 of the Fundamental Law — Presidential cooperation clause (12-24 month pattern recording)

Tamás Sulyok’s reply of 4 May 2026 substantively activated the duty of cooperation of constitutional bodies — this duty is recorded indirectly by the Fundamental Law, and directly in the general principles of European law and international law. MIAK proposes that the new government and parliament, within 12-24 months, anchor the operational pattern according to which the President’s request for cooperation in EU-law debates receives systematic institutional arrangement: (i) between the Office of the President of the Republic and the government, a coordination protocol should be prepared for every EU Court penalty proceeding (TFEU Article 260) case; (ii) the relevant parliamentary committee should place on the agenda the legislative schedule following Presidential messages; (iii) the communications protocol takes special account of the constitutional dignity of the Presidential role (the President is not a governmental actor — head of state, with an independent constitutional position). The proposal is the domestic operationalisation of the Weilerian constitutional-identity-debate dialogue model (see 6.4.3) — not unilateral refusal, but structured legal-legislative cooperation.

The three proposals together draw a gradually deepening rule-of-law restoration: the repeal in days, the release of funds in months, the recording of the constitutional pattern in one to two years. All three are based on the treaty interpretation of the rule of law: the primacy of EU law is not a political choice, but a treaty obligation — and the Presidential request for cooperation records its constitutional loyalty pattern rule.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Budget Release of the EUR 700–800 million is the new government’s first major EU-funds success; it arrives onto the Hungarian GDP path within 12-18 months. The repeal omnibus law may trigger political debates; with the Tisza parliamentary group’s 141 mandates it is technically passable, but the communications framing requires consciousness.
Rule of law Worldwide Governance Indicators and EU Rule of Law Report indicators improve; the first significant milestone of Hungarian rule-of-law restoration. The repeal may be selective — if parliament does only the minimum, the rule-of-law debate reopens. The text must be prepared exactly following the formulations of the court judgment.
EU relationship The relationship with the Commission and the European Court normalises; the Presidential cooperation gets a precedent character. If the Presidential cooperation pattern remains purely rhetorical, it can be reversed by later governments. MIAK proposes the legislative anchoring of the coordination protocol.
Society The rights protection system aligns with the European pattern; the rights protection of the LGBTI+ community is recognised in anti-discrimination regulation. The “child protection” narrative — although the court itself recognised it as a legitimate goal — may become politically instrumentalised. MIAK proposes that alongside the repeal, in parallel, a substantively strong, European-pattern-based child-protection regulation be born.

The common element of the four dimensions: the risks are manageable with transitional mechanisms — precise legislative text, parliamentary public hearing (see the proposals of the 4 May 2026 brother-in-law debate blog), conscious communications framing. The risk of NON-action is much greater: if the repeal is dragged out, the EUR 700–800 million is lost, the risk of penalty proceedings remains, and the starting step of Hungarian rule-of-law restoration is missed.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed performance indicators — KPIs)

In one year (May 2027) it is recommended to look at four indicators:

  1. Legal status of the contested law provisions: repealed yes/no; textual agreement of the repealing law with the formulations of the court judgment. Target: 100% repeal of the contested provisions of the 2021 law.
  2. Pace of release of the EUR 700–800 million: date of the Commission’s technical unblock, pace of actual drawdown, and targeted project allocation of the funds. Target: technical release within 90 days from the repeal, and 50% drawdown of the funds within 18 months.
  3. Status of the EU penalty proceedings: termination of the penalty proceedings under TFEU Article 260 after the fact of the repeal. Target: penalty proceedings terminated within 6 months.
  4. Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) — Rule of Law indicator: the World Bank’s annual rule-of-law indicator for Hungary. Target: above +0.40 (2024 value: +0.35 — full catch-up takes 4–5 years, but substantive movement is measurable within 12 months too).

5.2 Summary

The constitutional confrontation of the week preceding the inaugural session of 9 May 2026 — Viktor Orbán’s letter and Tamás Sulyok’s reply — formulates a precise policy request to the new parliament and the new government. MIAK asks that parliament, in the first week of the inaugural session, repeal those provisions of the 2021 “child protection” law that the Court of Justice of the European Union found unlawful in Case C-769/22; that the government, within 30 days, apply to the Commission for the technical release of the EUR 700–800 million blocked funding; and that, within 12–24 months, the precedent-setting pattern rule of the cooperation clause of constitutional bodies in EU-law debates be anchored. The proposals operationalise the transparency and accountability foundational values: transparency, because the relationship with the Commission is settled and publicly documented, and accountability, because the Hungarian legal system, through Article E of the Fundamental Law, has recognised the primacy of EU law by treaty since Costa v ENEL — this must apply also in concrete cases under penalty proceedings.

Part VI — Justifications and additional sources

6.1 Press framing across the spectrum

Liberal-left band (Telex, HVG, 24.hu, 444.hu, Népszava). Telex handled Sulyok’s reply at the level of leading news (“Sulyok replied to Orbán, who is unwilling to execute the European Court’s decision”). HVG reported Orbán’s letter on Saturday (“Orbán announced: they will not execute the European Court’s ruling on the ‘child protection’ law”), and on Monday Sulyok’s reply (“Sulyok replied to Orbán in the matter of the so-called child-protection law that was struck down”). 24.hu highlighted the constitutional confrontation (“Tamás Sulyok contradicted Orbán”); 444.hu expressly recorded the breakdown of the partnership relationship (“Orbán would still wage a rearguard fight with Brussels in the ‘child protection’ matter, Sulyok is no longer a partner to this”). Népszava published the Presidential reply independently. The liberal-left band thus clearly brought the Sulyok position to the foreground.

Economic band (Portfolio). Portfolio (“Tamás Sulyok has spoken on child protection”) emphasised, with matter-of-fact reporting, the budgetary side of the debate as well — it expressly addressed the question of the EUR 700–800 million blocked funding.

Conservative band (Mandiner, Magyar Nemzet). Mandiner reported Sulyok’s reply with the quote “expressed his sincere hope” ("‘Expressed his sincere hope’ — Tamás Sulyok replied to Viktor Orbán’s letter") — the presentation reinforced the partnership-future pattern, did not oppose the Presidential reply. Magyar Nemzet did not bring the debate as a leading story on this day, which shows the silent positioning dilemma of the conservative band: defence of Orbán’s position of execution refusal is difficult, while attacking the Sulyok position would touch the institution of the head of state.

Across the entire spectrum the Sulyok reply received substantive emphasis. The restraint of the conservative band signals the new press dynamic of the change-of-government power transition: the conflicts of constitutional bodies are not covered by the rhetorical positions of the outgoing government.

6.2 Facts and data

  • EU Court Case C-769/22 (April 2026 final judgment): the amendment of the 2021 “child protection” law violates Article 2 TEU (fundamental values), Article 4(3) TEU loyalty clause, Articles 7, 11, 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (private and family life, expression of opinion, prohibition of discrimination).
  • Amount of EU funding blocked due to this law: about EUR 700–800 million (according to HVG 4 May 2026 communication).
  • Tisza parliamentary group mandate count: 141 (NVI 19 April 2026 finalisation) — technical majority for repeal.
  • Article E of the Fundamental Law: the domestic constitutional basis of the direct application of EU law (accession treaty + Union treaties). According to Article E, Hungary’s EU membership is a constitutional-level commitment — the obligation to execute the judgment derives from this, not from political consideration.
  • Tamás Sulyok, President of the Republic, took his oath of office in February 2024; with the appointment of President Katalin Novák in 2022, the TEK protects the head of state too.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Justice (programme points) — primacy of EU law, duty of cooperation of constitutional bodies, rule-of-law restoration;
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — EU-Hungary relationship arrangement, cooperation with the EU Commission, handling of penalty proceedings;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (background material) — EU funds compliance framework system, rule-of-law conditionality system.

6.4 Literature details

6.4.1 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

Hart’s basic thesis: the modern legal system is not merely a system of commands (Austin), but a complex cooperation of two types of rules. Primary rules directly regulate behaviour (e.g. don’t kill, pay taxes); secondary rules concern the primary rules themselves — among them, the rule of recognition sets out what counts as valid law in the given legal system. According to Hart, “the unity and validity of the legal system are ultimately ensured by the rule of recognition, which determines the sources from which we recognise the rules as legal rules”. This is directly applicable to the Hungarian–EU legal debate: Article E of the Fundamental Law is itself the rule-of-recognition-level statement that recognises EU law as a valid source of the Hungarian legal order; this cannot be overridden through unilateral refusal of execution, because then in the Hartian sense the legal system comes into contradiction with itself — the domestic rule of recognition itself would recognise EU law, while the government would refuse execution. The Sulyok reply substantively formulates exactly this Hartian coherence requirement.

📖 Source: H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961, Hungarian edition 1995)

6.4.2 Hans Kelsen: Pure Theory of Law

Kelsen’s pure theory of law describes the legal system as a hierarchical rule pyramid, at the apex of which stands the Grundnorm — the basic norm. According to Kelsen, “the validity of every legal norm can be linked to a higher-ranking norm, and this hierarchy orders the legal-source ranking”. Since the Costa v ENEL (1964) judgment — which Article E of the Hungarian Fundamental Law implicitly accepts — European law enters the member-state Grundnorm pyramid as a level above the member-state rules. This is not a political decision, but the contractual choice of the Hungarian constitutional system: with the ratification of the 2003 accession treaty, Hungary recognised the EU level of the Kelsenian hierarchy. The “constitutional identity” argument (Orbán letter) provides no legal basis in Kelsen’s system to override the European level — at most it can be raised in a dialogue framework, where the Hungarian Constitutional Court enters into a consultative relationship with the Luxembourg court. Unilateral refusal of execution is not dialogue, but an attempt to terminate the Grundnorm pyramid — which in the Kelsenian framework would be equivalent to terminating the membership relationship, not modifying the membership relationship internally.

📖 Source: Hans Kelsen: Pure Theory of Law (1934, 1960, English edition University of California Press, 1967)

6.4.3 Joseph Weiler: The Constitution of Europe

Weiler’s European constitutional theory discusses in detail the relationship between member-state constitutional identity and the primacy of EU law. “Member-state constitutional identity is a legitimate argument in European legal debates — but not a shield that suspends the application of European law. The dialogue model is what links the two levels: the member-state court asks the European court within preliminary ruling proceedings, and the two levels build a common law-application standard.” The Hungarian “constitutional identity” (Article R of the Fundamental Law) argument can be located within Weiler’s framework, but unilateral refusal of execution violates the Weilerian dialogue model. The Sulyok reply substantively corresponds to the Weilerian dialogue model — it records a cooperation clause, equitable balance, the legislative task of parliament. The concrete Hungarian operationalisation of the Weilerian model is one of the structural tasks of the new government’s first month — the systematic application of the Presidential cooperation under Article 9 of the Fundamental Law in EU-law debates (see proposal 3.3).

📖 Source: Joseph H. H. Weiler: The Constitution of Europe: “Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?” and Other Essays on European Integration (Cambridge University Press, 1999)

6.5 International comparison

Germany (Karlsruhe-Luxembourg dialogue). The decade-long dialogue between the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the EU Court (Solange doctrine) is precisely the model example of the Weilerian model: the German constitutional court has never unilaterally refused the execution of EU law, but entered into consultative relationship within preliminary ruling proceedings. Poland (2021 constitutional court ruling and penalty proceedings). The counter-example: the Polish TK’s 2021 ruling, which declared certain provisions of European law unconstitutional, led to penalty proceedings and blocked EU funds — Hungary is currently facing this scenario in connection with the EUR 700–800 million, and on the basis of TFEU Article 260, a daily growing penalty risk is in place. The Hungarian path is successful if, after the repeal, the penalty proceedings can be terminated — in contrast to the Polish pattern, where political rhetoric continued to conserve the dispute.

Justice

  • I4 — structural reform of judicial and constitutional-court independence
  • I7 — Venice Commission recommendations execution mechanism

Foreign policy

  • KP4 — principled pragmatism in the EU-Hungary relationship
  • KP7 — EU-law dispute settlement and management of penalty proceedings

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A8 — domestic introduction of the EU funds compliance framework system

Proposed new programme point: Presidential cooperation clause in EU-law debates — coordination protocol — to the Justice area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 5 May 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961)
  • 📖 Hans Kelsen: Pure Theory of Law (1934, 1960; English edition University of California Press, 1967)
  • 📖 Joseph H. H. Weiler: The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1999)
  • 📖 TEU/TFEU consolidated version (2012) — particularly Article 2 TEU, Article 4(3) loyalty clause, Article 19; Article 260 TFEU (penalty proceedings)
  • 📖 András Sajó: Constitutional questions of human dignity — background material

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4, I7)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP4, KP7)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A8)
  • MIAK press monitor, 5 May 2026 — topic 2, score: 80/100

Additional public data sources:

  • European Commission RRF reports (Hungary rule-of-law conditionality system); Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 (World Bank); EU Rule of Law Report 2025; Venice Commission — Joint Opinion on Hungary 2022, 2024.

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